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Abstract
This essay explores freedom of religion or belief starting with religious and philosophical
overview and elaborating especially on manifestations of religion or belief, and conﬂicts
with other rights and freedoms guaranteed on national, European and international level
(such as freedom of expression or right to education). It challenges division of religious
freedom on forum internum and forum externum as being inappropriate to holistic per-
ception of religion by many believers.
The essay focuses predominantly on the European Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the caselaw of the European Court of
Human Rights which is interpreting and complementing the Convention. It also gives a
brief overview of freedom of religion in the European Union (antidiscrimination legis-
lation) and the United Nations and depicts their instruments for the protection of the
freedom.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introduction
Recent years have been marked with emergence of religious feelings among people in
regions that had considered religious times to be mere history. Awoken religiousness
among people living in Europe for a long time in conjuction with immigration of reli-
gious people needed just a short time to come into tension with proclaimed European
secularism.
For Europe is proud to respect deeply held religious feelings and beliefs. However, when it
comes to expressing these beliefs in public and living religion out, one gets into conﬂict
with neutrality of public sphere.
This essey argues that for majority of religions, living them faithfully means not to
diﬀerentiate between forum internum and forum externum. Once a religious person tries
to live religion in its fullness he or she might get into conﬂict with secular European
societies. There are some (typical) coﬂicting areas that deserves a special attention, so
this essay tries to brieﬂy address them.
One of the major topics in the media recently has been conﬂict of freedom of religion
with freedom of expression, especially after cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad were
published in various countries. Another area of long term struggles has been education
with question raised such as extent of religious information contained in public education
schemes, possibilities of religiously neutral education or following religious classes of
particular religions in particular countries.
Although religious symbols were (have been) used all around Europe as part of (Chris-
tian) cultural heritage, arrival of new religions requiring to be symbolically present in
public brought endless discussions on which symbols and to what extent are allowed in
a particular context.
It might seem that religious aﬃliation is something static. However, for majority of
believers, religious life forms a sort of journey. Usually people stay for their whole
spriritual journey inside one religious system; however, there might be times of total
reconsideration1 and person might end up belonging to another religion. Thus question
of proselytism arises, especially when one's personnal change is inﬂuenced by another
individual. Approach to this question diﬀeres from one religious school to another, from
court to court; therefore it might be valuable to try to understand some of the positions.
This essay tries to depict diﬀerent understanding to religion and aforementioned contro-
versies in relation to legislation and case-law of various organs of the Council of Europe,
the United Nations and the European Union. It tries to understand some of the tenden-
cies present (if any) and formulate possible ways for the future.
As issues connected to religion and religious freedom are sometimes higly controversial
and large variety of opinions exists, it is worth noting that this essay very much reﬂects its
1Total change of one's ways of thinking and living is represented e.g. in Christianity by concept of
metanoia.
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
author who has background in Christian theology, is practising Christian, and is actively
engaged in inter-religious dialogue (especially Christian-Muslim dialogue).
Let us conclude this introduction with quoting John Witte on relation of human rights
and religions:
Human rights norms provide no panacea to the world crisis, but they are a
critical part of any solution. Religions are not easy allies to engage, but the
struggle for human rights cannot be won without them. For human rights
norms are inherently abstract ideals  universal statements of the good life
and the good society. They depend upon the visions of human communities
and institutions to give them content and coherence, to provide the scale of
values governing their exercise and concrete manifestation. Religion is an
ineradicable condition of human lives and communities; religions invariably
provide universal sources and scales of values by which many persons and
communities govern themselves. Religions must thus be seen as indispensable
allies in the modern struggle for human rights. To exclude them from the
struggle is impossible, and indeed catastrophic. To include them  to enlist
their unique resources and protect their unique rights  is vital to enhancing
and advancing the regime of human rights.2
2John Witte. Introduction. In: Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective. Religious Perspec-
tives. English. Ed. by John Witte and Johan D. van der Vyver. The Hague: Kluwer Law International,
1996, pp. xviiixix.
CHAPTER 2. FREEDOM OF RELIGION AS A CONCEPT 3
2 Freedom of Religion as a Concept
2.1 Basic Distinctions
One of the basic distinctions that is usually drawn, is a distinction between positive
and negative religious freedom. Positive religious freedom (freedom to) is a freedom
of an individual to hold religion or belief and to manifest it in a reasonable way in
public sphere, either alone or in community with others. Negative religious freedom
(freedom from) is freedom of an individual not to be subject to coercion, indoctrination
or propaganda in religious matters. This two-fold religious freedom has its counterpart
in state's obligation to remain neutral in direction to all religions present (not to prefer
one religion to another).1 For this moment we leave aside real possiblity to stay neutral
while being based on certain (Western) cultural and religious values and traditions.
Moreover, it is possible to go even beyond state's neutrality because as John Witte
observes, the liberty dimension of religious rights requires that the state accommodate
the religious beliefs and practices of individuals and associations and exempt them from
generally applicable laws and policies which compel them to act, or to forgo action, in
violation of their religious convictions. This may embrace conscientious objection from
participation in the military, immunities from oath-swearing, from work on holy days,
from payment of religious taxes, or from participation in civic cremonies and activities
that they ﬁnd religiously odious.2
While speaking about religion and human rights, David Novak diﬀerentiates between
religious liberty (duty of society to respect and protect the right of every human person
to worship any god of his or her choice or no god at all) and the religious foundation
of human rights. He does not see the two concepts as mutually exclusive or incapable
of being connected, but he sees a diﬀerence in starting point. It is completly diﬀerent
perspective if one begins from religious rights along with other rights, and when one
commence from religious source of rights (as it happens in Judaism, Christianity and
Islam as they are religions of revelation).3 Whereas primary concern of this essay is
religious freedom (liberty), it is impossible not to address religion per se as a source
or vehicle of certain human rights, particularly freedom of religion. If we were not
addressing religious freedom as stemming out of religion, we would be hardly treating
1Michal Bobek. Diskriminace z d·vodu náboºenství. In: Rovnost a diskriminace. Czech. Ed. by
Michal Bobek, Pavla Bou£ková and Zden¥k Kühn. 1st ed. Praha: C. H. Beck, 2007, p. 285. Jürgen
Habermas. Intolerance and discrimination. English. In: International Journal of Constitutional Law
1.1 (2003). Pp. 212. URL: http://icon.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/1/1/2.pdf (visited on
16/04/2008), p. 8. Witte, Introduction, p. xxvii.
2Witte, Introduction, pp. xxviixxviii.
3David Novak. Religious Human Rights in Judaic Texts. In: Religious Human Rights in Global
Perspective. Religious Perspectives. English. Ed. by John Witte and Johan D. van der Vyver. The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996, p. 175.
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inherent claims of religious people in fairly manner.
For law, it is quite important to come up with a deﬁnition of any social phenomenon
that requires regulation. Following chapters show how complicated was the process of
trying to distinguish what is religion and what is not, especially throughout negotiations
of treaties and their subsequent interpretation by judicial bodies. It is, however, not
possible for this essay to elaborate in detail on numerous deﬁnitions introduced by jurists,
philosphers and theologians.
Nevertheless, it might be beneﬁcial for us to mention, that e.g. for Leonard Swidler
and John Witte the concept of religion embraces a creed, a cult, a code of conduct, and
a confessional community. A creed standing for accepted cadre of beliefs and values
concerning the ultimate origin, meaning, and purpose of life. A cult deﬁned as the
appropriate rituals, liturgies, and patterns of worship and devotion that give expression
to those beliefs. A code of conduct meaning the appropriate individual and social habits
of those who profess the creed and practice the cult. And a confessional community
being the group of individuals who embrace and live out the creed, cult, and code of
conduct, both on their own and with fellow believers.4
It is quite typical for Europe in post-Englightenment period to put emphasis on the
individual, and individual aspects of freedom. This applies also to the whole concept of
freedom of religion, thought and conscience which evokes that the primary concern of
protection is an individual and its integrity. The idea of collectivity and of communal
rights left legal thinking for some time and has been returning from time to time e.g. in
claims of self-determination of nations. It is important to re-accept corporate religious
rights as essential part of religious freedom.5
John Witte describes interest in the subject of religious human rights after the World
War II which was part of broader rights revolution. However, after the 1950s, aca-
demic inquiries and activist interventions into religious rights and their abuses became
increasingly intermittent and isolated, inspired as much by parochial self-interest as by
universal golden rules. This depreciation of religious rights was interconnected with po-
litical pressure to address the most glaring rights violations and abuses, especially of
physical nature.6
He notes that this depreciation of religious rights has sharpened the divide between
Western and non-Western theories of rights. Many non-Western traditions, particularly
those of Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, Taoist, and indigenous stock, cannot conceive of,
nor accept, a system of rights that exclude religion. Religion is for these traditions
inextricably integrated into every facet of life and no system of rights that ignores or
deprecates the cardinal palce of religion can be respected or adopted. The depreciation
4Witte, Introduction, p. xxv.
5For this idea plead numerous authors, for an overview see e.g. Witte, Introduction, p. xxvi.
6Witte, Introduction, pp. xxxxxxii.
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of religion has also exaggerated the role of the state as the guarantor of human rights. The
state is not, however, and cannot be, so omnicompetent, and vast plurality of voluntary
association (religious among others) is necessary for cultivation and realization of human
rights.7 This depreciation of public role of religious communities and surrender to state
has been more then visible in post-communist Europe.
While studying freedom of religion in a particular region, it is necessary to take into
consideration what is the relation of various religious groups with state (or other local
authority) and why is it so (historical background). It is not possible for this essay
to elaborate on various models that have appeared throughout history all around the
world. Nevertheless, we may note that on the one hand, there are exmples of clear
separation of church(es) and state as in the Unitited States of America or in France,
which is built upon the concept of laïcité. On the other hand, there are states with
a special connection to a particular religion, the most extreme case being theocracy
(such as arguably Iran or Saudi Arabia), or supposedly less interconnected models being
national or established churches. Typical example of established church is Church of
England (Anglican church). National churches are symptomatic for Northern European
(predominantly) Lutheran states (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland) and
for (predominantly) Orthodox countries (e.g. Greece, Romania, Russia or Georgia).
Quite speciﬁc model might be observed in predominantly Roman-Catholic states (such
as Italy, Spain or Poland), where Roman-Catholicism enjoys special status (although not
always oﬃcialy recognized).
2.2 The Historical Justiﬁcation and Human Dignity
A possible argument raised sometimes as a rationale for religious freedom looks to the
history of persecution on the basis of religion or belief in Europe. This argument can be
construed so as to claim that there is nothing particularly important about freedom of
religion as such except of the fact that historically religion has been used as a basis to
justify persecution and repression.8
Indeed, even religious leaders admit that religion has been hijacked by extremists,
politicians and the media.9 Though it would be too black-and-white to perceive hijacking
of religion only negatively. As William Vendley put it, whenever extremists attempt to
hijack religion for violent ends, whenever politicians seek to exploit sectarian diﬀerences,
and whenever the press mischaracterizes our faith traditions, people of faith, religious
7Witte, Introduction, pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.
8Carolyn Evans. Freedom of Religion under the ECHR. English. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001, p. 24.
9Laurel Hart and Kim Assalone. World Religious Leaders Reject Violence and Hijacking of Religion
at Religions for Peace World Assembly. English. In: (26th Aug. 2006). URL: http://www.wcrp.org/
files/PR-Opening-08-26-2006.pdf (visited on 05/05/2008).
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communities and religious leaders must stand up, speak out and take action.10 Thus,
hijecking of religion might serve also as an incentive for religious people to reﬂect upon
their faith and its manifestations and re-establish their relation towards the outer world.
Carolyn Evans admits that historical basis for the protection of freedom of religion is not
a satisfactory answer to the question of why freedom of religion is valuable. It may be a
partial explanation of why discrimination on the basis of religion and belief is speciﬁcally
prohibited in Article 14 of the Convention (along with other forms of discrimination), but
it does not explain why it is that people should not only have the right to be free from
torture, execution, and so forth on the basis of religion but should also have a positive
right to freedom or religion or belief. Neither does it explain why the exercise of one's
religious freedom was considered an inappropriate basis on which to discriminate against
a person.11
Another possibility how to approach religious freedom is to start with human dignity.
This way is followed both by secular philosophers and religious scholars.
An ethic of dignity (in comparison with ethic of interest) is rooted in a basic rediscovery
of the Protestant Reformation. It states that the human person is not created by his or
her own performance and cannot achieve ﬁnal recognition through his or her own works.
Not human perfection but Godly grace constitues the human person. Human dignity is
not dependent on the disposition of other humans, nor on the powers of society or the
state. The human person in his or her limited time is granted an unending dignity that
is not product of human eﬀorts but rather a pure, unearned gift of God.12
After the Protestant Reformation, the ethic of dignity also assumed secular forms. Im-
manuel Kant posed the categorical imperative in a way that requires one to acknowlege
humanity in the person of another as in oneself  not simply as means, but equally
as an end in itself.13 This formula repreats the thought that no human person can lay
complete claim to dispose of, or to deﬁne, another person.14
2.3 Religious Freedom and Religious Tolerance
The linkage between religious toleration and democracy occurs from both sides: on the
part of politics, which switches the basis for its legitimation over to a pluralist worldview,
and on the part of religion, which locks the moral and legal principles of secular society
10Hart and Assalone, World Religious Leaders Reject Violence and Hijacking of Religion at Religions
for Peace World Assembly.
11Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 2425.
12Wolfgang Huber. Human Rights and Biblical Legal Thought. In: Religious Human Rights in Global
Perspective. Religious Perspectives. English. Ed. by John Witte and Johan D. van der Vyver. The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 1996, p. 55.
13Immanuel Kant. Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals. English. Trans. by Jonathan Bennett.
2005. URL: http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdf/kantgw.pdf (visited on 03/05/2008).
14Huber, Human Rights and Biblical Legal Thought, p. 56.
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onto its own ethos. With the depoliticization of the dominant religions and the inclusion
of religious minorities in the political community as a whole, the spread of religious
toleration also acts, within democracy, as a stimulus and model for the introduction of
further cultural rights. Religious pluralism kindles and fosters sensitivity to the claims
of discriminated groups in general.15
Jürgen Habermas exposes concept of tolerance by analyzing German term Toleranz which
designates the general disposition to treat another person or a stranger patiently and
generously; more speciﬁcally, it is used in reference to a political virtue in our dealings
with citizens who are diﬀerent or are of a diﬀerent origin. Toleranz is considered a
core component of liberal political culture. That said, Toleranz is not the same as
the virtue of civil behavior. It must not be confused with the mere willingness to
cooperate and compromise, for each person's respective truth claims cannot be a matter
for negotiation when they conﬂict with the truth claims of someone else. Toleration
ﬁrst becomes necessary when one rejects the convictions of others: We do not need
to be tolerant if we are indiﬀerent toward other beliefs and attitudes or even if we
appreciate otherness. Later, religious toleration toward those holding diﬀerent beliefs is
generalized to constitute what is in the broadest sense political tolerance of people who
think diﬀerently; but in both cases the component of rejection is material.16
In case of judgement rejecting a religion, the appropriate answer is a critique of prejudices
and combating of discrimination, in other words the ﬁght for equal rights, and not more
tolerance. With people who think diﬀerently or have diﬀerent beliefs from our own, and
were discriminated against as a result of prejudices, the question of toleration ﬁrst arises
after these prejudices have been eliminated.17
The end of a form of discrimination does not always signify the beginning of toleration
toward the person whom is no longer discriminated against. However, only in the case of
competing worldviews does toleration mean accepting mutually exclusive validity claims.
In this narrowly deﬁned sense, toleration  as regards equal respect for everybody 
means the willingness to neutralize the practical impact of a cognitive dissonance that
nevertheless in its own domain demands that we resolve it.18
2.4 Religious Arguments
2.4.1 Generally
All basic texts (holy scriptures) of the major world religions contain some teachings
that can be interpreted in a way to uphold freedom of religion and belief. Thus, it is
15Habermas, Intolerance and discrimination, p. 8.
16Habermas, Intolerance and discrimination, p. 3.
17Habermas, Intolerance and discrimination, p. 3.
18Habermas, Intolerance and discrimination, pp. 1112.
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possible to argue that, properly understood, all religions are or should be supportive
of the right to religious freedom as a good in and of itself. Conversly, Carolyn Evans
and Robert Traer claim that religious tolerance may be part of the teaching of some
religions, but it is not common to all religions, and even religious groups that share some
commitment to a notion of freedom of religion may disagree fundamentally as to the
meaning of and limits to that freedom.19
Support of religious freedom in world religions, however, should not be about proper
understanding of religious teachings, especially as it is argued in modern hermeneutics
that ﬁnding the proper understanding is not possible. It is rather about assumptions
and understanding from the situation of the interpreter.
It is diﬃcult to state what religion says as religion is fundamentally based on revelation
or other transcendental experience. Nevertheless, the phrase religion says, religion
orders you has been used quite often to reach certain goals of the people in power. And
it is exactly the situation when religion is used (misused or hijacked) for non-religious
purposes; and it is highly questionable whether religion could (or should) be blamed for
this. If religion is to blame, could we blame also race, gender or sexual orientation by
themselves?
David Novak notes that ancient religious texts cannot function as precedents for moral
principles that are already formulated fully in and for the present. For when this is done,
the continuing moral necessity of reading these texts becomes lost because the principles
of which these texts are precedents are assumed to be true in and of themselves here
and now. They are taken to be self-suﬃcient even if not always self-evident. And,
indeed, anything but tangential concern with these ancient precedents might actually
be practically counterproductive by diverting attention away from the real and pressing
concerns to which moral principles are always to be addressed.20
John Barton warns us that the Old Testament (and we may consider ancient texts in
general) cannot be understood as a book full of binding commandments, laws and oders as
we are used to from Western moral philosophy. Old Testament writers were desperately
unsystematic, however, they show us that what really matters are simple everyday
acts. And he points out that half of the volume consists of stories. Stories which are
multilayered narrative structures without possibility of simpliﬁcation to one or two moral
points.21 This understanding may give us a lead in how to treat ancient religious texts.
The most appropriate way of understanding religious freedom would be meditating over
ancient narratives instead of using haphazard sentences as commandments or moral
orders and interpreting them from current legal viewpoint. This approach, however, is
not very easy to adopt, it is time consuming, and it almost excludes possibility of modern
19Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 26; Robert Traer. Faith and Human Rights. English.
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1994, pp. 36.
20Novak, Religious Human Rights in Judaic Texts, p. 177.
21John Barton. Ethics and the Old Testament. English. London: SCM Press, 1998.
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scientiﬁc analysis. Therefore we cannot use it as a basis for this essay; nonetheless, it
should be born in mind.
It is rather impossible to give a brief overview of the concept of religious freedom in
various religions and faith traditions. Especially as statements to this controversial issue
are not unanimously held by all adherents to a particular faith. On the following pages
we shall focus on some basic concepts and ideas that may serve as grounds for better
understanding freedom of religion in Judaism, Christianity and Islam.
2.4.2 Judaism
It is quite complicated to speak about religious freedom in a religion that is devoted to
One God who bestowed a special status on the Chosen people. Judaism might be in this
discourse interpreted as an exlusivist religion that cannot grant any favourable position
to people believing in other gods (considered as idols). However, many scholars would not
agree with this assumption on theological basis as there are also non-exlusivist texts22 and
interpretations. Moreover, given the historical experience of Jews scattered all around
the world and being persecuted wherever they have been, high value of religious freedom
should be understandable.
The term freedom of religion does not appear in Jewish classical texts as such. It
may, however, convey two diﬀerent messages: the freedom of the other to adhere to a
diﬀerent religion and the tolerance towards diﬀerent streams withing your own faith, as
well as towards non-religious members of your community. In Judaism this dilemma is
further complicated by the fact of being nation-religion.23
As for the Jewish teaching about the the nations, Asher Maoz (based on Maimonides) dif-
ferentiates between the Covenant of the Rainbow (done with Noah after the ﬂood) on the
one hand, and Torah and the commandments given to Moses on the other. Whereas the
seven Noahide commandments were given to all the people, the Torah and the command-
ments only to the people of Israel (and those who would like to join them).24 Following
the one or the other set of rules has diﬀerent connotations and consequences, especially
in the Messianic age; nevertheless, it leaves people with certain religious freedom.
We may ﬁnd in Judaic classic teachings harsh statements regarding idolatry. The idolatry
is sometimes interpreted as worshiping things (objects) instead of God, as deviation of
latreia (adoration, worship). Idolatry is not directed agaist people who worship God in
22Take for example (anti-)prophet Jonah who was sent by God to proclaim judgment over Nineveh.
However, God took pity on the people who realized that their ways were not righteous, and repented. It
is rather ironic to observe Jonah afterwards not being able to understand merciful God who just forgave
the wrongdoers from the gentiles.
23Asher Maoz. Religious Freedom as a Basic Human Right. The Jewish Perspective. English. In:
Annuario Direcom 5 (2006). Pp. 103112. URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1013512 (visited on
04/05/2008), p. 104.
24Maoz, Religious Freedom as a Basic Human Right, pp. 105107.
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other ways, but against people who worship things that are not worthy of worship.
Asher Maoz summarizes positions of various Jewish authorities on relation to Christianity
and Islam that are not considered to be idolatries. Moreover, Chrstianity and Islam are
regarded as legitimate religions and praised for removing the idols and subordinating
their nations to Noahide laws, thus giving them moral attributes far beyond what was
demanded of them by the Torah of Moses.25
Human persons in Judaism are regarded as sojourners in the world, who can only ﬁnd
their dwelling in the world when they realize that their authentic identity is neither
derived from the world nor from themselves. That identity comes from being related to
the One who himself transcends the world and directs it, the One to whom the world
is always immanent.26 This concept gives particular freedom to people because human
dignity and rights are not dependent on any earthly decision. It might be argued that
religious freedom on this basis contributed to persistance of Jewish communities.
The concern for justice is to include just dealings with those outside the community
itself; indeed, injustice towards the gentiles, for the Rabbis, entail the sin of profanation
of God's name. Such injustice prevents the gentiles from admiring the inherent justice
of the Torah and to praise the God who gave it as well as to desire to appropriate it.
Such injustice would not inspire them to come to Jerusalem for the just response to their
rights claims.27 28
Jewish tendency to grant as much freedom to the others as necessary for for the true
life of community might be also observed on the process of eradicating slavery. Although
slavery had particular regulations in the Torah, when Rabbi Eliezer needed tenth person
for starting the prayer, he did not hesitate to set a slave free for the community to be
able to worship together.29
As religious freedom inside Judaism is concerned, it is important to note that the
Covenant on Mt. Sinai was made with all the men of Israel including their children
and children's children. Therefore, all Children of Israel are bound by the Covenant and
25Maoz, Religious Freedom as a Basic Human Right, p. 108.
26Novak, Religious Human Rights in Judaic Texts, p. 185.
27Novak, Religious Human Rights in Judaic Texts, p. 192.
28This coming of nations to Jerusalem is explained by eschatological vision of prophet Micah: But
in the last days it shall come to pass, that the mountain of the house of the LORD shall be established
in the top of the mountains, and it shall be exalted above the hills; and people shall ﬂow unto it. And
many nations shall come, and say, Come, and let us go up to the mountain of the LORD, and to the
house of the God of Jacob; and he will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths: for the law
shall go forth of Zion, and the word of the LORD from Jerusalem. And he shall judge among many
people, and rebuke strong nations afar oﬀ; and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their
spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up a sword against nation, neither shall they learn war
any more. But they shall sit every man under his vine and under his ﬁg tree; and none shall make them
afraid: for the mouth of the LORD of hosts hath spoken it. (Micah 4:14; cited according to King
James Version.)
29Novak, Religious Human Rights in Judaic Texts, pp. 198200.
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are not free to deviate from the paths of the Torah.30
According to Babylonian Talmud, all Israelites are guarantors to each other.31 There-
fore, it is the duty of each and every Jew not only to abide by Halakha32, but also to
make sure that their fellow Jew abides by it. It is the behavior of each and every Jew
that may inﬂuence the revelation of eternal salvation.33
The issue of religious freedom inside Judaism might be even more complicated. It is
possible to say that while there is freedom of thought, it is not so with action. The
function of adjudicating diﬃcult questions lied with the Great Sanhedrin and any scholar
who went against its decisions was regarded a rebellious elder and theoretically liable to
capital punishment. However, the scholar does not become a rebellious elder by merely
teaching his opposite opinion but only if he instructs others to act in accordance with
his minority dissent opinion.34
The Talmud is full of conﬂicting opinions and both majority and minority opinions are
regarded to be words of the living God. It does not regard the ruling opinion of the
majority as more right then the minority opinion. Moreover, the minority opinion is said
to be included because it might become majority one in the future.35
The right to deviate from the majority opinion is not restricted to academic sphere. Since
the abolition of the Sanhedrin, Judaism lacks a central decisive authority. The custom is
that every Jew may choose the rabbi whose ruling in halakhic matters he will obey (but
not completly arbitrarily).36
2.4.3 Christianity
In Christianity, as in some other religions, it might be said that religious freedom has
developed and ﬂourished in places where there was necessity for various groups to co-
exist. It has been also closely interconnected with access of religious leaders to earthly
(secular) power. In the ﬁrst centuries when the Church was persecuted, Christians had
to live in diversity and solve disputes mainly by the way of dialogue. However, when
the church oﬃcials got close to state power, use of state repression was at hand. And
most of the time when church had possibility to be involved in politics and use oppresive
methods, religious freedom suﬀered. Dissenting people were excomunicated, condemned
or stigmatized.
Good example of church that has been since its foundation comprising radically diﬀerent
30Maoz, Religious Freedom as a Basic Human Right, p. 109.
31Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Shevuoth [Oaths], 39a.
32Halakha is the collective body of Jewish religious law, including biblical law (the 613 mitzvot) and
later talmudic and rabbinic law, as well as customs and traditions. Halakha could be translated as the
path or the way of walking.
33Maoz, Religious Freedom as a Basic Human Right, p. 109.
34Maoz, Religious Freedom as a Basic Human Right, p. 110.
35Maoz, Religious Freedom as a Basic Human Right, p. 111.
36Maoz, Religious Freedom as a Basic Human Right, p. 111.
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groups of believers is Anglican church (Anglican Communion). It is no supprise then
that many promoters of religious freedom lived at least for some time in close contact
with the Anglican Communion and got inspired by it.
Nowadays, various Christian groups try to promote idea of peaceful and enriching life
together  and have formed the ecumenical movement. During the history of ecumenical
movement, many people realized that uniting all Christians under one organizational
scheme is an utopia. Thus, they started to develop various models of diﬀerent Christians
living together. What is common to majority of these models is, that there is a necessity
to grant freedom to the others. And even if you do not agree with your fellow Christians
and you are not able to identify yourself with their teaching, you leave them space to be
diﬀerent and still Christian.
It might be said that for Christians it should be easy to respect each other in his or her
diﬀerences as there is a common ground, i.e. all Christians confess the Lord Jesus Christ
as God and Saviour according to the Scriptures, and therefore seek to fulﬁl together their
common calling to the glory of the one God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit.37 Yet, history
of religious conﬂicts among Christian denominations complicates this thesis. Neverthe-
less, ecumenical learning and openess to Christian others paves a way of understanding
and granting religious freedom also to non-Christians. This happens both on the basis
of mere pragmatic tolerance of the others and on the basis of soteriological inclusivism
claiming that also other believers (may) reach to salvation.
Wolfgang Huber describes the path by which the Biblical motif aﬀected Western legal
development as divided into ﬁve stages. The ﬁrst stage commenced with the Christian-
ization of the Roman Empire when legal institutions, often closely connected with the
Roman state religion, were transformed to reﬂect Jewish and Christian ideas of moral-
ity. This Christianization of the Roman Empire eﬀected secularization of Christianity
and the deﬁnitive emancipation of Christianity from its Jewish roots. The radical na-
ture of the Christian mission was thereby weakend. Even the ideas it incorporated of
a right created from the perspective of the weak were adapted to the prevailing power
structure.38
The second stage came with the Papal Revolution (cca 10501200) when comprehensive
systematization of legal rules was brought. The newly systematized law was grounded
in principles of natural law; and as the principles of natural law could be discovered by
revelation but could be also recognized through the use of reason, this step implied an
epochal emancipation from the Biblical roots. Thus, argues Huber, the secularization of
Western legal thought began deﬁnitely not in the modern period, but with the transfor-
mations born of Constantine as well as the Papal Revolution. Particularly momentous
37This formula is used by the World Council of Churches as a common basis since joining of the
Orthodox churches in 1960s.
38Huber, Human Rights and Biblical Legal Thought, pp. 4849.
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was the image of the human person that was conceived as a (Christian) individual, for
personhood was established through the act of baptism. Nevertheless, although the Pa-
pal Revolution substantially shifted the concept of the individual human person to the
center of the legal system, it was still far removed from the idea of universal human
rights.39
The third stage of the inﬂuence of the Biblical motif on Western legal development
came with the Protestant Reformation. The Reformers recognized the autonomy of legal
relationships against ecclesiastical claims of authority. Freedom of conscience and of
religion were recognized as frontiers at which claims of authority by the political power
should ﬁnd their limit. Together with the impetus of Renaissance humanism and late
scholasticism, the Reformation paved the way for a turning point in the human image
that urged recognition of the equal dignity of all men.40 Political arrangements after
Peace of Augsburg done accordingly to cuius regio, eius religio went hand in hand with
the idea of religious self-determination of an individual.
As the fourth stage is seen the era of positivism following the ﬁnding that legal system
must be contructed on some other basis then religion (due to bloody sectarian con-
ﬂicts). The state itself became a source of law. And as the state authority needed some
counterpoises, human a civil rights needed to be codiﬁed. Whereas the American de-
velopment arose from a spirit of Christian Enlightenment, French revolution was made
by an anticlerical enmity against Christianity. The latter heigtened the impression that
Christian legal thought and modern awareness of human rights are worlds apart and
resulted in Christian theology not adopting interpretation of human rights for more then
two centuries.41
The Age of Enlightenment also saw creation of the preconditions for the ﬁfth stage of
Biblical inﬂuence on the Western legal consciousness. These preconditions lay princi-
pally in the rediscovery of human subjective responsibility and autonomy. The decisive
conclusion was that all claims to validity must be created anew in the rationality of the
human subject. However, for recognition of human person in its legal subjectivity as
the decisive reference point for legal thought, experience of Nazism and Stalinism was
needed.42
Wolfgang Huber further notes that the Biblical tradition was frequently cited throughout
all ﬁve stages. This suggests a caveat that modern law (including human rights theory)
can be coupled with Biblical legal thought only from afar and at the level of principle. On
the one hand, Biblical legal thought should not be used simply to deﬁne and legitimate
the structure and content of modern legal systems. On the other hand, it is incorrect to
separate the legal system from the question of the theological basis for its validity and
39Huber, Human Rights and Biblical Legal Thought, pp. 4950.
40Huber, Human Rights and Biblical Legal Thought, pp. 5051.
41Huber, Human Rights and Biblical Legal Thought, pp. 5152.
42Huber, Human Rights and Biblical Legal Thought, p. 52.
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to leave it to its self-legality.
Huber suggests that we ﬁnd ourselves today on the threshold of a sixth stage as the pro-
cess of modern subjectivization and individualization has been bringing self-destructive
consequences.43 Or as David Novak puts it, the challenge for a presentation of religious
human rights in the world today is to avoid the emptiness of individualistic rights talk
without falling into the trap of the excesses of collectivism.44 For this time Biblical con-
cept of justice might help us as it aims not simply to enable each person to receive his or
her lawful rights, but rather to ensure rights for the other and to enable the community
to survive under conditions of equal freedom for all.45
Wolfgang Huber builds on the concepts of Weltethos which has been developped by Hans
Küng. Huber thinks that we face the task of developing a planetary legal consciousnes,
whose validity rests upon the principles of a planetary ethos. He notes that Western
legal thought has lost sight of maintaining viability of Planet Earth and ensuring digni-
ﬁed living conditions for humanity based on cooperation beyond the borders of cultural
tradition and religious conviction because of its blindness to the religious dimensions of
law. On account of this blindness, Western legal thought frequently stands uncompre-
hendingly opposed to the coupling of law and religion in other traditions. Omitting the
religious dimensions of law, however, further deepens the gulf between Western and non-
Western legal conceptions. For believers in Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, or Confucianism
assume the inner unity of law and religion.46
Wolfgang Huber observes that discovery of Christian freedom in the Protestant Reforma-
tion and the understanding of the need for religious toleration prepared the ground for
the modern development of human rights. To this extent, a central element of all human
rights is the guarantee of freedom of conscience, belief, and religion. The inalienability
of the human person, and the untaouchability of human dignity, can be guaranteed only
if religious beliefs and their individual and corporate expression remain free from all
external constraint. He thinks that this idea must be foreign to Biblical legal thought,
for the coupling between giving honor to only one God and the legal form of community
life is so narrowly conceived that the recognition of an equal right for those professing
another faith does not arise.47 At this point it is possible to argue that Biblical thinking
is not always that exclusivist, but creates also certain space for people believing in dif-
ferent way. And not only in practical everyday arrangements but also in eschatological
perspective and as salvation is concerned.48
43Huber, Human Rights and Biblical Legal Thought, p. 53.
44Novak, Religious Human Rights in Judaic Texts, p. 181.
45Huber, Human Rights and Biblical Legal Thought, p. 54.
46Huber, Human Rights and Biblical Legal Thought, p. 54.
47Huber, Human Rights and Biblical Legal Thought, pp. 5859.
48This is, however, set of questions widely disputed for the whole history of Christianity. For an
overview of various approaches see e.g. Pavel Ho²ek. Na cest¥ k dialogu. K°es´anská víra v pluralit¥
náboºenství. Czech. Praha: Návrat dom·, 2005.
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2.4.4 Islam
In case of Islam it is even more important to note for a European reader, that it is
impossible to present a teching that would be applauded by all the Muslims. This
subsection tries to introduce positions that are not major in presentations of Islam in
Western media. The fact of underrepresentation in Western media, however, does not
mean underrepresentation among faithful Muslims.
As a matter of terminology, it is necessary to clarify that no distincion was made in
the work of early Islamic scholars, or in the minds of their followers, between law and
theology. Subject-matters ranging from legal, in the modern sense of the term, to that
pertaining to belief and doctrine, ethics and morality, religious ritual practices, style of
dress, hygiene, courtesy, and good manners, were all seen as falling within the domain
of Shari'a, the divinely ordained way of life.49
Abdullahi An-Na'im states that commitment to human rights enhances the quality of
religious belief and the relevance and utility of its precepts to the lives of its adherents.
By its very nature, and in order to inﬂuence eﬀectively the moral convictions and daily
behavior of those who subscribe to it, religious belief must be voluntarily adopted and
maintained. Coerced belief is a contradiction in terms, and can only breed hypocrisy,
social corruption, and political oppression.50
Riﬀat Hassan believes that the Qur'an is the Magna Carta of human rights and that
a large part of its concern is to free human beings from the bondage of traditionalism,
authoritarianism (religious, political, economic, or any other), tribalism, racism, sexism,
slavery or anything else that prohibits or inhibits human beings from actualizing the
Qur'anic vision of human destiny embodied in the classic proclamation: Towards Allah
is thy limit.5152
The greatest guarantee of personal freedom for a Muslim lies in the Qur'anic decree that
no one other than God can limit human freedom,53 and in the statement that judgment
(as to what is right and what is wrong) rests with God alone.5455
The Qur'anic proclamation there shall be no coercion in matters of faith56 guarantees
freedom of religion and worship. This means that, according to Qur'anic teaching, non-
49Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im. Islamic Foundations of Religious Human Rights. In: Religious Human
Rights in Global Perspective. Religious Perspectives. English. Ed. by John Witte and Johan D. van der
Vyver. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996, p. 336.
50An-Na'im, Islamic Foundations of Religious Human Rights, p. 336.
51Surah 53: An-Najm: 42.
52Riﬀat Hassan. Religious Human Rights and the Qur'an. English. In: Emory Int'l L. Rev. 10.1
(1996). Pp. 8596, p. 85.
53Surah 42: Ash-Shura: 21.
54Surah 12: Yusuf: 40.
55Hassan, Religious Human Rights and the Qur'an, p. 90.
56Surah 2: Al-Baqarah: 256. In authorized English translation of the Qur'an is maybe more famous
wording: There shall be no compulsion in religion.
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Muslims, living in Muslim territories, should have the freedom to follow their own faith-
traditions without fear or harassment. A number of Qur'anic passages state clearly that
the responsibility of the Prophet Muhammad is to communicate the message of God and
not to compel anyone to believe. The right to exercise free choice in matters of belief is
unambiguously endorsed by the Qur'an which states: The Truth is from your Lord: Let
him who will believe, and let him who will, reject (it).5758
The Qur'an also makes clear that God will judge human beings not on the basis of what
they profess but on the basis of their belief and righteous conduct: Those who believe
(in the Qur'an) and those who follow the Jewish (scriptures), and the Christians and the
Sabians, any who believe in God and the Last Day, and work righteousness, shall have
their reward saith the Lord; on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve.5960
There are references to Jews and Christians in the Qur'an containing both praise and
criticism. In its criticism of their beliefs and practices, the Qur'an did not ever criticize
the religions of Judaism or Christianity as scuh, nor the status of their Scriptures repre-
sented by the Torah and the Gospel. Both Judaism and Christianity were respected as
religions of the Book alongside Islam. The Qur'an, however, saw itself as the Scripture
that had come to conﬁrm what was in the Torah and the Gospel, and as the determiner
of what was genuine of the earlier revelations.61
Degree of tolerance that was aﬀorded to Christianity and Judaism diﬀered from the one
aﬀorded to non-revealed religions. There was no recognition of beliefs and practices that
involved idolatry (similarly to Judaism). Despite the non-recognition, the Qur'an urged
Muslims to deal with all people, including idolaters, with respect, as long as they too
showed respect. Indeed, the Muslims were commanded not to abuse or slander even the
deities of idolaters.62
In the context of the human right to exercise religious freedom, it is important to mention
that the Qur'anic dictum, "Let there be no compulsion in religion"63 applies not only
to non-Muslims but also to Muslims. While those who renounced Islam after professing
it and then engaged in acts of war against Muslims were to be treated as enemies
and aggressors, the Qur'an does not prescribe any punishment for non-profession or
renunciation of faith. The decision regarding a person's ultimate destiny in the hereafter
rests with God.64
However, as Abdullah Saeed notes, many Muslims today argue that Islam is the true and
57Surah 18: Al-Kahf: 29.
58Hassan, Religious Human Rights and the Qur'an, p. 90.
59Surah 2: Al-Baqarah: 62
60Hassan, Religious Human Rights and the Qur'an, p. 90.
61Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed. Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam. English. Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2004, p. 21.
62Saeed and Saeed, Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam, p. 21.
63Surah 2:A1-Baqarah: 256.
64Hassan, Religious Human Rights and the Qur'an, p. 91.
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ﬁnal religion and that turning from this true religion to another which is, by deﬁnition,
false cannot be tolerated. Since salvation is the most important objective for a human
being, all attempts should be made, in their view, to keep the person within the fold of
Islam, the only path to salvation.65
According to Abdullah Saeed, while there is general consensus that coercion should
not be used to convert someone to any religion, including Islam, the right of religious
freedom is not extended to a Muslim who wants to change his or her religion to another.
Signiﬁcantly, pre-modern Islamic law states that coercion must be used to bring such a
person back to Islam. If the person refuses, he or she should receive the ultimate penalty.
However, this position is now being challenged by some Muslims.66
As expression of personal belief is concerned, Riﬀat Hassan notes that right to freedom
includes the right to be free to tell the truth. The Qur'anic term for truth is Haqq
which is also one of God's most important attributes. Standing up for the truth is a right
and a responsibility which a Muslim may not disclaim even in the face of the greatest
danger or diﬃculty.67 While the Qur'an commands believers to testify to the truth, it
also instructs society not to harm persons so testifying.6869
2.5 Implications for Interpretation
The short overview of various secular and religious approaches to freedom of religion
shows that it is not possible to talk about uniﬁed understanding of this concept. It is
even not possible to agree on the starting points and key elements inside one school
of thought. This should not mean that we resign on any possibility of ﬁnding some
common grounds. On the contrary, this plurality should encourage dialogue among the
groups holding diﬀering opinions.
The conception of freedom of religion that is adopted will lead to diﬀerent interpretations
of the scope and importance of the freedom. Thus while many people may agree that
the concept of freedom of religion and belief is beneﬁcial, their conceptions may be so
divergent that the way in which they envisage religious freedom working in practice will
diﬀer signiﬁcantly. If freedom of religion is important because everyone has diﬀerent
and wholly subjective religious ideas, for example, then beliefs about religion may be no
more signiﬁcant then beliefs about the best ﬂavour of ice-cream, so little reason may be
needed to justify state interference. If religious freedom is important only to limit social
conﬂict then constraints on the freedom that do not cause conﬂict may be acceptable.
If questions about religion and belief are, however, perceived as an essential component
65Saeed and Saeed, Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam, p. 16.
66Saeed and Saeed, Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam, p. 19.
67Surah 4: An-Nisa': 135.
68Sura 2: Al-Baqarah: 282.
69Hassan, Religious Human Rights and the Qur'an, p. 91.
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of self-identity and if interference with them is seen to be an attack on the autonomy of
the individual, then religious freedom is likely to be given a wide scope and limitations
on it will require serious justiﬁcation.70
As Carolyn Evans notes, in a religiously pluralistic Europe, the courts should be wary of
drawing too heavily on religious models as a basis for freedom of religion or belief. While
some individuals may respect religious freedom because of their religious beliefs, other
may have to be forced to respect the freedom of others despite their religion or belief.71
These preliminary deliberations emphasize importance of prudent decisions of judicial
(and quasi-judicial) bodies. As it is unfeasible to agree on a general understanding of the
concept of religious freedom, the main responsibility rests with judicial bodies weighting
various rights, interests and concerns being in stake in particular cases.
The following chapters try to elaborate on how various organs in the Council of Europe,
the United Nations and the European Union have accomplished this role.
70Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 32.
71Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 28.
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3 Freedom of Religion and the Council of Europe
3.1 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
was opened for signature in 1950 and entered into force in 1953. The Convention has now
been ratiﬁed by 47 European states.1 The Convention was designed to give binding eﬀect
to some of the rights and freedoms set out in the United Nations' Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. It was unprecedented in international law in three important respects.
First, it empowered states to bring before an international tribunal other states alleged to
have violated the rights of their own citizens. Second, it recognized individuals as subjects
of international law by giving them the right to petition directly an international body
with complaints directed against a state or states. Finally, it set up an enforcement
mechanism to ensure that the contracting parties to the Convention respected their
engagements.2
What importance has been given in the Convention to freedom of religion was accurately
formulated by the Court in well-known case of Kokkinakis v. Greece:
[F]reedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of
a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention. It is, in its
religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to make up the
identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious
asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism
indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the
centuries, depends on it.3
There are four articles dealing directly with freedom of religion in the Convention. Article
9, Article 14, Article 2 of the First Protocol and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12. Article 9
(Freedom of thought, conscience and religion) reads as follows:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
(2) Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society
1Updated information is accessible on http://conventions.coe.int/
2Willi Fuhrmann. Perspectives on Religious Freedom from the Vantage Point of the European Court
of Human Rights. English. In: Birgham Young University Law Review (2000). Pp. 829840, p. 829.
3Kokkinakis v. Greece, app. no. 14307/88 (1993).
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in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 14  Prohibition of discrimination (concerning rights and freedoms stipulated
by the Convention):
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall
be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, associ-
ation with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
Article 1 of the Protocol No. 124 enlarges scope of Article 14 and sets out general
prohibition of discrimination:
(1) The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status.
(2) No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any
ground such as those mentioned in paragraph 1.
Article 2 of the First Protocol deals with right to education:
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any
functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State
shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in
conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.
Some other articles could be used to protect certain aspects of freedom of religion or
belief, although they do not refer directly to them: Article 8 (Right to respect for private
and family life), Article 10 (Freedom of expression) and Article 11 (Freedom of assembly
and association).
3.1.1 Admissibility
One of the important jobs of the Commission was to deal with the admissibility claims
under the Convention. Among other rather technical issues the question of standing
enjoys particular importance.
It is not entirely clear whether Article 9 rights are conﬁned to natural persons. It appears
that a distinction is drawn between freedom of conscience and freedom of religion.
4The Protocol No. 12 was opened for signature in Rome on 4th November 2000, entered into force
on 1st April 2005. As of 22nd March 2008 the total number of ratiﬁcations/accessions was 16 (total
number of signatures not followed by ratiﬁcations was 21).
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Because only individuals can have thoughts or conscience, these freedoms cannot be
relied on by corporations or associations.5
The Commission originally held that churches or religious organizations had no right
to bring a claim under either Article 9 or Article 2 of the First Protocol. It were the
adherents of the church who had a right to freedom of religion, not the churches them-
selves.6 Later, however, the Commission revised its decision to refuse to grant standing
to churches.7 The Commission has also recognized that some churches may be non-
governmental organizations and thus entitled to standing under Article 25. The Com-
mission has also extended its ruling to an association with religious and philosophical
objectives.8
While the Commission has decided that the legal person of a church can have a standing
to bring a freedom of religion case, freedom of conscience is not exercisable by a legal
person. The Commission has consistently denied that a proﬁt-making corporation could
have any claim (either as to conscience or religion) under Article 9. In later cases, how-
ever, the Commission did not exclude the possibility that a proﬁt-making organization
that was established for purposes of exercising philosophical beliefs in community with
others could have rights under Article 9(1).9
3.1.2 Interpretation of the Convention
The Court has accepted that Articles 3133 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties10 represent customary international law and that they are thus applicable to
interpreting the Convention.11 This means that the Court will interpret the words of the
Convention in good faith, in light of its objects and purposes and that it will be prepared
to use the travaux prépraratoires as a supplementary means of interpretation. Yet in
some cases the Court can be seen to emphasize the importance of fulﬁlling the objects
and purposes of the Convention, even if that at times requires a very broad approach
to the meaning of the words themselves.12 The Court has held that it should seek an
5Richard Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson. The Law of Human Rights. English. 1st ed. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2000, p. 970.
6Church of X v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 3798/68 (1968). Evans, Freedom of Religion under
the ECHR, p. 12.
7[The] disctinction between the Church and its members under Article 9(1) is essentially artiﬁcial.
When a church body lodges an application under the Convention, it does so in reality, on behalf of its
members. It should therefore be accepted that a church body is capable of possessing and exercising
the rights contained in Article 9(1) in ints own capacity as a representative of its members. X. and the
Church of Scientology v. Sweden, app. no. 7805/77 (1979).
8Omkarananda and the Divine Light Zentrum v. Switzerland, app. no. 8118/77 (1981).
9Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 1415.
10Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done at Vienna on 23 May 1969, entered into force on
27 January 1980.
11Golder v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 4451/70 (1975).
12Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 5152.
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interpretation of articles that is most appropriate in order to realise the aim and achieve
the object of the treaty, and not that which would restrict to the greatest possible degree
the obligations undertaken by the parties.13 It has also recognized the importance of
applying the Convention in such a way as to ensure that the rights granted in it are
practical and eﬀective and not merely theoretical and illusory.14
3.1.3 Article 9: What is Meant by Religion or Belief?
The ﬁrst part of Article 9 protects the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion without mentioning belief, but refers also to the right to change religion or
belief. The second part refers to the right of a person to manifest his religion or
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance, without mentioning thought or
conscience. Thus thought and conscience must be distinct in some way from religion
or belief, as there is a non-derogable obligation to protect the right to freedom of thought
and conscience, but there is no right to manifest them. 15
The word belief is introduced in second part of Article 9(1). It seems to cover con-
veniently groups that have some religious elements but do not necessarily fall into the
category of a religion (e.g. atheists or agnostics). Yet, if this is correct, the exclusion
of belief from the ﬁrst part of Article 9 seems to suggest that e.g. an atheist has the
right to manifest his or her belief, but his or her right to hold this belief is not protected.
Carolyn Evans suggests that probably the best way around this anomaly would be to
assume that beliefs are a subset of the broader category of thought and conscience. The
Court and Commission have worked under the assumption that there is a right both to
have and to manifest beliefs without making their reasoning on this issue clear.16
The task of deﬁning religion or belief in the context of Article 9 has generally been per-
formed by the Commission.17 The Commission has, however, not entered much into the
controversy as it has rarely determined that something that is alleged to be a religion or
belief is not.18 The Court held in Campbell and Cossans v. the United Kingdom that a
conviction under Article 2, Protocol 1 of the Convention is not synonymous with opin-
ion or ideas as used in Article 10 but is rather akin to the term beliefs in Article 9.
To amount to a conviction under Article 2 of Protocol 1, the belief in question had to
attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance.19 Under the pro-
13Wemhoﬀ v. Germany, app. no. 2122/64(1968).
14Artico v. Italy, app. no. 6694/74 (1980).
15Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 52. Malcolm D. Evans. Religious Liberty and In-
ternational Law in Europe. English. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 284285.
16Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 53.
17Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, pp. 290293.
18David Harris, Michael O'Boyle and Colin Warbrick. The Law of the European Convention on Human
Rights. English. London: Butterworths, 1995, pp. 357358. Cited according to Evans, Freedom of Religion
under the ECHR, p. 54.
19Para. 36, Campbell and Cossans v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 7511/76 and 7743/76 (1982).
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tection of Article 9 have fallen as religions or beliefs various Christian denominations,20
Islam,21 Hinduism,22 Buddhism,23 Judaism,24 atheism25 and even Druids26 and Divine
Light Zentrum.27
Whereas followers of well-known religions do not need to provide much information about
what they believe in, the situation of adherents to new faiths or people having some
kind of special belief has been more complicated. There were two cases in front of
the Commission dealing with right to free exercise of religion in prison. Sadly, neither
of applicants was able to provide suﬃcient information about existence of such religion.
First one claimed to be a light worshipper,28 second to be a member of the Wicca
religion.29 The Commission gave no indication of how many members a religion has to
have, what length of time it has to have been in existence, how developed its rules need
to be, or what other criteria it would consider relevant to the determination of whether
or not a religion or belief exists. It is possible that the Commission was just concerned
in the prison cases that prisoners might invent a religion or belief simply as a way of
getting priviledges to which they would not otherwise be entitled. Such a fear of abuse,
however, could be dealt with more directly and the State should be asked to show some
reason to think that the person is using religious or other belief fraudulently.30
Further complication is that the term belief could include relatively individualistic be-
liefs that are not part of a structured religion or organization of believers. Many atheists
fall into this category and the Court has explicitly recognized that the protection of
the Convention extends to free-thinkers, atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the uncon-
cerned.31 From perspective of history of religion it is possible to note that majority
of today indisputable religions (especially based upon revelation) started as some kind
20Knudsen v. Norway, app. no. 11045/84 (1985).
21X. v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 8160/78 (1981), Karaduman v. Turkey (1993).
22ISKCON and others v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 20490/92(1994).
23X. v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 5442/72 (1974).
24D. v. France, app. no. 10180/82 (1983).
25Angeleni v. Sweden, app. no. 10491/83 (1986).
26A.R.M. Chappell v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 10461/83 (1987).
27Omkarananda and the Divine Light Zentrum v. Switzerland, app. no. 8118/77 (1981).
28X. v. the Federal Republic of Germany , app. no. 4445/70 (1970).
29X. v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 7291/75 (1977). The applicant asked unsuccessfully his
religious denomination to be entered into the prison record. The Commission stated [i]t would seem,
however, that the registration entitles the prisoner concerned to certain facilities for the manifesting of
his religion. It is evident that such facilities are only conceivable if the religion to which the prisoner
allegedly adheres is identiﬁable. The Commission observes that in the present case the applicant has
not mentioned any facts making it possible to establish the existence of the Wicca religion. Such a
statement might be quite surprising taking into consideration the reputation and number of followers of
this neopagan religion.
30Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 5859.
31Kokkinakis v. Greece, app. no. 14307/88 (1993); Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR,
p. 58.
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of unstructured (or structures denying) movement of outcasts; and religious structure
appeared in the times after the ﬁrst generation when their personal experience needed
to be passed on.32
It is disputable whether certain political beliefs such as Nazism33 or communism34 are
to be considered as beliefs under Article 9, in contrast with e.g. politically or ethically
motivated paciﬁsm.3536
This might be caused by the Commission that tended to look at the word belief in
rather an abstract way and has not recognized that it is part of the phrase religion or
belief in Article 9. Part of this conceptual confusion could be avoided, according to
Carolyn Evans, if belief were to be given a more restricted meaning linked to it playing
essentially the same role in the life of the individual as religion. She points out that
attempt to treat all philosophies equally and fairly and reluctance to develop a theory
of religious freedom resulted in Commission stretching the idea of belief so that there
is an extra protection given to many ideas that would be better dealt with as simply
thought or conscinece. Even the types of manifestation outlined in the second part of
Article 9(1) suggest that belief is not intended to have a very general and broad scope,
as the protected manifestations are connected to relatively traditional religious practices
(particularly worship and observance). This leads the Commission into a dilemma when
dealing with cases involving the meaning of freedom of religion or belief and the scope
of the notion of manifestation. Having failed to use the deﬁnitional stage as a way of
ﬁltering out any but a very limited number of beliefs, it is then necessary for it to deﬁne
the rights under Article 9 narrowly in order to ensure that the scope of the Article does
not become so wide that it is impracticable.37
As Carolyn Evans argues, it is indeed a pity that neither the Commission nor the Court
were able to deﬁne (clearly) what deﬁnition of belief is and that this uncertainty results in
inconsistency in the case law. On the other hand, the concepts of religion, faith and belief
are highly controversial and should the Court or the Commission try to deﬁne them, even
more serious harm might be caused to faith-based communities and individuals.
32It is basically birth of tradition in its latin meaning of tradere  to hand over, to hand down an
account of an event but also to give up, surrender or betray.
33X. v. Austria, app. no. 1747/62 (1963).
34Hazar, Hazar, Açik v. Turkey , app. no. 16311/90, 16312/90, 16313/90 (1992).
35Arrowsmith v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 7050/75 (1978).
36Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 5657.
37Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 6566.
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3.1.4 Deﬁning Religion and Belief  Alternatives to the Viewpoint of the
Court
Indeed, the Court has found itself in situation when it is quite impossible to ﬁnd a
criterion for drawing a borderline between what religion or belief is  and what is not.38
What might help to deeper understanding of this dilematic state is short analysis of other
approaches.
None of the United Nations or regional treaties give a deﬁnition of religion or belief and,
while the travaux préparatoires of the various United Nations treaties do suggest a broad
consensus on the inclusion of non-theistic beliefs in the term belief, they give little insight
into what the terms mean beyond this. The application of these treaties by the relevant
bodies has also tended toward broad and inclusive deﬁnitions that lack precision39 and
needs to be deﬁned by case-law.40
Domestic courts have been forced to be a little more precise then international bodies,
although they too have been wary of developing an unduly restrictive or conservative
deﬁnition of religion or belief. The Supreme Court of the United States has excluded
beliefs with a secular basis or that are philosophical and personal rather then reli-
gious from the scope of the religion clauses of the First Amendment.41 Compared to
the European Court's emphasis on the coherence of a belief, the Supreme Court has
expressly recognized that religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent or
comprehensible to qualify for protection under the First Amendment.42
In developing a positive deﬁnition, the Supreme Court drew on the works of theologians,
particularly Paul Tillich, to hold that religious beliefs incorporate all sincere beliefs that
occupy a parallel role to religion.43 Tillich's work draws on the notion of ultimate
concern as the touchstone of religious experience. Every person, by this test, has an
ultimate concern that gives meaning and orientation to his or her life. Thus, to fall
within the meaning of religion, it is necessary for a person to show that he or she has
concern (i.e. a deep motivation) that is ultimate (i.e. fundamental and unable to be
38Similar situation mentions e.g. Z. Künh in case of drawing line between justiﬁable discrimination
and forbidden discrimination against. For more details see Zden¥k Kühn. Diskriminace v teoretickém
a srovnávacím kontextu. In: Rovnost a diskriminace. Czech. Ed. by Michal Bobek, Pavla Bou£ková and
Zden¥k Kühn. 1st ed. Praha: C. H. Beck, 2007, pp. 3742.
39See e.g. Human Rights Committee General Comment 22, Article 18 which states that Article 18
[of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic
beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief. The terms belief and religion are to
be broadly construed. Article 18 is not limited in its application to traditional religions or to religions
and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to those of traditional religions.
40Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 6061.
41Wisconsin v. Yoder, 380 U.S. 205 (1972).
42Thomas v. Review of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
43United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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compromised).44
Such a test is very subjective, and many beliefs can suﬃce as long as they are ultimate
for the believer. This may be an advantage as it can protect minority or new religions
even if they would not meet objective standards designed by the majority. Such
a deﬁnition is also capable of including philosophical movements such as humanism or
atheism which do not have traditional religious roots. However, its inclusiveness is also a
weakness. It provides no principled way to distinguish between, for example, an ultimate
concern with football and an ultimate concern with the tenets of Islam.45
Kent Greenawalt does not like courts using some kind of dictionary deﬁnition of religion.
He suggests an analogical concept of religion. According to this approach, religion should
be determined by the closeness of analogy in the relevant respects between the disputed
instance and what is indisputably religion. A claimant for protection would have to show
suﬃcient shared features with indisputable religion in a similar way that Wittgenstein
showed that the term games had no common deﬁnition but rather a series of family
resemblances.46
Something of a compromise between the content based deﬁnitions and those which sug-
gest reasoning by analogy, was used in the Australian High Court in The Church of the
New Faith v. The Commission of Pay-roll Tax (Victoria). The court held that no single
characteristic is determinative, but that the following criteria were helpful in character-
ising beliefs as religious: a belief that reality extends beyond that which is capable of
perception by the senses; that the ideas relate to man's nature and place in the uni-
verse and his relation to things supernatural; that the ideas are accepted by adherents
as requiring or encouraging them to observe particular standards or codes of conduct,
or to participate in speciﬁc practices having supernatural signiﬁcance; that adherents
constitute an identiﬁable group (even if loosely knit); and that adherents themselves see
the ideas as religious.47
44Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 63.
45Timothy Macklem. Reason and Religion. In: Faith in Law. English. Ed. by Peter Oliver. Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 2000. Cited according to Lucy Vickers. Religion and Belief Discrimination in Em-
ployment  the EU law. European Network of Legal Experts in the non-discrimination ﬁeld, 2007.
URL: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/fundamental_rights/pdf/legnet/07relbel_en.
pdf (visited on 27/04/2008), p. 26.
46And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and
cries-crossing: sometimes overall similarities. See aphorism 66 (and following). Ludwig Wittgenstein.
Philosophical Investigations. English. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001. URL: http://www.
galilean-library.org/pi7.html (visited on 23/03/2008). Kent Greenawalt. Religion as a Concept in
Constitutional Law. In: California Law Review 72.5 (1984). Pp. 753816, pp. 762764. Evans, Freedom
of Religion under the ECHR, p. 63.
47The Church of the New Faith v. The Commission of Pay-roll Tax (Victoria), High Court of
Australia, 154 C. L. R. 120 (19821983). Vickers, Religion and Belief Discrimination in Employment
 the EU law, p. 27. Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 64.
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3.1.5 Forum Internum and manifestation of religion or belief
According to the Court and in compliance with United Nations treaties, Article 9 pri-
marily protects the sphere of personal beliefs and religious creeds, i. e. the area which is
sometimes called the forum internum. In addition, it protects acts which are intimately
linked to these attitudes, such as acts of worship or devotion which are aspects of the
practice of a religion or belief in a generally recognised form. In protecting this personal
sphere, Article 9 does not always guarantee the right to behave in the public sphere in
a way which is dictated by such a belief.48 However, little consideration is given to
what precisely does this entail. If it only entails the right to maintain one's internal
beliefs, without any attempt to communicate them or act upon them, then there would
be little diﬃculty in its application both because of its simplicity and the rarity of it be-
ing breached, since an applicant would have to show that external pressure suﬃcient to
induce a forcible change in inner belief has been applied. In fact the approach adopted
is somewhat broader and focuses upon the danger of indoctrination inherent in being
obliged to act by the State in a way that runs counter to one's inner beliefs.49
The very case of State obliging to act in religious way contrary to one's personal belief
occured in Buscarini and Others v. San Marino. The newly elected members of Grand
General Council (the parliament of the Republic of San Marino) were required to take
an oath on the Gospels, which meant (according to the Court) swearing allegiance to a
particular religion on pain of forfeiting their parliamentary seats. The court held that
such interference was contrary to Article 9 as it was not necessary in a democratic
society.50 Carolyn Evans argues that this case should be an interference with forum
internum. The Court just assumed that it was dealing with a case of manifestation of
religion or belief and did not mention the issue of the basic freedom of religion itself.
This was a good opportunity for elaborating a bit more the concept of forum internum
and developing Court's jurisprudence relating to the ﬁrst limb of Article 9.51
The crucial question is the point at which an action by the State is so intrusive that it
is held to interfere, not merely with a person's right to manifest a religion but also with
his or her right to have a religion or belief. The answer so far seems to be that States
have to act very repressively before the Court or Commission will hold that they have
interfered with the forum internum.52
While the Court and Commission have been relatively limited in holding that a State has
interfered in the forum internum by forcing parcitipation in a non-religious programme,
48C. v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 10358/83 (1983). Para. 3, Porter v. the United Kingdom, app.
no. 15814/02 (2003).
49Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 7273. Evans, Religious Liberty and International
Law in Europe, Chapter 1.
50Buscarini and Others v. San Marino, app. no. 24645/94 (1999).
51Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 7374.
52Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 78.
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arguably diﬀerent considerations should apply when the State is or appears to be involved
in promoting a particular religious viewpoint. There are two primary contexts in which
this could be said to occur: the ﬁrst is in establishment of a State Church, the second is
in education of children in State schools.53 These two contexts are discussed in following
subsections separately.
While there is no acknowledgement of this in the jurisprudence of the Court and Com-
mission, the idea that beliefs and actions are separated and distinguishable notions is
controversial. In the United States a similar division between belief and action (the ﬁrst
being inviolable and the second open to limitation) has become part of the orthodoxy of
First Amendment case law.54
It is possible to say that acceptance of division between forum internum and forum
externum is typical only for Western secular thinking. Majority of religions (including
Judaism, Christianity and Islam) requires wholeness of life and does not diferentiate
between religious and non-religious sphere. However, it very much depends on particular
religious school or movement how is the religion lived out.
The second part of Article 9(1) provides for freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest someone's religion or belief, in worship,
teaching, practice and observance. The manifestation is subject to limitations of Article
9(2). We are now about to examine diﬀerent aspects and forms of the manifestation.
3.1.5.1 Alone or in Community with Others, in Public or in Private
The right to manifest one's religion in community with others has always been regarded
as an essential part of the freedom of religion and the two alternatives either alone or in
community with others in Article 9(1) cannot be considered as mutually exclusive, or as
leaving a choice to the authorities, but only as recognising that religion may be practised
in either form. At the same time, however, the freedom of religion is not absolute but
subject to the limitations of Article 9(2).55
While it is clear that individuals have a right to gather together for worship or reli-
gious ritual, the issue of whether the right to manifest a religion or belief in community
with others also allows for the creation of organizations, institutions, or other permanent
groups to promote the interest of the religion or belief is less clear. The Commission has
decided that Article 9 does not give rise to a right to be formally recognized or regis-
tered as a religion in States that still distinguish between recongized and non-recognized
religions.56
53Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 79.
54Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 7475.
55Para. 5, X. v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 8160/78 (1981).
56Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 104. X. v. Austria, app. no. 8652/79 (1981).
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3.1.5.2 Worship, Teaching, Practice and Observance
The Court and the Commission have not made it clear whether list of worship, teaching,
practice and observance is to be considered as taxative or not. Anyhow, the list tends to
be interpreted as exclusive and the Court and Commission have been reluctant to extend
Article 9 to allow for the creation of new rights that are not explictly mentioned in
the Convention. They rather focused on interpreting the four terms. Special attention
was given to the concept of practice which is by itself very broad and has required
interpretation. However, the term practice does not cover each act which is motivated
or inﬂuenced by a religion or a a belief.57
Worship has been given the highest status of the manifestations listed in Article 9(1).
The Court and Commission have not explicated the precise scope of the term and treat it
together with observance as self-evident and not in need of deﬁnition. Conversely, the
term teaching is not that clear by itself and for that reason does not have a common
deﬁnition or understanding before the Court. It includes, subject to certain limitations,
the freedom to attempt to convert others to one's belief. Thus it is often connected with
(improper) proselytism.58 An important issue is also transmitting teaching to younger
generations, so it is connected to school education.59 60
The leading case in interpretation of the term practice and its scope is Arrowsmith v. the
United Kingdom. Pat Arrowsmith was convicted under sections 1 and 2 of the Incitement
to Disaﬀection Act 1934, mainly on the ground that she had distributed leaﬂets to troops
stationed at an army camp endeavouring to seduce them from their duty or allegiance in
relation to service in Northern Ireland. She considered that her conviction and sentence
interfered with her right to manifest her paciﬁst belief as guaranteed by Article 9(1) and
her right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10.61
Pat Arrowsmith deﬁned her paciﬁsm as the commitment, in both theory and practice,
to the philosophy of securing one's political or other objectives without resort to the
threat or use of force against another human being under any circumstances, even in
response to the threat of or use of force. The Commission stated that such paciﬁsm as a
philosophy falls within the ambit of the right to freedom of thought and conscience. The
attitude of paciﬁsm may therefore be seen as a belief (conviction) protected by Article
9(1). However, the distribution of the leaﬂets by the applicant was not considered to be
57Arrowsmith v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 7050/75 (1978). Evans, Religious Liberty and
International Law in Europe, pp. 304307. Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 105106.
58Question of proselytism is further elaborated in subsection 3.1.6 Freedom to Change Religion and
Proselytism.
59Kokkinakis v. Greece, app. no. 14307/88 (1993); Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR,
pp. 107110; Clayton and Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights, pp. 972973.
60Freedom of religion in relation to right to education is further elaborated in subsection 3.1.9 Freedom
of Religion and Belief in Education.
61Arrowsmith v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 7050/75 (1978).
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protected by Article 9(1) as manifestation of her paciﬁst belief, because, according to
the Commission the leaﬂets did not express paciﬁst views.62
The Commission held that not all actions which are motivated by religion or belief are
covered by the protection in Article 9 but it did not set out any real test to determine
which actions are covered. By excluding actions that are merely motivated or inﬂuenced
by belief, the Commission suggested that a very direct link is needed between the belief
and the action if the action is to be considered a practice under Article 9. This has
come to be interpreted in later decisions of the Commission as a type of necessity test
or Arrowsmith test. Such an interpretation of Arrowsmith requires applicants to show
that they were required to act in a certain way because of their religion or belief.63
The Arrowsmith test was devised as a way of deﬁning and limiting the potentially open-
ended term practice. At times, however, the Commission has applied it also to worship
under Article 9(1). The high-water mark in this line is the controversial decision of X v.
the United Kingdom where the Commission suggested that no Article 9 issue was raised
because the applicant had not shown that Friday prayer was required by his religion, i.e.
Islam.64
The application of the Arrowsmith test by the Commission and Court has not been
consistent and its scope is not entirely clear. It seems that it is generally restricted to
questions of practice but that the Commission or Court have some discretion in whether
to characterize an issue as one of practice or another form of manifestation such as
teaching. It also appears that there are some cases that the Commission is prepared
simply to assume must fall outside the protection of Article 9, even without applying the
Arrowsmith or any other test to explain why this is so.65
The Court and Commission are not even very clear on what kind of evidence is necessary
for proving that certain practice is required by applicant's religion. They usually do
not accept subjective assessment of the applicants themselves, do not hear the evidence
oﬀered by them66 and reference to expert evidence or publications of faith-based bodies67
(authorities) happens rather on an ad hoc basis. It follows that this approach favours
organized religions with clear decision-making authority and assumes that individual
believers follow the teachings of the authorities.68 It means that the approach of the
Court and Commission does not respect and value pluralism inherent to religions and
faiths present in Europe and builds upon rather simpliﬁed understanding of religious
62Arrowsmith v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 7050/75 (1978).
63Arrowsmith v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 7050/75 (1978); Evans, Religious Liberty and Inter-
national Law in Europe, pp. 307312; Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 115.
64X. v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 8160/78 (1981); Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR,
p. 117.
65Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 117119.
66See e.g. X. v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 8160/78 (1981).
67E.g. report by the World Council of Churches in Kokkinakis v. Greece, app. no. 14307/88 (1993).
68Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 120123.
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aﬀairs, ending up in inconsitent case-law.
3.1.5.3 Limitations on Manifestations of Religion or Belief
Once it has been determined or assumed that an applicant's right to manifest a religion
or belief under Article 9(1) has been restricted, it is necessary to determine whether this
interference can be justiﬁed under Article 9(2). As to the case-law, Carolyn Evans notes
that because of the limited scope given to Article 9(1), relatively few cases have been
decided under Article 9(1), although it has come to greater prominence recently. In most
of these cases, the Commission and Court have paid scant attention to Article 9(1) and
either held with little explanation that there has been a breach of Article 9(1) or ignored
the Article 9(1) issue altogether. Moving to a consideration of Article 9(2) with little or
no discussion of Article 9(1) can lead the Court to pay undue attention to the arguments
of the government about its justiﬁcation for the law and its application, and to lose sight
of the importance to the individual of the manifestation of religion in question.69
The drafting of the limitation clause for Article 9 was a controversial process and the
drafters rejected the notion that all the rights in the Convention should be subject to
the same limitations clause (as had been the case for the Universal Declaration). The
ﬁnal draft of Article 9(2) was the narrowest of the proposed Articles, so the right to
manifest a religion or belief is subject to fewer limitations than the right to privacy
(Article 8), freedom of expression (Article 10), and freedom of peaceful assembly and
association (Article 11). The freedom to have or change a religion or belief is subject
to no limitations at all. The Court and Commission, however, have tended to deal with
Article 9(2) in a roughly similar way to the other limitations clauses and have interpreted
its wording quite broadly.70
The limitations have to be prescribed by law. According to the Court, there are two
requirements ﬂowing from this expression. Firstly, the law must be adequately accessible:
the citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of
the legal rules applicable to a given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a
law unless it is formulated with suﬃcient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his
conduct: he must be able  if need be with appropriate advice  to foresee, to a degree
that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may
entail. Those consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty: experience
shows this to be unattainable. Again, whilst certainty is highly desirable, it may bring
in its train excessive rigidity and the law must be able to keep pace with changing
circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a
greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions
69Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 134137.
70Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 137.
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of practice.71
A number of applicants in Article 9 cases have attempted to use the requirement that a
restriction on freedom of religion or belief be prescribed by law to turn their particular
case into a test case to challenge the validity of the law more generally. This has been the
case in particular with broadly drafted laws that speciﬁcally target religious behaviour
and under which numerous members of a particular religious minority have been tar-
geted.72 So far, however, no Article 9 case has succeeded and generally the Court has
explicitly held that the legislation under which State action was taken was prescribed by
law.73
If a restriction on religion or belief is prescribed by law, the Court or Commission then
considers whether the law or manner in which it was applied is necessary in a democratic
society for one of the reasons outlined in Article 9(2). In Handyside v. the United
Kingdom the Court outlined the concept of necessity and developed the notion that
States have a margin of appreciation in determining whether a particular restriction
on a right is required in the given circumstance. This is because by reason of their
direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities
are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on
the exact content of these requirements as well as on the necessity of a restriction
or penalty intended to meet them. The margin of appreciation is given both to the
domestic legislator (prescribed by law) and to the bodies, judicial amongst others, that
are called upon to interpret and apply the laws in force.74
However, the margin of appreciation is not unlimited. The Court maintains its super-
visory role. Carolyn Evans mentions some relevant factors to the width of the margin
that have been identiﬁed by the Court and Commission: level of consensus on the issue
among Contracting States, the extent to which the matter interferes with the core of
an applicant's private life, the importance of the right to a democratic and pluralistic
society, and the circumstances and background of the particular case.75
Any restriction placed on freedom to manifest a religion or belief must be necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public
order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Thus
States cannot simply argue that their actions were necessary for the pursuit of any State
interest, but have to show that the actions had a legitimate aim. One of the key issues
in determining whether a law has a legitimate aim is the extent to which the Court or
71Para. 49, Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 6538/74 (1979).
72Good examples are Kokkinakis v. Greece, app. no. 14307/88 (1993) and Manoussakis and Others
v. Greece, app. no. 18748/91 (1996).
73Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 139.
74Para. 48, Handyside v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 5493/72 (1976). Evans, Freedom of Religion
under the ECHR, p. 142.
75Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 143.
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Commission is prepared to accept a State's assertions as to the aim of the legislation in
question. It is necessary to note that the Court has been quite reluctant to test State's
justiﬁcations as the State is likely to have a better understanding of why a law was passed
and it does not want to accuse the State of bad faith and mendacity.76
Interests of public safety and protection of public order are usually taken together. It
is quite important not to interpret these terms too widely (as to e.g. public interest) for
the States tend to intervene in religious practices at any time they become inconvenient
or annoying to those in power. Proportionality requires a balancing of general public
concerns with the rights that are at stake. Carolyn Evans comments that in a number
of cases dealing with public order and safety limitations the Commission seemed more
concerned to determine whether there was any justiﬁcation for a State's claim of public
policy then to weigh this against the restrictions of religious freedom. This seems to be
changing into more restricted approach in the past years in cases such as Buscarini v.
San Marino or Serif v. Greece.77
When it comes to the protection of the health of those who are not members of a religion,
the issue is relatively simple and the need for the State to be able to invervene to protect
third parties is clear. However, laws that seek to protect adult religious believers from
risks that hey have choosen themselves raise more complex issues.78 Quite a nice example
of such dilemma might be case of X. v. the United Kingdom in which the applicant, a
practising Sikh, was ordered to pay ﬁnes for failing to comply with a regulation requiring
motorcyclists to wear a protective helmet. He alleged a violation of Article 9, arguing
that, as his religion required him to wear a turban, it was not possible for him to wear
a helmet. The Commission found that the obligation to wear a helmet was a necessary
safety measure and that any resulting interference with the applicant's freedom of religion
was justiﬁed for the protection of health by virtue of Article 9(2).79 This approach was
conﬁrmed recently in a case dealing with Sikh who was forced to remove his turban at a
security check on an airport.80
Other area that tends to be controversial in the health context is that of children who
are endangered by their parents' religious beliefs. This endangerment may take the form
of their parents refusing medical treatment, such as blood transfusion, on behalf of the
child or using religious practices (such as prayer treatment) instead of standard medical
treatment, or requiring the child to undergo a ritual that is physically hamrful, such as
female genital mutilation. Given the lack of consensus on how to deal with such cases,
and the fact that States that used their powers to overrule parents and permit hospitals
to treat minors would be acting to protect the health of the child, it is likely that the
76Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 147149.
77Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 149155.
78Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 155156.
79X. v. the United Kingdom app. no. 7992/77 (1978).
80Phull v. France app. no. 35753/03 (2005).
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actions of the States would fall withing the margin of appreciation.81
As the protection of morals is concerned, the States are accorded a fairly generous margin
of appreciation. This seems to be also outlook for the future, unless some evidence
emerges of a general European standard in particular circumstances.82 The cases rasing
moral issues are often intertwined with the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others, which are usually emphasized by the Court and Commission.83
The exercise of religious freedom gives rise to a range of potential conﬂicts with the
rights and freedoms of others. This happens both while balancing diﬀerent rights on
the level of the Convention84  and under the scope of limitation mentioned in Article
9(2). Thus, this restriction functiones as something of a catchall. As the Court has
noted, in democratic societies, in which several religions coexist within one and the
same population, it may be necessary to place restrictions on the freedom to manifest a
religion or belief in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that
everyone's beliefs are respected.85
Freedom of religion or belief might be also limited by Article 15 dealing with state of
emergency:
In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any
High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations
under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other
obligations under international law.
While some articles in the Convention are non-derogable under Article 15, Article 9 is
subject to it. The whole of Article 9, and not just the right to manifest a religion or
belief, is covered by the derogation, although it is diﬃcult to think of a situation that
would strictly require a state to interfere in the forum internum of believers. Anyway,
the Court has looked at states of emergency only a small number of times and no clear
case law has been established.86
3.1.5.4 Religious Symbols in Public Sphere
There are two interesting cases dealing with wearing religious symbols in public. In
both cases is the symbol in question Muslim headscarf, hijab. First case being Dahlab
81Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 157158.
82Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, p. 324.
83Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 160.
84Sometimes it is suggested that the limitations clause may have a wider scope then the rights under
the Convention. For details see Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 161162 and Evans,
Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, p. 328.
85Kokkinakis v. Greece, app. no. 14307/88 (1993); Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in
Europe, p. 328. Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 160161.
86Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 165.
CHAPTER 3. FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 35
v. Switzerland, second Leyla ahin v. Turkey. Lucia Dahlab, primary school teacher,
was prohibited from wearing a headscarf in the performance of her teaching duties. She
submitted that the measures taken against her infringed Article 9. The Court noted
that the applicant, who abandoned the Catholic faith and converted to Islam in 1991,
by which time she had already been teaching at the same primary school for more than
a year, wore an Islamic headscarf for approximately three years, apparently without any
action being taken by the head teacher or the district schools inspector or any comments
being made by parents. That implies that during the period in question there were
neither objections to the content or quality of the teaching provided by the applicant nor
attempts to take advangate of manifestation of her belief.87
The Court accepted that it is very diﬃcult to assess the impact that a powerful external
symbol such as the wearing of a headscarf may have on the freedom of conscience and
religion of very young children. The applicant's pupils were aged between four and eight,
an age at which children wonder about many things and are also more easily inﬂuenced
than older pupils. In those circumstances, it cannot be denied outright that the wearing
of a headscarf might have some kind of proselytising eﬀect, seeing that it appears to be
imposed on women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran and which is hard to
square with the principle of gender equality. It therefore appears diﬃcult to reconcile
the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect for others and,
above all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must
convey to their pupils.88
Thus, it is not a surprise that the Court accordingly considered prohibiting the applicant
from wearing a headscarf while teaching necessary in a democratic society. However,
what is quite unclear is the basis on which the Court based such assumptions and what
might be then considered as religious symbol with proselytising eﬀect. These questions
should have been answered in Leyla ahin v. Turkey, nontheless, they were addressed
only in dissenting opinion of Françoise Tulkens.
Leyla ahin was refused access to exams because she did not conform with a circular
forbiding to wear Islamic headscarf at the university. She submitted that the ban on
wearing the Islamic headscarf in institutions of higher education constituted an unjusti-
ﬁed interference with her right to freedom of religion, in particular, her right to manifest
her religion. The Court assumed that there was the interefence as stated without further
investigation89 (slight move forward in favour of applicants in comparison with former
87Dahlab v. Switzerland, app. no. 42393/98 (2001).
88Dahlab v. Switzerland, app. no. 42393/98 (2001).
89The applicant said that, by wearing the headscarf, she was obeying a religious precept and thereby
manifesting her desire to comply strictly with the duties imposed by the Islamic faith. Accordingly, her
decision to wear the headscarf may be regarded as motivated or inspired by a religion or belief and,
without deciding whether such decisions are in every case taken to fulﬁl a religious duty, the Court
proceeds on the assumption that the regulations in issue, which placed restrictions of place and manner
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decisions). The Court found that there was legal basis (although contested by the appli-
cant) and the interference was prescribed by law. The legitimacy of the aim was not an
issue between the parties.90
So the Court moved to examine whether the interference was necessary in a democratic
society. The Court noted the emphasis placed in the Turkish constitutional system on
the protection of the rights of women and gender equality and considered that, when
examining the question of the Islamic headscarf in the Turkish context, there must be
borne in mind the impact which wearing such a symbol, which is presented or perceived as
a compulsory religious duty, may have on those who choose not to wear it. The issues at
stake include the protection of the rights and freedoms of others and the maintenance
of public order in a country in which the majority of the population, while professing a
strong attachment to the rights of women and a secular way of life, adhere to the Islamic
faith. Imposing limitations on freedom in this sphere may, therefore, be regarded as
meeting a pressing social need by seeking to achieve those two legitimate aims, especially
since this religious symbol has taken on political signiﬁcance in Turkey in recent years.
There are extremist political movements in Turkey which seek to impose on society as a
whole their religious symbols and conception of a society founded on religious precepts.
Thus, the States are allowed to take a stance against such political movements, based
on its historical experience. The regulations were viewed as preserving pluralism in the
university. 91
The Court concluded that having regard to the above background, it is the principle of
secularism . . . which is the paramount consideration underlying the ban on the wearing
of religious symbols in universities. In such a context, where the values of pluralism,
respect for the rights of others and, in particular, equality before the law of men and
women are being taught and applied in practice, it is understandable that the relevant
authorities should wish to preserve the secular nature of the institution concerned and so
consider it contrary to such values to allow religious attire, including, as in the present
case, the Islamic headscarf, to be worn. The Court found that the interference in issue
was justiﬁed in principle and proportionate to the aim pursued and consequently there
was no breach of Article 9.92
The decision of the Grand Chamber has been sixteen to one. It is quite interesting to
read the dissenting opinion of judge Tulkens who discusses both principles underlying
majority decision, secularism and (gender) equality. She opposes the threat posed by
extremist political movements seeking to impose on society as a whole their religious
on the right to wear the Islamic headscarf in universities, constituted an interference with the applicant's
right to manifest her religion. Para. 78, Leyla ahin v. Turkey, app. no. 44774/98 (2005).
90Para. 1517, 70, 7699, Leyla ahin v. Turkey, app. no. 44774/98 (2005).
91Para. 115, Leyla ahin v. Turkey, app. no. 44774/98 (2005). Partially based on Refah Partisi
(Welfare Party) v. Turkey, app. no. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98 (2003).
92Para. 116, 122 and 123, Leyla ahin v. Turkey, app. no. 44774/98 (2005).
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symbols and conception of a society founded on religious precepts on which the majority
based justiﬁcation of the regulations in issue to preserve pluralism in the university.
While everyone agrees on the need to prevent radical Islamism, a serious objection may
nevertheless be made to such reasoning. Merely wearing the headscarf cannot be asso-
ciated with fundamentalism and it is vital to distinguish between those who wear the
headscarf and extremists who seek to impose the headscarf as they do other religious
symbols. Not all women who wear the headscarf are fundamentalists and there is nothing
to suggest that the applicant held fundamentalist views. She pointed out also ambivalent
meaning of headscarf as a symbol, which the Court did not deal with.93 According to her
it is not even up to the Court to make scuh appraisals of a religion or religious practice.
She concludes that if wearing the headscarf really was contrary to the principle of the
equality of men and women in any event, the State would have a positive obligation to
prohibit it in all places, whether public or private.94
Judge Tulkens elaborated also on the right to education in general:
By accepting the applicant's exclusion from the University in the name of
secularism and equality, the majority have accepted her exclusion from pre-
cisely the type of liberated environment in which the true meaning of these
values can take shape and develop. University aﬀords practical access to
knowledge that is free and independent of all authority. Experience of this
kind is far more eﬀective a means of raising awareness of the principles of
secularism and equality than an obligation that is not assumed voluntarily,
but imposed. A tolerance-based dialogue between religions and cultures is
an education in itself, so it is ironic that young women should be deprived of
that education on account of the headscarf. Advocating freedom and equality
for women cannot mean depriving them of the chance to decide on their fu-
ture. Bans and exclusions echo that very fundamentalism these measures are
intended to combat. Here, as elsewhere, the risks are familiar: radicalisation
of beliefs, silent exclusion, a return to religious schools. When rejected by
the law of the land, young women are forced to take refuge in their own law.
As we are all aware, intolerance breeds intolerance.95
93As the German Constitutional Court noted in its judgment of 24 September 2003, wearing the
headscarf has no single meaning; it is a practise that is engaged in for a variety of reasons. It does not
necessarily symbolise the submission of women to men and there are those who maintain that, in certain
cases, it can even be a means of emancipating women. Para. 11, Dissenting opinion of judge Tulkens,
Leyla ahin v. Turkey, app. no. 44774/98 (2005).
94Dissenting opinion of judge Tulkens, Leyla ahin v. Turkey, app. no. 44774/98 (2005).
95Dissenting opinion of judge Tulkens, Leyla ahin v. Turkey, app. no. 44774/98 (2005).
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3.1.6 Freedom to Change Religion and Proselytism
Although quite many people are raised up by their families in a particular faith, it is
not the only way of becoming follower of a particular religion. Irrespective of start of
individual spiritual journey inside or outside religious community, the person's belief
changes during the lifetime. It is quite necessary to provide suﬃcient space for a person
to act accordingly to his belief. This is also provided for by Article 9 which includes
freedom to change someone's religion or belief.
It might be noted that in many religious systems true living of a particular faith means
living it out and talking to other people about the spiritual way found. This means
walking on thin ice endangered by breaching freedoms of partner(s) in dialogue and
commiting improper proselytism. The Court dealt with this subject matter in famous
case of Kokkinakis v. Greece.
The facts of the case are quite simple: Minos Kokkinakis, who was born into and Or-
thodox family, became Jehovah's Witness and since that time was subjected to several
arrests and police harassments. On 2 March 1986 he and his wife called at the home of
Mrs Kyriakaki in Sitia and engaged in a discussion with her. Mrs Kyriakaki's husband,
who was the cantor at a local Orthodox church, informed the police, who arrested Mr
and Mrs Kokkinakis and took them to the local police station.96 Following the arrest,
they were tried for proselytism. According to section 4 of Law no. 1363/1938
[b]y proselytism is meant, in particular, any direct or indirect attempt to
intrude on the religious beliefs of a person of a diﬀerent religious persuasion
(eterodoxos), with the aim of undermining those beliefs, either by any kind
of inducement or promise of an inducement or moral support or material
assistance, or by fraudulent means or by taking advantage of his inexperience,
trust, need, low intellect or naïvety.97
Mr Kokkinakis criticised the absence of any description of the objective substance of the
oﬀence of proselytism. He thought this deliberate, as it would tend to make it possible
for any kind of religious conversation or communication to be caught by the provision.
He referred to the risk of extendibility by the police and often by the courts too of
the vague terms of the section, such as in particular and indirect attempt to intrude
on the religious beliefs of others. The Court has not accepted this argumentation and
reiterated that the wording of many statutes is not absolutely precise. The need to
avoid excessive rigidity and to keep pace with changing circumstances means that many
laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague.
Criminal-law provisions on proselytism fall within this category. The interpretation and
application of such enactments depend on practice. In this instance there existed a body
96Para. 6 and 7, Kokkinakis v. Greece, app. no. 14307/88 (1993).
97Para. 16, Kokkinakis v. Greece, app. no. 14307/88 (1993).
CHAPTER 3. FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 39
of settled national case-law, which had been published and was accessible, supplemented
the letter of section 4 and was such as to enable Mr Kokkinakis to regulate his conduct
in the matter.98
Thus the Court held that the measure complained was prescribed by law within the
meaning of Article 9(2) and also pursued legitimate aim (the latter without providing
detailed reasoning).99
According to the Court, Article 9 includes in principle the right to try to convince one's
neighbour, for example through teaching, failing which, moreover, freedom to change
[one's] religion or belief, would be likely to remain a dead letter. However, a distinction
has to be made between bearing Christian witness and improper proselytism. The former
corresponds to true evangelism. The latter represents a corruption or deformation of it.
It may take the form of activities oﬀering material or social advantages with a view to
gaining new members for a Church or exerting improper pressure on people in distress or
in need; it may even entail the use of violence or brainwashing; more generally, it is not
compatible with respect for the freedom of thought, conscience and religion of others.
Scrutiny of section 4 of Law no. 1363/1938 showed that the relevant criteria adopted by
the Greek legislature were reconcilable with the foregoing if and in so far as they were
designed only to punish improper proselytism. However, the Greek courts established
the applicant's liability by merely reproducing the wording of section 4 and did not
suﬃciently specify in what way the accused had attempted to convince his neighbour
by improper means. There was missing justiﬁcation of the applicant's conviction by
a pressing social need and thus the contested measure was not proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued or, consequently, necessary in a democratic society . . . for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. For that reason the Court found a
breach of Article 9.100
From the (lack of) reasoning, weak and controversial argumentation it is quite under-
standable that the judgement was criticized also by the judges of the Court. There are
ﬁve separate opinions.
Judge Pettiti stated that the Law in question contradicted Article 9 as, despite being
forseeable, made it possible at any moment to punish the slightest attempt by anyone to
convince a person he was addressing. Moreover, the expression proselytism that is not
respectable, which was a criterion used by the Greek courts when applying the Law, was
suﬃcient for the enactment and the case-law applying it to be regarded as contrary to
Article 9. Judge Pettiti contested also haziness of the deﬁnition of proselytism and too
wide martin of interpretation for determining criminal penalties (so that the decisions
are almost arbitrary). As the relation of freedom of religion and proselytims is concerned,
he noted that:
98Para. 38 and 40, Kokkinakis v. Greece, app. no. 14307/88 (1993).
99Para. 41 and 44, Kokkinakis v. Greece, app. no. 14307/88 (1993).
100Para. 31, 48, 49 and 50, Kokkinakis v. Greece, app. no. 14307/88 (1993).
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Freedom of religion and conscience certainly entails accepting proselytism,
even where it is not respectable. Believers and agnostic philosophers have
a right to expound their beliefs, to try to get other people to share them and
even to try to convert those whom they are addressing. The only limits on
the exercise of this right are those dictated by respect for the rights of others
where there is an attempt to coerce the person into consenting or to use
manipulative techniques. The other types of unacceptable behaviour  such
as brainwashing, breaches of labour law, endangering of public health and
incitement to immorality, which are found in the practices of certain pseudo-
religious groups  must be punished in positive law as ordinary criminal
oﬀences. Proselytism cannot be forbidden under cover of punishing such
activities.101
Judge Martens is of the opinion that whether or not somebody intends to change religion
is no concern of the State's and, consequently, neither in principle should it be the State's
concern if somebody attempts to induce another to change his religion. He continues that
many religious faiths count teaching the faith (which is protected by Article 9) amongst
the principal duties of believers. Admittedly, such teaching may gradually shade oﬀ into
proselytising, which creates a possible conﬂict between two subjects of the right to
freedom of religion. In principle, however, it is not within the province of the State to
interfere in this conﬂict between proselytiser and proselytised. Firstly, because  since
respect for human dignity and human freedom implies that the State is bound to accept
that in principle everybody is capable of determining his fate in the way that he deems
best  there is no general justiﬁcation for the State to use its power to protect the
proselytised. Secondly, because even the public order argument cannot justify use of
coercive State power in a ﬁeld where tolerance demands that free argument and debate
should be decisive. And thirdly, because under the Convention all religions and beliefs
should, as far as the State is concerned, be equal.102
On the other hand, according to judge Valticos freedom of religion certainly means
freedom to practise and manifest it, but not to attempt persistently to combat and alter
the religion of others, to inﬂuence minds by active and often unreasonable propaganda.103
Kokkinakis v. Greece was further elaborated in respect of proselytism in Larissis and
Others v. Greece, where oﬃcers in the army, who were members of Pentecostal church,
were accused of proselytising their subordinates. The Court noted that
101Partly concurring opinion of judge Pettiti, Kokkinakis v. Greece, app. no. 14307/88 (1993).
102Para. 14 and 15, Partly dissenting opinion of judge Martens, Kokkinakis v. Greece, app. no.
14307/88 (1993).
103Dissenting opinion of judge Valticos, Kokkinakis v. Greece, app. no. 14307/88 (1993). It is worth
to read this dissenting opinion as it argues almost militantly against any form of religious proselytism.
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the hierarchical structures which are a feature of life in the armed forces
may colour every aspect of the relations between military personnel, making
it diﬃcult for a subordinate to rebuﬀ the approaches of an individual of
superior rank or to withdraw from a conversation initiated by him. Thus,
what would in the civilian world be seen as an innocuous exchange of ideas
which the recipient is free to accept or reject, may, within the conﬁnes of
military life, be viewed as a form of harassment or the application of undue
pressure in abuse of power. It must be emphasised that not every discussion
about religion or other sensitive matters between individuals of unequal rank
will fall within this category. Nonetheless, where the circumstances so require,
States may be justiﬁed in taking special measures to protect the rights and
freedoms of subordinate members of the armed forces.104
3.1.7 Conscientious objection
Although there is no automatic right to conscientious objection in the Convention, the
state may in some circumstances be requiered to accommodate diﬀerences of conscience
by exempting a person from the operation of a general law or requirement where she or
he objects to it on the grounds of religion of beliefs.105
The issue has been raised in conjunction with religious education in schools and claims
by parents that their children be exempt from attending religious lessons, practices or
school events that are oﬀensive to their religious convictions.106 Widely disputed is also
conscientious objection in relation to military service.107
Many Contracting Parties have some form of compulsory military service required of
their young men by law. Historically, in some European States military service was ex-
pected of all able-bodied young men and no exemptions on the basis of conscience were
permitted. Nowadays, however, most European compulsory military service systems also
permit conscientious objectors (variously deﬁned) to perform substitute civilian service
if they are opposed to armed service. Generally a refusal to undertake either military
or alternative service leads to a variety of punishments, which can include imprison-
ment. Until very recently conscientious objectors have had little assistance from the
Convention.108
The question of conscientious objection has not been considered directly under Article
9 yet. The famous Thlimmenos v. Greece has been decided on the basis of Article 14
in conjuction of Article 9.109 For that reason it is awaited Court's decision in case of
104Para. 51, Larissis and Others v. Greece, app. no. 23372/94, 26377/94 and 26378/94 (1998).
105Clayton and Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights, p. 979.
106For more detailed analysis see subsection 3.1.9 Freedom of Religion and Belief in Education.
107Clayton and Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights, p. 979.
108Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 170.
109Iakovos Thlimmenos, Jehovah's Witness, was not appointed a chartered accountant as a result of
42 CHAPTER 3. FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
Bayatayan v. Armenia that was hold admissible for examination under Article 9.110
3.1.8 Freedom of Religion and State Church
Although churches and States in Europe are less intertwined nowadays in comparison
with the past, still there are number of State churches or majority churches with special
status.111 None of these States has oﬃcial policy of persecution or intolerance of other
religion. Most, however, give certain privileges or comparative beneﬁts to a particular
church (or churches) vis-à-vis other religions or churches.112 The Court held concerning
the State church the following:
A State Church system cannot in itself be considered to violate Article 9 of
the Convention. In fact, such a system exists in several Contracting States
and existed there when the Convention was drafted and when they became
parties to it. However, a State Church system must, in order to saﬁsfy Article
9, include speciﬁc safeguards for the individual's freedom of religion.113
One of the major areas of interconnectedness between State and State church(es) is the
economic area. The State may collect church taxes directly for an established church (or
for any other church) from people who are members of that church. The Commission
has also permitted a State to require a non-believer to pay the proportion of taxes to
a State church that is required for the Church to carry out its secular functions. For
all of these purposes the State can require people to notify it of a change of religion 
arguably an interference in the right not to be compelled to reveal one's religion. The
State may also authorize churches to require direct payments of church taxes and permit
the churches to use the judicial machinery of the State to enforce the payments. In
assessing cases related to taxation, the Commission has sometimes equated membership
of a church with members of a private organization and has not given consideration to
the fact that consequently the individuals might be required to reveal their religious
his past conviction for insubordination consisting in his refusal to wear the military uniform. The Court
agreed with the Greek government that persons who refuse to serve their country must be appropriately
punished. However, noted that the applicant did serve a prison sentence for his refusal to wear the
military uniform. Thus imposing a further sanction on him would be disproportionate. It followed that
the applicant's exclusion from the profession of chartered accountants had not pursued a legitimate aim.
As a result, the Court found that there existed no objective and reasonable justiﬁcation for not treating
the applicant diﬀerently from other persons convicted of a serious crime. Thlimmenos v. Greece, app.
no. 34369/97 (2000).
110Bayatayan v. Armenia, app. no. 23459/03.
111General overview of the church and State relations in the old 15 members of the European Union
can be found in Gerhard Robbers, ed. State and Church in the European Union. English. Baden-Baden:
Nomos, 1996.
112Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 80.
113Annex to the decision of the Court in Darby v. Sweden, app. no. 11581/85 (1990); cited according
to Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 80.
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aﬃliation. That may inhibit some persons from freely exercising their choice and may
thus act as a constraint on the forum internum.114
According to the Commission, the State may arrange the taxes in a way that provides
more beneﬁts to one church over another. In Iglesia Bautista El Salvador and Ortega
Moratilla v. Spain, a protestant church claimed the same exemption from property
tax as was granted to the Catholic Church in a Concordate. There was, however, no
infringement of Article 9, either alone or in conjuction with Article 14 as the Commission
found objective and reasonable justiﬁcation for the diﬀerence in treatment in the very
fact of the agreement between Spain and Holy See, which placed reciprocal obligations
on the two parties. As there was no comparable arrangement between the Baptist church
and the State, there was no discrimination in allowing tax exemption only to Catholic
Church. Finally, the Commission dissmissed the argument that exemption only for one
church was form of indirect contribution (subsidy) to the church as obligation to pay taxes
is a general and neutral one.115 Carolyn Evans notes that the decision was presumably
inﬂuenced by the fact that if all religions had to be given the same privileges as the State
church, the whole notion of State church would be undermined.116 The argumentation
of the Commission in this case is, anyway, a weak one.
Connected with taxation and redistribution of taxes are issues of power exercised by the
State in the State church or churches dependent on such redistribution. The Commission
found legitimate for the State to set out conditions for employment and limit religious
freedom of (some) civil servants117 which could be otherwise considered as interference
with the the autonomy of church and violation of religious freedom.
On the other hand, State church requires also State actions and State responsibility
under the Convention for some of the actions of the church. The State has the ability,
at least in some circumstances, to require a minister either to behave in a certain way
or to resign. The freedom of religion of ministers in established churches is, thus, quite
limited. The State could not force the minister to remain a member of the church or the
ministry but it could regulate minister's behaviour, even in areas of theological opinion
and conscience.118119
In comparison with State churches, regulation of non-State religious groups is far more
limited. Despite the State attempts to treat these religious groups in the same way as it
treats the State church. An exemplary case being Serif v. Greece in which Greek gov-
ernment prosecuted Serif for behaving as a Mufti of Rodopi. The problem was that he
114Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 8182.
115Iglesia Bautista El Salvador and Ortega Moratilla v. Spain, app. no. 17522/90 (1992).
116Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 84.
117X. v. Denmark, app. no. 7374/76 (1976).
118See e.g. X. v. Denmark, app. no. 7374/76 (1976) where Danish minister was not given freedom of
tailoring catechesis (preaparation for baptism) for a particular person and had to follow instructions of
Church Ministry preaching right to baptism without attending religous lessons.
119Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 8486.
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was elected by the Muslims attending Friday prayer after another person was elected and
appointed by the government. Greek government justiﬁed its intervention by claiming
to protect the public order (some acts of muftis are recognized by the civil law120) and
the communities from tensions. However, in the Court's view, punishing a person for
merely acting as the religious leader of a group that willingly followed him can hardly be
considered compatible with the demands of religious pluralism in a democratic society.
Moreover, the Court does not consider that, in democratic societies, the State needs
to take measures to ensure that religious communities remain or are brought under a
uniﬁed leadership. And although the Court recognises that it is possible that tension
is created in situations where a religious or any other community becomes divided, it
considers that this is one of the unavoidable consequences of pluralism. The role of the
authorities in such circumstances is not to remove the cause of tension by eliminating
pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each other.121 Nevertheless,
it is necessary to note that the Court evaded controversies inherent to the case by elabo-
rating on moral leadership of the Mufti as there was no proof of Serif exercising any acts
with civil law implications or causing any (violent) tensions in the community or among
the communities.
As Carolyn Evans points out, the issue of the extent to which the establishment of a
church may interfere in the forum internum of both members and non-members of the
church has rarely been considered and has only in the Darby case led the Commission to
the conclusion that the State had gone too far in seeking to promote the iterests of its
church. The historical importance of established religions in Europe seems to have made
the Court reluctant to engage with the diﬃcult philosophical questions that surround
the extent to which such establishment might create an environment that interferes with
the forum internum of both adherens and non-adherents of a particular religion.122
3.1.9 Freedom of Religion and Belief in Education
The drafters of the Convention were divided over how to protect the rights of parents
over their children's religious and moral education. It was generally agreed that using
a school for religious or moral indoctrination was abhorent and could become a tool of
120Article 11 of the Treaty of Peace of Athens between Greece and others provides: In addition to
their authority in purely religious matters and in the supervision of the management of vacouf property,
the muftis shall have jurisdiction as between Muslims in the spheres of marriage, divorce, maintenance
(nefaca), guardianship, administration, capacity of minors, Islamic wills and succession to the oﬃce of
mutevelli (Tevliét).
Judgments delivered by the muftis shall be enforced by the competent Greek authorities.
As regards successions, any interested Muslim party may with prior agreement submit a dispute to
the mufti as arbitrator. Unless the agreement expressly provides otherwise, all avenues of appeal to the
Greek courts shall lie against an arbitral award.
121Serif v. Greece, app. no. 38178/97 (1999).
122Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 87.
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a totalitarian government. There were, however, concerns that any protection of their
children should not involve expense of the State. Thus, while parents should be able to
require the State not to teach their child in a particular way, they should not be able to
demand that the State fund religious or moral education of a particular kind.123
The State can, however, choose to subsidize religious schools or pay for certain types
of religious education (whether in State schools124 or not) if it so desires. The concern
of the drafters of the Convention was not to keep the State out of religion, but rather
to ensure that the State was not subject to ﬁnancial demands that it did not wish to
meet.125
When faced with a school that wishes to teach a particular course and with parents
who want the course either to be taught diﬀerently or not at all, or for their child to be
excused from all or part of a course, the Court is faced with a diﬃcult dilemma. There
is a need to protect children from indoctrination and to protect the rights of parents to
choose the religious and moral education of their children. The Court must also consider,
however, the rights of a child to a full education and the practical diﬃculties caused to
schools if too many exemptions are given from attending certain subjects. There is also
the issue of whether society has a legitimate interest in seeing that all childern are given
a good, general education that may include information about issues which are morally
or religiously controversial.126
The Court addressed this dilemma in Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark
which dealt with parents objecting to integrated, and hence compulsory, sex education
introduced into State primary schools in Denmark. The Danish government contested
applicability of the second sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to State schools
and emphasized that Denmark does not force parents to entrust their children to the
State schools; it allows parents to educate their children, or to have them educated,
at home and, above all, to send them to private institutions to which the State pays
very substantial subsidies. The Court noted that the second sentence of Article 2 is
binding upon the Contracting States in the exercise of each and every function and it
must be read together with the ﬁrst sentence which enshrines the right of everyone to
education. It is on to this fundamental right that is grafted the right of parents to
respect for their religious and philosophical convictions, and the ﬁrst sentence does not
distinguish, any more than the second, between State and private teaching. The second
sentence of Article 2 aims at safeguarding the possibility of pluralism in education which
123Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 88.
124Of the 46 Council of Europe member States which were examined, 43 provide religious education
classes in state schools. In 25 of the 46 member States, religious education is a compulsory subject.
However, the scope of this obligation varies depending on the State. Para. 3031, Hasan and Eylem
Zengin v. Turkey, app. no. 1448/04 (2007).
125Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 89.
126Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 90.
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possibility is essential for the preservation of the democratic society as conceived by
the Convention. In view of the power of the modern State, it is above all through State
teaching that this aim must be realised.127
Danish government pleaded also that the second sentence of Article 2 implies solely
the right for parents to have their children exempted from classes oﬀering religious
instruction of a denominational character. According to the Court Article 2 applies to
each of the State's functions in relation to education and to teaching and does not permit
a distinction to be drawn between religious instruction and other subjects. It enjoins the
State to respect parents' convictions, be they religious or philosophical, throughout the
entire State education programme. The second sentence of Article 2 does not prevent
States from imparting through teaching or education information or knowledge of a
directly or indirectly religious or philosophical kind. It does not even permit parents
to object to the integration of such teaching or education in the school curriculum, for
otherwise all institutionalised teaching would run the risk of proving impracticable. In
fact, it seems very diﬃcult for many subjects taught at school not to have, to a greater or
lesser extent, some philosophical complexion or implications. The same is true of religious
aﬃnities if one remembers the existence of religions forming a very broad dogmatic
and moral entity which has or may have answers to every question of a philosophical,
cosmological or moral nature. However, the State, in fulﬁlling the functions assumed by
it in regard to education and teaching, must take care that information or knowledge
included in the curriculum is conveyed in an objective,128 critical and pluralistic manner.
The State is forbidden to pursue an aim of indoctrination that might be considered as
not respecting parents' religious and philosophical convictions.129
In Campbell and Cossans v. the United Kingdom, which is very much based upon ar-
gumentation of Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, the Court addressed
philosophical convictions of parents not agreeing with corporal punishment of their chil-
dren in school. The Court took as philosophical convictions such convictions as are wor-
thy of respect in a democratic society and are not incompatible with human dignity;
in addition, they must not conﬂict with the fundamental right of the child to education.
The Court noted that the right to education guaranteed by the ﬁrst sentence of Article 2
by its very nature calls for regulation by the State, but such regulation must never injure
the substance of the right nor conﬂict with other rights enshrined in the Convention
or its Protocols. A condition of access to an educational establishment that conﬂicts
with another right enshrined in Protocol No. 1 (such as return to school conditioned
127Para. 50, Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, app. no. 5095/71, 5920/72 and
5926/72 (1976).
128It is highly disputable whether there is a possibility to present anything in an objective manner,
this being so especially in the area of philosphy and religon.
129Para. 5153, Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, app. no. 5095/71, 5920/72 and
5926/72 (1976).
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by accepting corporal punishment which is contrary to parents' convictions) cannot be
described as reasonable and in any event falls outside the State's power of regulation
under Article 2.130
The Court also pointed out that the education of children is the whole process whereby,
in any society, adults endeavour to transmit their beliefs, culture and other values to the
young, whereas teaching or instruction refers in particular to the transmission of knowl-
edge and to intellectual development. In relation to this the Court expressed that attempt
to separate matters related to internal administration (allegedly corporal punishment)
from education and teaching under Article 2 is quite artiﬁcial and not justiﬁable. The
imposition of disciplinary penalties is an integral part of the process whereby a school
seeks to achieve the object for which it was established, including the development and
moulding of the character and mental powers of its pupils.131
Building on Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark is also Commission deci-
sion in Angeleni v. Sweden which dealt with atheist applicants contesting not granting
of exception from teaching of religious knowledge in Swedish school system. The Com-
mission found complaint of the parent incompatible ratione personae with the Article 2
of protocol No. 1 as it was read in conjuction with Swedish reservation providing that
exeptions from religious clases could only be granted for children of another faith than
the Swedish Church in respect of whom a satisfactory religious instruction had been
arranged. The Commission noted that the organisation of the instruction of religious
knowledge falls under Article 2 of the Protocol No. 1 (and thus Swedish reservation
applies), however protection against religious indoctrination falls under Article 9 (and
Swedish reservation does not apply).132
The Commission is of the opinion that Article 9 of the Convention aﬀords protection
against indoctrination of religion by the State, be it in education at school or in any
other activity for which the State has assumed responsibility. As regards the contents
of the instruction in religious knowledge the Swedish government submitted that the
teaching in the subject religious knowledge aimed at being a teaching about religion, not
in religion. In principle, teaching which provides information only cannot be regarded as
being in conﬂict with the Convention or its Protocols. The Commission concluded that
the mere fact of instruction in religious knowledge focusing on Christianity at junior level
at school does not mean that the second applicant was under religious indoctrination in
breach of Article 9.133
Carolyn Evans notes that Angeleni v. Sweden means shift from emphasis on general
and neutral conveyance of information as a means of protecting against potential in-
doctrination to requiring the applicant to show actual indoctrination  which is a far
130Para. 3641, Campbell and Cossans v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 7511/76 and 7743/76 (1982).
131Para. 33, Campbell and Cossans v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 7511/76 and 7743/76 (1982).
132Angeleni v. Sweden, app. no. 10491/83 (1986).
133Angeleni v. Sweden, app. no. 10491/83 (1986).
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higher test for the applicant to meet. Moreover, it can be argued that the Commission
has been less sympathetic to atheists/agnostics who claim the need to be exempted from
religious instruction then to members of other religious faiths.134
In case of Valsamis v. Greece parents (Jehovah's Witnesses) claimed Article 2 of the
Protocol No. 1 to be breached when their 12-year-old daughter was asked to take part
in the celebration of the National Day on 28 October, when the outbreak of war between
Greece and Fascist Italy on 28 October 1940 is commemorated with school and military
parades. The girl refused to take part and was punished with one day's suspension
from school. The refusal was based on paciﬁst conviction of Jehovah's Witnesses. The
Court stated that it can discern nothing, either in the purpose of the parade or in the
arrangements for it, which could oﬀend the applicants' paciﬁst convictions to an extent
prohibited by the second sentence of Article 2 (or Article 9). The obligation on the
pupil does not deprive her parents of their right to enlighten and advise their children,
to exercise with regard to their children natural parental functions as educators, or to
guide their children on a path in line with the parents' own religious or philosophical
convictions. And it is not for the Court to rule on the expediency of other educational
methods which, in the applicants' view, would be better suited to the aim of perpetuating
historical memory among the younger generation.135
Case dealing with education under Article 9, however not invoking Article 2 of Protocol
No. 1, is Saniewski v. Poland. Bartosz Saniewski received a school report containig
a list of courses that he had followed, including religion/ethics, and marks obtained
for his progress. The place reserved for religion/ethics contained no mark, but was
left blank. Likewise, places reserved for certain other subjects such as informatics,
music and ﬁne arts were left blank. The applicant asserted that his freedom of
thought and conscience was breached since the absence of a mark for the course in
religion revealed that he had not followed the course. He was obliged thereby to make
a public statement as to his beliefs. The Court recalled the case-law of Commission
which found that there was no interference with the rights safeguarded by Article 9
where voluntary religious education had been organised in State schools, or exemptions
were possible from compulsory religious education, or when marks for attendance at
such courses or alternative ethics courses were foreseen in school reports.136 The Court
concluded that as the applicant did not show suﬀering such consequences from the school
report which could be said to amount to an interference with his rights and freedoms
guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention, the application is to be rejected as being
manifestly ill-founded.137
134Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, pp. 9495.
135Valsamis v. Greece, app. no. 21787/93 (1996).
136See C.J., J.J. and E.J. v. Poland, app. no. 23380/94 (1996) and Angeleni v. Sweden, app. no.
10491/83 (1986).
137Para. 1, Saniewski v. Poland, app. no. 40319/98 (2001).
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Present Europe is characterized by higher percentage and participation of religious mi-
norities connected with emphasis on intercultural and inter-religious dialogue. It is not
of a great surprise then, that recently there were two controversial cases dealing with
content and character of religious education in public schools. First being Folgerø and
Others v. Norway and second Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey.
In Folgerø and Others v. Norway parents complained both under Article 9 and under the
second sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the refusals by the domestic
authorities to grant their children full exemption from the compulsory KRL subject
dealing with Christianity, Religion and Philosophy taught during the ten-year compulsory
schooling in Norway. The question to be determined was whether Norway, in fulﬁlling
its functions in respect of education and teaching, had taken care that information or
knowledge included in the Curriculum for the KRL subject was conveyed in an objective,
critical and pluralistic manner or whether it had pursued an aim of indoctrination not
respecting the applicant parents' religious and philosophical convictions and thereby had
transgressed the limit implied by Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.138
The Norwegian Education Act 1998 laid emphasis on the transmission of knowledge
about not only Christianity but also other world religions and philosophies. It moreover
stressed the promotion of understanding and respect for, and the ability to maintain
dialogue between, people with diﬀerent perceptions of beliefs and convictions. It was to
be an ordinary school subject that should normally bring together all pupils and should
not be taught in a preaching manner. The diﬀerent religions and philosophies were to be
taught from the standpoint of their particular characteristics and the same pedagogical
principles were to apply to the teaching of the diﬀerent topics. From the drafting history
it emerges that the idea was that the aim of avoiding sectarianism and fostering intercul-
tural dialogue and understanding could be better achieved with an arrangement bringing
pupils together within the framework of one joint subject rather than an arrangement
based on full exemption and splitting pupils into sub-groups pursuing diﬀerent topics.
Moreover, it should be noted that the second sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1
does not embody any right for parents that their child be kept ignorant about religion
and philosophy in their education. That being so, the fact that knowledge about Chris-
tianity represented a greater part of the Curriculum for primary and lower secondary
schools than knowledge about other religions and philosophies cannot, in the Court's
opinion, of its own be viewed as a departure from the principles of pluralism and ob-
jectivity amounting to indoctrination. In view of the place occupied by Christianity in
the national history and tradition of Norway, this must be regarded as falling within the
State's margin of appreciation in planning and setting the curriculum.139
When seen together with the Christian object clause (according to which the object of
138Para. 53 and 85, Folgerø and Others v. Norway, app. no. 15472/02 (2007).
139Para. 89, Folgerø and Others v. Norway, app. no. 15472/02 (2007).
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primary and lower secondary education was to give pupils a Christian and moral up-
bringing), the description of the contents and the aims of the KRL subject suggests that
not only quantitative but even qualitative diﬀerences were to be applied to the teaching
of Christianity as compared to that of other religions and philosophies. It is not clear
then how promoting understanding, respect and the ability to maintain dialogue between
people with diﬀerent perceptions of beliefs and convictions, could be properly attained.
In the Court's view, the diﬀerences were such that they could hardly be suﬃciently at-
tenuated by the requirement for the teaching to follow a uniform pedagogical approach
in respect of the diﬀerent religions and philosophies.140
The Court examined the system of partial exemption which pressuposed that the parents
concerned be adequately informed of the details of the lesson plans to be able to identify
and notify to the school in advance those parts of the teaching that would be incompatible
with their own convictions and beliefs. The Court found that the system of partial
exemption was capable of subjecting the parents concerned to a heavy burden with a risk
of undue exposure of their private life and that the potential for conﬂict was likely to deter
them from making such requests. In certain instances, notably with regard to activities
of a religious character, the scope of a partial exemption might even be substantially
reduced by diﬀerentiated teaching. This could hardly be considered consonant with the
parents' right to respect for their convictions for the purposes of Article 2 of Protocol
No. 1, as interpreted in the light of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention. In this respect,
it must be remembered that the Convention is designed to guarantee not rights that are
theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and eﬀective.141
Notwithstanding the many laudable legislative purposes stated in connection with the
introduction of the KRL subject in the ordinary primary and lower secondary schools, the
Court concluded that Norway did not take suﬃcient care that information and knowledge
included in the curriculum was conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner
for the purposes of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.142 The Grand Chamber decided nine
votes to eight that there was a violation of Article 2 which reﬂects how complex and
controversial issues at stake are.143
In Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey the applicants came again from a religious mi-
nority, or better to say from a minority branch of Islam, Alevism. Ms Zengin, who
was a pupil in a state school, was obliged to attend classes in religious culture and
ethics from the fourth year of primary school. The Court had to determine, ﬁrstly,
if the content-matter of this subject was taught in an objective, critical and pluralist
manner. Secondly, it examined whether appropriate provisions have been introduced in
140Para. 9095, Folgerø and Others v. Norway, app. no. 15472/02 (2007).
141Para. 97100, Folgerø and Others v. Norway, app. no. 15472/02 (2007).
142Para. 102, Folgerø and Others v. Norway, app. no. 15472/02 (2007).
143For reading basically opposite reasoning in majority of case elements see joint dissenting opinion of
judges Wildhaber, Lorenzen, Birsan, Kovler, Steiner, Borrego Borrego, Hajiyev and Jebens.
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the Turkish educational system to ensure that parents' convictions to be respected.144
According to the syllabus for religious culture and ethics classes, the subject was taught
in compliance with respect for the principles of secularism and freedom of thought, re-
ligion and conscience, and was intended to foster a culture of peace and a context of
tolerance. It also aimed to transmit knowledge concerning all of the major religions.
The syllabus and textbooks for teaching in primary schools and the ﬁrst cycle of sec-
ondary school gave greater priority to knowledge of (Sunni) Islam in comparison with
other religions and philosophies, but the extent did not amount to indoctrination, hav-
ing regard to the fact that, (Sunni) Islam is the majority religion practiced in Turkey.
However, the Court noted that religious diversity which prevails in Turkish society was
not taken into account and Alevi faith was not represented (enough) in the syllabus
and textbooks. For that particular reason the Court concluded that the school subject
religious culture and ethics cannot be considered to meet the criteria of objectivity
and pluralism and to respect the religious and philosophical convictions of Ms Zengin's
father. As for the second question, Turkish law provided possibility to opt-out from
religious clases (of Sunni Islam) only for Christians and Jews; followers of other faiths
had to undertake special examination and disclose their religious aﬃliation. The Court
did not consider the exemption procedure to be appropriate method providing suﬃcient
protection to those parents who could legitimately consider that the subject taught is
likely to give rise in their children to a conﬂict of allegiance between the school and their
own values. Thus the Court unanimously held that there was a violation of Article 2 of
Protocol No. 1. 145
3.1.10 Freedom of Religion and Belief versus Freedom of Expression
Freedom of religion and freedom of expression are both fundamental freedoms upon which
Western democracy is based. In deciding cases dealing with freedom of expression, the
problem is usually not what is still to be considered as expression, but how to balance
positive and negative consequences of such an expression,146 especially as interference
with religious freedom is concerned.
An early case dealing with conﬂict of freedom of religion and freedom of expression was
brought forward by Church of Scientology and its members in 1970s. They felt insulted
by agitation against them published in local Swedish newspaper. The infamatory
statement was made by a professor of theology in the course of a lecture.147 The Com-
144Para. 5657, Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, app. no. 1448/04 (2007).
145Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, app. no. 1448/04 (2007).
146Petr Jäger and Pavel Molek. Svoboda projevu. Demokracie, rovnost a svoboda slova. Czech. 1st ed.
Praha: Auditorium, 2007, p. 28.
147It included following passage: Scientology is the most untruthful movement there is. It is the
cholera of spiritual life. That is how dangerous it is. Church of Scientology and 128 of its members v.
Sweden, app. no. 8282/78 (1980).
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mission held that a particular creed or confession cannot derive from the concept of
freedom of religion a right to be free from ctiticism. The Comission did not exclude the
possibility of criticsm or agitation against a church or religious group unless it reaches
such a level that it might endanger freedom of religion and tolerance of such behaviour
by the authorities could engage State responsibility.148
In case of Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria149 the Court reiterated150 that
those who choose to exercise the freedom to manifest their religion, irrespec-
tive of whether they do so as members of a religious majority or a minority,
cannot reasonably expect to be exempt from all criticism. They must tolerate
and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and even the propa-
gation by others of doctrines hostile to their faith. However, the manner in
which religious beliefs and doctrines are opposed or denied is a matter which
may engage the responsibility of the State, notably its responsibility to ensure
the peaceful enjoyment of the right guaranteed under Article 9 (art. 9) to
the holders of those beliefs and doctrines. Indeed, in extreme cases the eﬀect
of particular methods of opposing or denying religious beliefs can be such as
to inhibit those who hold such beliefs from exercising their freedom to hold
and express them. . . . The respect for the religious feelings of believers as
guaranteed in Article 9 (art. 9)151 can legitimately be thought to have been
violated by provocative portrayals of objects of religious veneration; and such
portrayals can be regarded as malicious violation of the spirit of tolerance,
which must also be a feature of democratic society.152
148Church of Scientology and 128 of its members v. Sweden, app. no. 8282/78 (1980).
149Otto-Preminger-Institut für audiovisuelle Mediengestaltung (OPI) announced a series of six show-
ings, which would be accessible to the general public, of the ﬁlm Das Liebeskonzil (Council in Heaven)
by Werner Schroeter (released in 1981). The ﬁlm portrays the God of the Jewish religion, the Christian
religion and the Islamic religion as an apparently senile old man prostrating himself before the Devil
with whom he exchanges a deep kiss and calling the Devil his friend. He is also portrayed as swearing
by the Devil. Other scenes show the Virgin Mary permitting an obscene story to be read to her and
the manifestation of a degree of erotic tension between the Virgin Mary and the Devil. The adult Jesus
Christ is portrayed as a low grade mental defective and in one scene is shown lasciviously attempting
to fondle and kiss his mother's breasts, which she is shown as permitting. God, the Virgin Mary and
Christ are shown in the ﬁlm applauding the Devil. At the request of the Innsbruck diocese of the Roman
Catholic Church, the public prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings against OPI's manager which
ended in seizure and forfeiture of the ﬁlm. Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, app. no. 13470/87
(1994).
150Church of Scientology and 128 of its members v. Sweden, app. no. 8282/78 (1980). Kokkinakis v.
Greece, app. no. 14307/88 (1993).
151Judges Palm, Pekkanen and Makarczyk oppose in their joint dissenting opinion that Convention
could guarantee a right to protection of religious feelings. More particularly, such a right cannot be
derived from the right to freedom of religion, which in eﬀect includes a right to express views critical of
the religious opinions of others.
152Para. 47, Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, app. no. 13470/87 (1994).
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Thus, the measures complained of by OPI were taken to protect the right of citizens not
to be insulted in their religious feelings by the public expression of views of other persons
and pursued a legitimate aim under Article 10 para. 2, namely the protection of the
rights of others. For whoever exercises the rights and freedoms enshrined in Article 10(1)
undertakes an obligation to avoid as far as possible expressions that are gratuitously
oﬀensive to others and thus an infringement of their rights, and which therefore do
not contribute to any form of public debate capable of furthering progress in human
aﬀairs.153 As a matter of principle it may be considered necessary in certain democratic
societies to sanction or even prevent improper attacks on objects of religious veneration,
provided always that any formality, condition, restriction or penalty imposed be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.154
The Court also reiterated that in the case of morals it is not possible to discern through-
out Europe a uniform conception of the signiﬁcance of religion in society.155 For that
reason it is not possible to arrive at a comprehensive deﬁnition of what constitutes a
permissible interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression where
such expression is directed against the religious feelings of others. A certain margin of
appreciation is therefore to be left to the national authorities in assessing the existence
and extent of the necessity of such interference.156
The dicta of Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria gave rise to a case in which the ex-
panded notion of the right to religious respect was claimed as a positive right by two
applicants. They argued that the State should have intervened to bring criminal charges
angainst Polish magazine Wprost that published on its cover a picture of Black Madonna
of Czestochowa (object of deep religious veneration in Poland for centuries) wearing a
gas mask, in order to illustrate a cover story about growing air pollution. The Polish
government investigated complaints made by people who were oﬀended by the image
but decided not to bring charges. The Commission dismissed the case as manifestly
ill-founded and emphasized that the applicants were not inhibited from exercising their
153On the contrary, judges Palm, Pekkanen and Makarczyk states in their joint dissenting opinion that
it should not be open to the authorities of the State to decide whether a particular statement is capable
of contributing to any form of public debate capable of furthering progress in human aﬀairs; for such a
decision cannot but be tainted by the authorities' idea of progress. Furthermore, if such interference is
applied to protect the perceived interests of a powerful group in society, there is a danger that such prior
restraint could be detrimental to that tolerance on which pluralist democracy depends. They propose
that the duty and the responsibility of a person seeking to avail himself of his freedom of expression
should be to limit, as far as he can reasonably be expected to, the oﬀence that his statement may cause
to others. Only if he fails to take necessary action, or if such action is shown to be insuﬃcient, may the
State step in.
154Para. 4849, Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, app. no. 13470/87 (1994). Para. 49, Handyside
v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 5493/72 (1976).
155For details see Müller and Others v. Switzerland, app. no. 10737/84 (1988).
156Para. 50, Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, app. no. 13470/87 (1994).
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freedom to hold and express their belief.157
Similar case to Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria arose in British ﬁlm industry: Wind-
grove v. the United Kingdom. Nigel Wingrove wrote the shooting script for, and directed
the making of, a short movie (18 minutes) entitled Visions of Ecstasy. It depicts St Teresa
of Avila, the sixteenth-century Carmelite nun, experiencing powerful ecstatic visions of
her psyché and of Jesus Christ (mainly of sexual nature). Because of alleged inﬁngement
of criminal law of blasphemy, the British Board of Film Classiﬁcation rejected issuance of
classiﬁcation certiﬁcate. The Court notes that, as stated by the Board, the aim of the in-
terference was to protect against the treatment of a religious subject in such a manner as
to be calculated . . . to outrage those who have an understanding of, sympathy towards
and support for the Christian story and ethic, because of the contemptuous, reviling,
insulting, scurrilous or ludicrous tone, style and spirit in which the subject is presented.
The Court concludes that the refusal to grant a certiﬁcate for the distribution of the
short ﬁlm had a legitimate aim under Article 10(2). And the discriminatory nature of
British law on blasphemy (protecting only Anglican Christianity), does not detract from
the legitimacy of the aim pursued in that context.158
As for the (rarely used) laws on blasphemy, the Court stated that there is as yet not
suﬃcient common ground in the legal and social orders of the member States of the
Council of Europe to conclude that a system whereby a State can impose restrictions on
the propagation of material on the basis that it is blasphemous is, in itself, unnecessary
in a democratic society and thus incompatible with the Convention.159 The Court
reiterated that in the ﬁeld of morals the State has wide margin of appreciation,160 however
subject to ﬁnal supervision of the Court. Such supervision is all the more necessary given
the breadth and open-endedness of the notion of blasphemy and the risks of arbitrary or
excessive interferences with freedom of expression under the guise of action taken against
allegedly blasphemous material.161
Dissenting judge Lohmus notes that in cases of prior restraint (censorship) there is in-
terference by the authorities with freedom of expression even though the members of the
society whose feelings they seek to protect have not called for such interference. The
interference is based on the opinion of the authorities that they understand correctly the
feelings they claim to protect. The actual opinion of believers remains unknown.162
157Dubowska and Skup v. Poland, app. no. 33490/96 and 34055/96 (1997). Evans, Freedom of Religion
under the ECHR, p. 70.
158Windgrove v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 14719/90 (1996).
159Para. 57, Windgrove v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 14719/90 (1996).
160Judge Lohmus notes that in some cases, the margin of appreciation is applied is wide, in other cases
it is more limited. However, it is diﬃcult to ascertain what principles determine the scope of that margin
of appreciation. See dissenting opinion of judge Lohmus, para. 6, Windgrove v. the United Kingdom,
app. no. 14719/90 (1996).
161Para. 58, Windgrove v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 14719/90 (1996).
162Dissenting opinion of judge Lohmus, para. 3, Windgrove v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 14719/90
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Building on the foregoing case-law is also recent case of .A. v. Turkey in which publisher
of a book called The forbidden phrases was convicted of blasphemy. The Court took
as common ground that the applicant's conviction constituted interference with his right
to freedom of expression under Article 10(1). Furthermore, it was not disputed that
the interference was prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aims of preventing
disorder and protecting morals and the rights of others, within the meaning of Article
10(2). The dispute related to the question whether the interference was necessary in a
democratic society. After reiterating the foregoing case-law the Court noted that the
case concerned not only comments that oﬀended or shocked, or a provocative opinion,
but also an abusive attack on the Prophet of Islam. Notwithstanding the fact that
there is a certain tolerance of criticism of religious doctrine within Turkish society, which
is deeply attached to the principle of secularity, believers might have legitimately felt
themselves to be the object of unwarranted and oﬀensive attacks through the following
passages: Some of these words were, moreover, inspired in a surge of exultation, in
Aisha's arms. . . . God's messenger broke his fast through sexual intercourse, after dinner
and before prayer. Muhammad did not forbid sexual intercourse with a dead person or
a live animal.163
The Court therefore considered that the measure taken in respect of the statements in
issue had been intended to provide protection against oﬀensive attacks on matters re-
garded as sacred by Muslims. In that respect it found that the measure might reasonably
be held to had met a pressing social need. The authorities cannot be said to have over-
stepped their margin of appreciation in that respect and that the reasons given by the
domestic courts to justify taking such a measure against the applicant were relevant and
suﬃcient. As to the proportionality of the impugned measure, the Court was mindful
of the fact that the domestic courts had not decided to seize the book, and accordingly
considered that the insigniﬁcant ﬁne imposed was proportionate to the aims pursued.
Therefore, there has been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention.164
As C. Evans pointed out, the tendency of the Court is quite unfortunate in the aspect
of tending to beneﬁt majority religions or religious groupes that are prepared to respond
to criticism or mockery with intolerance or outrage.165 Whereas tolerant, moderate and
peaceful religious groups would suﬀer in any case, either being treated as fundamental-
ists (especially by secular society)  or not true believers. Moreover, it might be quite
diﬃcult for minorities to invoke protection of their religious feelings in situation when
the State (or regional government) cares only about not harming (historical) religious
majority.
In recent years there have been many discussions, especially in the media, about scope
(1996).
163Para. 29, .A. v. Turkey, app. no. 42571/98 (2005).
164Para. 3032, .A. v. Turkey, app. no. 42571/98 (2005).
165Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, p. 71.
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of freedom of expression and its possible limitations. In the line of protecting freedom
of speech, it is possible to quote Lord Justice Hoﬀmann in the case of R v. Central
Independent Television plc:
There are many emphatic statements about the importance of freedom of
speech and the press. But they are often followed by a paragraph which begins
with the word nevertheless. The judge then goes on to explaing that there
are other interests which have to be balanced against press freedom. . . . But
a freedom which is restricted to what judges think to be responsible or in the
public interest is no freedom. Freedom means the rights to publish things
which government and judges, however well motivated, think should not be
published. It means the rights to say things which right-thinking people
regard as dangerous or irresponsible. This freedom is subject only to clearly
deﬁned exceptions as laid down by common law. . . 166
Some people feels that self-censorship (avoiding controversial religious topics) and polit-
ical correctness are threats to democracy and want to test current situation of freedom
of expression v. freedom of religion or belief. This reasoning can be found e.g. be-
hind publishing 12 cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in Danish newspaper
Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten.167 As quite substantial part of Muslims forbids depict-
ing of the Prophet, it was not unreasonable to predict disaproving reaction. This be
the case especially when one of the pictures was interpreted as connecting the Prophet
with terrorism. The most visible group protesting against portrayal of the Prophet were
fundamentalists organizing violent demonstrations and riots (particularly in the Middle
East). However, many Muslims objected to publishing the cartoons (and violent forms
of fundamentalism) peacefully in the media, before administration and even before the
courts.
166Clayton and Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights, p. 1009.
167Kurt Westergaard, author of the 12 cartoons gave an interview two and half years after publishing
them:
Guernica or a bomb in a turban, does everything really have to be said?
Yes, that's the way we do it here.
Even if you know it's oﬀensive?
Oﬀensive? That's something they'll just have to learn to live with. Politicians are insulted by cartoons
every day. We live in a tolerant country and we can do that. Anyone who lives here must accept
democracy the way we do it. In Europe, we didn't give in when the Nazis and fascists threatened us or
when the communists were at the door. Another totalitarian force is attacking us now. Not the Muslims
as a group, of course, but a handful of radicals. You don't give in to them. I am an atheist but I'm not
anti-religion. Muslims as a group must realise that religion is a private matter.
Nanda Troost. A totalitarian power threatens us in Europe. English. In: de Volkskrant (10th Mar.
2008). URL: http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/article511506.ece/A_totalitarian_power_
threatens_us_in_Europe (visited on 28/03/2008).
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The case has not reached the Court in its merits (yet). One attempt was made by
Maroccan citizen and NGOs, however was declared inadmissible because the Court con-
sidered that there was no jurisdictional link between any of the applicants and the rel-
evant member State, namely Denmark.168 It would have been interesting to observe
the Court dealing with this matter under altered situation in the society since the last
substantial decisions. Nevertheless it must be noted that the decision of the Director
of Public Prosecutions on discontinueing criminal investigations against publisher was
quite well-argumented and could be falling without great problems within the margin of
appreciation.
Case based on the same grounds was brought by the Union of Islamic Organisations
of France and the World Islamic League against Paris-based satirical weekly Charlie
Hebdo for reprinting two of the Danish cartoons in 2006. However, Paris criminal court
acquitted the editor, Philippe Val, and court of appeal uphold his acquittal in March
2008.169
On the top of the discussion about relation of freedom of religion and freedom of speech it
is possible to question the whole situation when (religious) radicals and fundamentalists
(of irrespective religious aﬃliation) manage to get into prime time and the media gives
them great coverage because of violent and attracting expressions of their viewpoints
that are not acceptable for the majority society. Whereas the persons who try to express
themselves by publishing their critical opinions or provocative pieces of art are prevented
from it in order not to harm religious feelings of the majority population.
3.2 Recommendations and Resolutions of the Parliamentary As-
sembly
Developments in the areas related to freedom or religion has been also on an agenda of
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. For having a general overview
it might be good to mention some of related PACE's recommendations and resolutions,
although they are merely part of the Council of Europe's soft power:170
• Recommendation 1178 (1992), of 5 February 1992, on Sects and new religious
movements;
168Ben El Mahi and Others v. Denmark, app. no. 5853/06 (2006).
169France: court conﬁrms Charlie Hebdo editor's acquittal over Mohammed cartoons. English. In:
Reporters without Borders (12th Mar. 2008). URL: http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=
26198 (visited on 25/03/2008).
170The term soft powever was explained by René van der Linden, the President of the
PACE, speaking at the 3rd European Ecumenical Assembly in Sibiu (Romania) in September
2007. René van der Linden. Speech during the Third European Ecumenical Assembly. English.
In: (6th Sept. 2007). URL: http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/
Communication/PresidentSpeeches/2007/20070906_Sibiu-Romania.htm (visited on 01/05/2008)
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• Recommendation 1202 (1993), of 2 February 1993, on Religious tolerance in a
democratic society;
• Recommendation 1353 (1998), of 27 January 1198, on the Access of minorities to
higher education;
• Recommendation 1396 (1999), of 27 January 1999, on Religion and democracy;
• Recommendation 1412 (1999), of 22 June 1999, on Illegal activities of sects;
• Recommendation 1720 (2005) of 4 october 2005, on Education and religion;
• Resolution 1510 (2006) of 28 June 2006, on Freedom of expression and respect for
religious beliefs;
• Resolution 1535 (2007) of 25 January 2007, on Threats to the lives and freedom of
expression of journalists;
• Recommendation 1805 (2007) of 29 June 2007, on Blasphemy, religious insults and
hate speech against persons on grounds of their religion;
• Resolution 1605 (2008) and Recommendation 1831 (2008), of 15 April 2008, on
European Muslim communities confronted with extremism.
3.3 The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) is the Council of
Europe's monitoring body, combating racism, xenophobia, antisemitism and intolerance
in greater Europe, from the perspective of the protection of human rights. ECRI's action
covers all the measures needed to combat violence, discrimination and prejudice against
persons or groups of persons on grounds of race, colour, language, religion, nationality
or national or ethnic origin.
ECRI was established by the ﬁrst Summit of Heads of State and Government of the
member States of the Council of Europe. The decision is contained in the Vienna Decla-
ration which the Summit adopted on 9 October 1993. On 13 June 2002 the Committee of
Ministers granted ECRI its own Statute, thereby consolidating its role as an independent
human rights monitoring body.
ECRI has been cooperating with other Council of Europe bodies in the area of religious
freedom. Worth mentioning is e.g. cooperation with Directorate of Youth and Sport on
study sessions, training courses and campaigns for young people in promoting religious
tolerance.171
171Out of this cooperation was e.g. organized a seminar on Islamophobia and its consequences on
Young people foollowed by a comprehensive report: Ingrid Ramberg. Islamophobia and its consequences
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ECRI publishes regularly country reports and occasionaly examples of good practices.
In its general policy recommendations it addressed also issues of antisemitism172 and
islamophobia.173
3.4 Conclusion
Freedom of religion and belief has been high on the agenda of the Council of Europe.
This is closely connected with the assumption that religion plays an important role
in maintaining democracy, protecting human rights, developing human resources and
promoting active citizenship in civic society.
Key role in protecting freedom of religion and belief had adoption of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, establishing
possibility of applying to the Commission and Court by individuals whose freedom was
restricted and developing a system of case-law interpreting freedom of religion and belief
stipulated in the Convention. This has not been, however, an easy process with holistic
approach based on deep understanding of both religious and legal dimensions. The Court
has failed to deﬁne clearly what is the content of the concept of freedom of religion and
belief. It rather decided cases on ad hoc basis and quite often without proper detailed
reasoning. The argumentation was not based on reports and studies of experts in the
ﬁeld of religion but rather on personal assumptions of the judges.
The Court and Commission might be accused of basing their judgements on Western
Christian thinking higly inﬂuenced by secularism and division between forum internum
and forum externum. This is quite recognizeable in approach to religions and faith-based
groups that have not been traditionally present in Europe, and thus subjected to stricter
examination by the Court. It is also possible to say that the Court has treated more
favourably established and majority churches as it recognized that importance of their
historical role should matter also in the present date.
The Court bases itself on principle of subsidiarity and constantly holds that some things
are better dealt on the local or national level. Thus it grants quite wide margin of appre-
ciation to the States. This being so especially when the matters in question diﬀer from
region to region and it is not possible to ﬁnd a common stand. Such an approach values
very much European pluralism and diversity. However, it may lead also to alibismus
when the Court does not want to deal with a certain (cotroversial) question.
on Young People. Council of Europe, 2004. URL: http://eycb.coe.int/eycbwwwroot/HRE/eng/
documents/Islamophobia%20report/Islamophobia%20final%20ENG.pdf (visited on 06/05/2008).
Also various educational resources were published that are widely used in human rights education.
172Recommendation No. 1: Combating racism, xenophobia, antisemitism and intolerance, CRI(96)43.
Recommendation No. 6: Combating the dissemination of racist, xenophobic and antisemitic material
via the Internet, CRI(2001)1. Recommendation No. 9: The ﬁght against antisemitism, CRI(2004)37.
173Recommendation No. 5: Combating intolerance and discrimination against Muslims, CRI(2000)21.
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4 Freedom of Religion under the United Nations
This chapter aimes at giving a short overview of major instruments dealing with freedom
of religion and belief under the auspices of the United Nations. It may shed also some light
on the understanding and interpretation of the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms because Article 9 of the Convention was
drafted upon the text of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Religion and freedom of religion are addressed by numerous conventions, declarations and
other instruments. For maintaining character of a brief overview, this chapter focuses
only on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. Finally impact of establishment of Human
Rights Council on religious freedom is concisely evaluated.
4.1 Religious Freedom and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights
Article 18 of the UDHR provides:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
The discussion that did take place over the Article 18 suggest that the substance of
the right to religious freedom was far from straightforward. If the adoption of the text
proved to be comparatively unproblematic, this reﬂected a willingness to compromise,
rather than a common understanding of what was embraced by such a right.1
It is axiomatic that the UDHR was not intended as a source of legal obligation but
was, as the Preable declares, proclaimed as a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all anations. A lack of precision in a declaration which was setting rather
then creating rights and imposing obligations meant that there was room for subsequent
creative development. The question became more problematic, however, when Article
18 of the UDHR was taken as the model for Article 9 of the European Convention and,
in consequence, has been interpreted and applied by the Strasbourg organs within a
Western European context.2
1Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, p. 183.
2Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, p. 192.
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4.2 Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights
It was not until the Second Session of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in
December 1947 that it was decided that the international bill of rights should comprise
a declaration, a covenant and means of implementation. The Covenant was to provide
both a source of legal obligation and deﬁne in detail the rights set out in the Declaration.3
Although diﬀerent in several respects from Article 18 of the UDHR, it cannot be said that
the text and drafting history of the ICCPR article lends much by way of clariﬁcation.
Both were intented to forge a consensus by avoiding the central point at issue: whether
the freedom of religion included the freedom to change religion. For some of the Muslim
States, the very idea that it might be legitimate to abandon Islam for another faith was
an aﬀront that could not be countenanced, whilst for others the freedom to change one's
religion was so fundamental that the freedom of religion shorn of this attribute would not
be a freedom worthy of legal recognition at all. The wording ﬁnally adopted might seem
to anchor the article within comfortable proximity of the right to change one's religion.
Yet precise wording to this eﬀect was expressly excluded from the text and it was open
to the interpretation that it allowed an individual to continue in a faith, to adopt a faith,
but not abandon a faith already held. It has, however, become generally accepted that
Article 18 does embrace the right to change religion, although the evidence advanced in
support of this is not wholly convincing.4
General Comment e.g. states that freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief
necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace
one's current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the
right to retain one's religion or belief.5
Article 18 of the ICCPR reads as follows:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and re-
ligion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or
belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship,
observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety,
3Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, p. 194.
4Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, pp. 201202.
5Para. 5, Human Rights Committee. General Comment 22, Article 18. United Nations, 1993. URL:
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/hrcom22.htm (visited on 21/03/2008).
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order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for
the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the
religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own
convictions.
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion is absolute and inviolable under the ICCPR
because it is exempted from the scope of Article 4 which provides that in time of public
emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is oﬃcially
proclaimed, the States may take measures derogating from their obligations under the
Covenant.
The Article 18 does not clearly distinguish among religion, belief and related terms,
thus causing interpretational problems which were partially transfered also into the Eu-
ropean Convention. Moreover, answers to questions such as what is religion or belief?,
what is a manifestation of a religion or belief? and what restrictions on the freedom
of conscience, thought and religion are to be allowed? are left surprisingly opaque.6
According to members of HRC, Article 18 deals with the right of the individual to
freedom of thought and religion and does not deal with the freedom of churches or
religious organizations with which religion could not be identiﬁed.7
Article 18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not
to profess any religion or belief. The terms belief and religion are to be broadly
construed. Article 18 is not limited in its application to traditional religions or to religions
and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to those of traditional
religions. The Committee therefore views with concern any tendency to discriminate
against any religion or belief for any reason, including the fact that they are newly
established, or represent religious minorities that may be the subject of hostility on the
part of a predominant religious community.8
As the term coercion is concerned, Malcolm Evans noted that the point at which
persuasion becomes coercion is very much a matter of subjective assessment, as is the
point at which restrictions placed upon the manifestation of a belief become coercive.
However, coercion which impairs the freedom does embrace indirect as well as direct
forms of pressure and so a fairly broad range of possibilities seems to be encompassed by
the term. Malcolm Evans further notes that the article was being seen not as primarily
concerned with the religious freedom of believers, but with maintaining order between
those espousing diﬀerent points of view within the framework of a liberal society.9
6Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, p. 212.
7Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, p. 213.
8Para. 2, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18.
9Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, pp. 198, 206207.
CHAPTER 4. FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS 63
According to General Comment, Article 18(2) bars coercion that would impair the right
to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal
sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to their religious beliefs and
congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert. Policies or practices having
the same intention or eﬀect, such as, for example, those restricting access to education,
medical care, employment or the rights guaranteed by article 25 and other provisions
of the Covenant, are similarly inconsistent with article 18(2). The same protection is
enjoyed by holders of all beliefs of a non-religious nature. Moreover, in accordance with
articles 18(2) and 17, no one can be compelled to reveal his thoughts or adherence to a
religion or belief. And ﬁnally, the freedom from coercion to have or to adopt a religion or
belief and the liberty of parents and guardians to ensure religious and moral education
cannot be restricted.10
Whilst Article 18 grants to the individual the freedom to hold patterns of thought,
conscience and religion, the right of manifestation is limited to religion or belief. Given
that the concept of a religion or belief, for the purposes of the Covenant, remains unclear,
it is not possible to consider in a meaningful fashion the question whether, and how, a
distinction should be drawn between, on the one hand, religion and belief and, on the
other, thought and conscience, the manifestation of which would not be embraced by
Article 18.11
The freedom to manifest religion or belief may be exercised either individually or in
community with others and in public or private. The freedom to manifest religion or
belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching encompasses a broad range of acts.
The concept of worship extends to ritual and ceremonial acts giving direct expression
to belief, as well as various practices integral to such acts, including the building of
places of worship, the use of ritual formulae and objects, the display of symbols, and
the observance of holidays and days of rest. The observance and practice of religion or
belief may include not only ceremonial acts but also such customs as the observance of
dietary regulations, the wearing of distinctive clothing or headcoverings, participation
in rituals associated with certain stages of life, and the use of a particular language
customarily spoken by a group. In addition, the practice and teaching of religion or belief
includes acts integral to the conduct by religious groups of their basic aﬀairs, such as the
freedom to choose their religious leaders, priests and teachers, the freedom to establish
seminaries or religious schools and the freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts
or publications.12 Malcolm Evans notes that worship, observance, practice and teaching
provide and exhaustive catalogue and the interpretation placed upon the four heads limits
their scope to acts closely and directly connected with the formal practice of religion rites
10Para. 3, 5 and 8, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18.
11Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, p. 215.
12Para. 4, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18.
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and customs. Thus, forms of behaviour and activites which ﬂow from religious convictions
are not seen as manifestations of belief.13
It is not very clear whether and to what extent is a right to conscientious objection covered
by Article 18. It can be sustained only if considered to be a form of manifestation of
religion or belief. Malcom Evans states that to the extent that the HRC has come to
acknowledge the right to conscientious objection, this is of a sui generis nature and does
not impact upon the broader issues under Article 18.14
In interpreting the scope of permissible limitation clauses, States parties should proceed
from the need to protect the rights guaranteed under the Covenant. Limitations imposed
must be established by law and must not be applied in a manner that would vitiate the
rights guaranteed in article 18. Article 18(3) is to be strictly interpreted: restrictions are
not allowed on grounds not speciﬁed there, even if they would be allowed as restrictions
to other rights protected in the Covenant, such as national security. Limitations may
be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly
related and proportionate to the speciﬁc need on which they are predicated. Restrictions
may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory manner.
The concept of morals derives from many social, philosophical and religious traditions;
consequently, limitations on the freedom to manifest a religion or belief for the purpose
of protecting morals must be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single
tradition.15 Moreover, general limitations of Article 20 ICCPR prohibit propaganda for
war and advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence.
Inclusion of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 18 is something of an anomaly. At both Fifth
and Sixth Session the CHR rejected a number of proposals that concerned the right of
parents to determine the nature of the religious teaching, if any, given to their children,
principally on the grounds that the proper place for such a provision was in an article
dealing with education. This was realized in Article 14(3) of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), but during the Fifteenth Session of
the Third Committee in 1960, Greece pressed to include the text of that article, in so
far as it applied to religious and moral instruction, within the ICCPR in order to ensure
that it would apply to those States which only became a party to the latter instrument.16
Although worded in a separate section, the freedom of parents to ensure that the religious
education of their children is in accord with their own convictions can be seen as a speciﬁc
form of manifestation.17 The Committee is of the view that article 18(4) permits public
13Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, p. 216.
14For more details see Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, pp. 216219.
15Para. 8, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18.
16Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, pp. 200201.
17Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, p. 219.
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school instruction in subjects such as the general history of religions and ethics if it is
given in a neutral and objective way. The liberty of parents or legal guardians to ensure
that their children receive a religious and moral education in conformity with their own
convictions, set forth in article 18(4), is related to the guarantees of the freedom to teach
a religion or belief stated in article 18(1). The Committee notes that public education
that includes instruction in a particular religion or belief is inconsistent with article 18(4)
unless provision is made for non-discriminatory exemptions or alternatives that would
accommodate the wishes of parents and guardians.18
The ICCPR established in its Article 40 the Human Rights Committee (HRC) as a
treaty-monitoring body with power to receive, examine and comment upon reports which
States party to the ICCPR were obliged to submit and which set out their record of
compliance with the obligatiosn assumed. States could also agree to the HRC considering
communications concerning their record which had been submitted by other State Parties
which had themselves accepted this procedure. Above all, and for those States which
accepted it, the First Optional Protocol to the Covenant established a mechanism by
which individuals claiming to be victims of a violations of the Covenant could submit a
communication to the HRC.19
Unfortunately, the HRC's examination of State reports and its consideration of individual
communications has shed little further light on the meaning to be accorded to Article
18. On the other hand, in 1993 the HRC adopted General Comment No. 22(48)20 which
provides an authoritative statement of heir understanding of the article. Throughout all
its work, however, the HRC fails to distinguish adequately between the right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion and the question of discrimination on these grounds
(Article 26).21
4.3 The 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief
The UN General Assembly, in reaction to a worldwide wave of anti-Semitic incidents,
requested in 1962 in two parallel resolutions the drawing up of a declaration and con-
vention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination and a declaration and
convention on the elimination of all forms of religious intolerance. It is quite striking for
political processes prevailing at the time that the two instruments on racial discrimina-
tion were already adopted by the United Nations in 1963 and in 1965 respectively, but
that it lasted up till 1981 that the Declaration on religious intolerance was ﬁnally agreed
upon. The convention on religious intolerance, though strongly propagated in earlier
18Para. 6, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18.
19Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, p. 207.
20Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18.
21Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, pp. 207208.
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and later years by interested constituencies, never saw the light.22 Quite many speakers
during 25th Anniversary Commemoration of the adoption of the 1981 Declaration noted
that given the complicated process of adopting the Declaration,23 it would not be wise
to invest time, money and energy into drafting and adopting a convention.24
The primary purpose of the Declaration and convention was to eliminate intolerance
and discrimination. They were not inteded to promote religious freedom as such, and
were aimed at intolerance and discrimination not only against but by the religious and
the non-religious on account of ther beliefs. To that extent, they have more to do with
the question of non-discrimination then with freedom of religion per se  and given
that their origins lie alongside the Declaration and Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, that is hardly surprising.25
Article 1 of the Declaration proclaimes the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion being based upon the wording of Article 18 of ICCPR. Malcom Evans notes that
inclusion of such wording was prompted by the inability of the CHR to agree upon a
deﬁnition of the concepts it proclaimed. This being so even when Krishnaswami Study26
was at their disposal. The problem with Article 18 of ICCPR is that it was supposed to
be a source of legal obligation and not of deﬁnitions of (its) terminology.27
The text of the Declaration had potentially damaging impact upon the UDHR. The
UDHR makes express mention of the rith to change one's religion or belief. The ICCPR
adopted a compromise formula which was wilfully obscure on this point. All of the draft
texts of Article 1 of the Declaration considered in the CHR had included the right to
change religion, however, it was removed from the ﬁnal wording. Thus, the Declaration
became the weakest of the three instruments in this regard and twenty-four years of
discussion surrounding them had resulted in the diminution of what for many had always
been a key element of their conception of religious freedom.28
The Krishnaswami Study saw the freedom to manifest a religion or belief as having
22Theo van Boven. Speech on the 25th Anniversary Commemoration in Prague on 25 November
2006 of the adoption of the 1981 Declaration on the elimination of intolerance and discrimination based
on religion or belief. English. In: (25th Nov. 2006). URL: http://www.tolerance95.cz/1981down/
Afternoon_Speech-Theo_van_Boven.doc (visited on 20/04/2008).
23For more details on the drafting process see e.g. Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in
Europe, pp. 227231.
24For details check the speeches of participants in the 25th Anniversary Commemoration
in Prague on 25 November 2006 of the adoption of the 1981 Declaration on the elimina-
tion of intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief, on the conference website:
http://www.tolerance95.cz/1981declaration/download.php.
25Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, p. 230.
26Arcot Krishnaswami. Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices.
United Nations, 1960. URL: http://www.religlaw.org/interdocs/docs/akstudy1960.htm (visited
on 20/04/2008).
27Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, pp. 231236.
28Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, pp. 237238.
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two basic elements: the freedom to comply with what was prescribed or authorized
by a religion or belief and the freedom from performing acts incompatible with the
prescriptions of a religion or belief. The freedom of action included worship, processions,
pilgrimages, the use of equipment and symbols, arrangements for disposal of the dead,
observance of holidays and days of rest, diatary practices, the celebration of marriage and
its dissolution by divorce, the dissemination or religion or belief and training of personnel.
The freedom from forced participation included the taking of oaths, issues relating to
military service, participation in religious or civic ceremonies, divulging secrets of the
confessional and compulsory prevention or treatment of disease.29
The content of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion undertook a a
long process of negotiations.30 Final wording of Article 6 of the Declaration reads as
follows:
In accordance with Article I of the present Declaration, and subject to the
provisions of Article 1, Paragraph 3, the right to freedom of thought, con-
science, religion or belief shall include, inter alia, the following freedoms:
a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to
establish and maintain places for these purposes;
b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian insti-
tutions;
c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles
and materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief;
d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas;
e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes;
f) To solicit and receive voluntary ﬁnancial and other contributions from
individuals and institutions;
g) To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders
called for by the requirements and standards of any religion or belief;
h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in
accordance with the precepts of one's religion or belief;
i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and commu-
nities in matters of religion and belief at the national and international
levels.
29Krishnaswami, Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices. Evans,
Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, p. 239.
30For details about process see Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, pp. 239245.
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In 1983, the CHR and the Sub-Commission requested that a Special Rapporteur be
appointed to prepare a report which would, inter alia, comment upon the various man-
ifestations of intolerance and discriminination on the grounds of religion or belief in the
contemporary world and on speciﬁc rights violated, using the Declaration as a stan-
dard.31 In 2000, the Commission on Human Rights decided to change the mandate title
from Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance to Special Rapporteur on freedom of
religion or belief. United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief
has been attached to the Commission on Human Rights and later to the Human Rights
Council. This position has been carried out by Asma Jilani Jehangir since 2004.
Although the Reports are described as being concerned with the implementation of the
Declaration, the Special Rapporteur is not an agent of enforcement. Rather, her role
is to investigate, comment and advise upon the manner in which States adhere to the
standards set out in the Declaration. Given the scope of the mandate and its relationship
with the Declaration, it is not surprising that the work of the Special Rapporteur tends
not to address directly questions such as the deﬁnition of religion or belief or of the
legitimate scope of the freedom of manifestation.32
4.4 Recent Developments
The United Nations General Assembly established on 15 March 2006 the Human Rights
Council (HCR), which replaced Commission on Human Rights (CHR). CHR was often
criticized for the high-proﬁle positions it gave to member states that did not guarantee
the human rights of their own citizens. Even former UN Secretary General Koﬁ Annan
commented that CHR cast a shadow on the reputation of the United Nations system as
a whole. It seems, hower, that the expectations of reform to bring higher standard of
human rights protection has been rather illusionary.33
The problems begin with the HRC's composition. Only 25 of its 47 members are classiﬁed
as free democracies, according to Freedom House's ranking of civil liberties. Nine are
classiﬁed as not free. Four  China, Cuba, Russia and Saudi Arabia  are ranked as
the worst of the worst. These nations are responsible for repeated violations of the UN's
own Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet it is they who dominate the council,
leading a powerful bloc of predominantly Arab and African nations that consistently vote
31CHR Res. 1983/40 and Sub-Commission Res. 1983/31. Evans, Religious Liberty and International
Law in Europe, p. 245.
32Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, p. 247.
33Jackson Diehl. A Shadow on the Human Rights Movement. English. In: The Wash-
ington Post (25th June 2007). URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/06/24/AR2007062401373.html (visited on 19/04/2008). Warren Hoge. Dis-
may Over New U.N. Human Rights Council. English. In: New York Times (11th Mar.
2007). URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/11/world/11rights.html?ex=1331269200&en=
3888d2c40656df4c&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss (visited on 19/04/2008).
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as a unit. These regimes have repeatedly used the Council as a powerful tool for shielding
themselves from scrutiny and meting out criticism along stark political lines. According
to Human Rights Watch, the council has turned a blind eye to at least 26 countries 
the sites of some of the world's worst human-rights crises.34 Although slightly more than
half of the Human Rights Council's 47 members are free democracies, only a minority of
these countries  about a dozen  have consistently voted in defense of the values and
principles that the Council is supposed to promote. Unfortunately, too many democracies
have thus far gone along with the spoilers, out of loyalty to regional groups and other
political alliances.35
Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) has pushed through two HRC resolutions 
one at the Council's June 2006 inaugural session and another, with even worse language in
March 2007. With the Council's adoption of the June 2006 resolution, the Islamic states
succeeded in commissioning reports meant to support their position that the religion of
Islam and its practitioners are singular victims in today's world.36
Human Rights Council's resolution of 30 March 2007 on Combating defamation of reli-
gions focused mainly on recent defamation of Islam (Muslims and Arabs), especially in
connection to Danish Cartoons.37 The resolution urged legal measures to protect reli-
gions rather then individual believers. It did not state that violence is an inappropriate
response to oﬀense.38 It containts e.g. that the Human Rights Council
Emphasizes that everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which
should be exercised with responsibility and may therefore be subject to limita-
34Ronan Farrow. The U.N.'s Human-Rights Sham. English. In: Wall Street Journal (29th Jan.
2008). A16. URL: http://www.ngo-monitor.org/article.php?viewall=yes&id=1784 (visited on
19/04/2008).
35UN Watch. Dawn of a New Era? Assessment of the United Nations Human Rights Coun-
cil and its Year of Reform. United Nations, 2007. URL: http://www.unwatch.org/atf/cf/
%7B6DEB65DA-BE5B-4CAE-8056-8BF0BEDF4D17%7D/DAWN_OF_A_NEW_ERA_HRC%20REPORT_FINAL.PDF
(visited on 19/04/2008), p. 1.
36Moreover, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur on Racism, and
the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion were each charged with preparing reports on incitement
of religious hatred and defamation of religion. However, the joint report by the two rapporteurs
discussed not only Islamophobia but also anti-Semitism and Christianophobia. In further deﬁance of
the OIC's original design, the experts observed that international human rights law protects primarily
individuals in the exercise of their freedom of religion and not religions per se. They also noted
that criminalizing defamation of religion can be counterproductive. The High Commissioner's report
included a reference to the incitement of hatred of non-Muslims in the Middle East. Consequently, while
the March 2007 resolution welcomed the racism expert's report on the situation of Muslims and Arabs
in various parts of the world, it failed to even mention the joint report described above. Similarly, the
OIC-dominated Council only took note of the High Commissioner's report, but did not welcome it,
as is often the practice. UN Watch, Dawn of a New Era?, pp. 1516.
37Danish Cartoons are dealt with in greater detail in 3.1.10 Freedom of Religion and Belief versus
Freedom of Expression.
38UN Watch, Dawn of a New Era?, pp. 1516.
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tions as provided by law and necessary for respect of the rights or reputations
of others, protection of national security or of public order, public health or
morals and respect for religions and beliefs;
Deplores the use of the print, audio-visual and electronic media, including
the Internet, and any other means to incite acts of violence, xenophobia or
related intolerance and discrimination towards Islam or any other religion;39
4.5 Concluding remarks
The United Nations contributed to large extent to development of the concept of freedom
of religion or belief and helped this freedom to be implemented and respected.
Two major weaknesses of the UN freedom of religion system are enforceability and politi-
cization. The former stemming from the fact that the only binding document is ICCPR
(and the implementing mechanism is not that eﬀective), whereas e.g. Declaration 1981
lacks binding character at all. The latter being inﬂuenced by high representation in the
UN bodies of States (regimes) infringing freedom of religion and not being interested in
its implementation and enforcment, but rather disguising violations.
39Para. 10 and 11, A/HRC/4/9 Resolution of United Nations Human Rights Council on Combating
defamation of religion (accessible at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A-HRC-RES-
4-9.doc).
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5 Freedom of Religion and the European Union
5.1 Introduction
The initial Treaties for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as well as Eu-
ropean Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community
(EEC) did not contain any general human rights provisions. By the early 70s, although
not mandated by the Treaties, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) informally estab-
lished a competence for human rights issues within its case law by declaring human rights
to be a general principle of Community law, which the Court saw itself obliged to ensure.
To do so, the ECJ drew on the constitutional traditions common to all Member States
as well as international human rights instruments ratiﬁed by all members, especially the
ECHR.1
Still, the informal construction of human rights competence through case-law was not
directly transferred into formal competencies. The ﬁrst formal mentioning of human
rights is to be found in the preamble of the Single European Act, which declared that
the Community is determined to work together to promote democracy on the basis of
the fundamental rights recognized in the constitutions and laws of the Member States,
in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and
the European Social Charter, notably freedom, equality and social justice.2
The Maastricht Treaty formally codiﬁed the standard set by ECJ case-law with the
introduction of Article F (now Article 6) TEU, which conﬁrmed that [t]he Union shall
respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms . . . and as they result from the constitutional traditions
common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law.
The Amsterdam Treaty (1997), ﬁrst, strengthened the wording of Article 6 by stating
that the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to
the Member States. Second, in Article 46, it explicitly extended the powers of the Court
of Justice to Article 6. The ECJ obtained the power to decide whether the institutions
have failed to respect fundamental human rights. Third, in Article 7, the Amsterdam
Treaty laid down a procedure for dealing with member states in breach of Article 6. The
unanimous Council (minus the state in question) may, with the assent of the European
Parliament, determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach and decide to
suspend some of the state's rights including voting rights in the Council.3
1Frank Schimmelfennig and Guido Schwellnus. The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in the
European Union: Human Rights Case Studies and QCA Coding. English. In: (2004). URL: http:
//www.eup.ethz.ch/research/constitutional/fs-gs-dossier.pdf (visited on 23/04/2008), p. 1.
2Schimmelfennig and Schwellnus, The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in the European
Union: Human Rights Case Studies and QCA Coding, pp. 12.
3Schimmelfennig and Schwellnus, The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in the European
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The Treaty of Nice (2000) added a prior step to the sanctioning mechanism established
at Amsterdam. In case the member states see a clear risk of a serious breach, they
may address recommendations to the state and ask a group of independent experts
for a report. The presidents of the European institutions (Council, Parliament, and
Commission) also proclaimed a Charter of Fundamental Rights. The provisions of the
Charter dealing with freedom of thought, conscience and religion as well as with cultural
and religious diversity are further examined in this chapter.
The Charter itself was incorporated in Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.
As the Constitution was rejected, it is not necessary to examine it per se in detail. The
Constitution was, however, in slightly modiﬁed version adopted as Treaty of Lisbon and
incorporated Charter into primary law. Aspects of Lisbon Treaty related to freedom of
religion, churches, religious associations and communities are examined at the end of this
chapter.
It is quite understandable that religion as such and freedom of religion and belief have
not been much present in the primary law due to orientation on economic aspects of
European integration in the (E)EC. This is also reﬂected in poor case law of ECJ dealing
with religious aﬀairs which is brieﬂy introduced in this chapter. However, it is quite
recognisable since 1990s that once economic integration is more or less accomplished,
religion cannot be avoided. The necessity of addressing religion and treating religious
communities as partners has been even more evident with immigrants coming from non-
Christian and non-secularized backgrounds.
In 1990, Jacques Delors, the president of the European Commission at that time, ap-
pealed to a delegation of Protestant and Anglican church leaders to contribute to the
heart and the sould of Europe as the EC should be moving from a common market to
a real community.This appeal has resulted in series of meetings with various faith-based
bodies. Despite continuous raise of religion on the EU agenda, probably the most impor-
tant inﬁltration of religion into the European law happened through anti-discrimination
law.
5.2 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is a document containing
human rights provisions, solemnly proclaimed by the European Parliament, the Council
of the European Union, and the European Commission on 7 December 2000. An adapted
version of the Charter was proclaimed on 12 December 2007 in Strasbourg, ahead of the
signing of the Treaty of Lisbon, which makes the Charter legally binding in all countries
except Poland and the UK.4
Union: Human Rights Case Studies and QCA Coding, p. 2.
4Protocol No. 30 to Lisbon Treaty provides that the Charter does not extend the ability of the ECJ,
or any court or tribunal of Poland or of the UK, to ﬁnd that the laws, regulations or administrative
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In the rejected EU Constitution Charter was integrated into the text of the treaty. Lisbon
Treaty takes slightly diﬀerent approach in its Article 6(1):
The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as
adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal
value as the Treaties.
The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences
of the Union as deﬁned in the Treaties.
The Charter reaﬃrms in its Preamble the rights as they result, among others, from the
constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and of the European
Court of Human Rights. It is quite important that the Charter is not a new document
completly independent of the ECHR and its extensive interpretation developped by the
Court, and needs to be intepreted with due regard to the evolution of religious freedom
protection in Europe.
Article 10 of the Charter states under the title Freedom of thought, conscience and
religion the following:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
This right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
(2) The right to conscientious objection is recognised, in accordance with the
national laws governing the exercise of this right.
The Explanation of the European Convention notes that the right guaranteed in para-
graph 1 corresponds to the right guaranteed in Article 9 of the ECHR and, in accordance
with Article 52(3) of the Charter, has the same meaning and scope. Limitations must
therefore respect Article 9(2) of the ECHR.5
Although right to conscientious objection is not explicitly mentioned in the ECHR as
military concepts were diﬀerent in 1950,6 the evolution of civil and military services
provisions, practices or action of Poland or of the UK are inconsistent with the fundamental rights,
freedoms and principles that it reaﬃrms. In particular, nothing in Title IV of the Charter (Solidarity)
creates justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the UK except in so far as Poland or the UK has
provided for such rights in its national law.
5Praesidium of the European Convention. Explanations relating to the complete text of the Charter as
set out in the Charter. European Convention, 2000. URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/
pdf/04473_en.pdf (visited on 01/05/2008), p. 12.
6For more details on conscientious objection under the ECHR see subsection 3.1.7 Conscientious
objection.
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during the second half of 20th century made it necessary to be mentioned in the Charter.
However, the Charter itself does not go beyond recognition of the conscientious objection
and leaves the conent of this right upon discretion of the Member States.
Article 14 deals with right to education and provides for the following:
(1) Everyone has the right to education and to have access to vocational and
continuing training.
(2) This right includes the possibility to receive free compulsory education.
(3) The freedom to found educational establishments with due respect for
democratic principles and the right of parents to ensure the education and
teaching of their children in conformity with their religious, philosophical and
pedagogical convictions shall be respected, in accordance with the national
laws governing the exercise of such freedom and right.
The Article 14 is based on Article 2 of the First Protocol to ECHR which was extended to
vocational and continuing training and added the principle of free compulsory education.
The latter might have also implications to religiously unbiased information provided in
public schools.7
Article 21 provides for non-discrimination on the basis of, among others, religion or
belief. It is important to note that Article 21 features for the ﬁrst time a non-exhaustive
list of grounds for discrimination. Actions to combat discrimination, especially anti-
discrimination directives, are based on Article 13 TEC (Article 19 TFEU).8 Article 21
further draws on Article 14 of the ECHR and Article 11 of the Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine as regards genetic heritage. Insofar as it corresponds to Article
14 of the ECHR, it applies in compliance with it.9
Article 22 states:
The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.
Article 22 is based on Article 6 TEU and on Article 151(1) and (4) of the EC Treaty
concerning culture. It is also inspired by declaration No. 11 to the Final Act of the
Amsterdam Treaty on the status of churches and non-confessional organisations.10
7For further information on religion in education and case-law related to Article 2 of the First Protocol
to ECHR see subsection 3.1.9 Freedom of Religion and Belief in Education.
8Article 13 TEC and anti-discrimination directives are further elaborated in section 5.3 Anti-
Discrimination Law.
9Praesidium of the European Convention, Explanations relating to the complete text of the Charter
as set out in the Charter, p. 23.
10Praesidium of the European Convention, Explanations relating to the complete text of the Charter
as set out in the Charter, p. 23.
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5.3 Anti-Discrimination Law
Non-discrimination can be understood in two ways: ﬁrst, it is a general principle derived
from the founding idea of human rights that [a]ll human beings are born free and equal
in dignity and rights (Article 1 UDHR), which is maybe most aptly described by the
Aristotelian principle that likes should be treated alike and is most often institutional-
ized in national constitutions and international human rights documents as the general
provision of equality before the law. Second, it is also a speciﬁc human rights norm,
proscribing discriminatory treatment on speciﬁc grounds, e.g. gender, race, disability,
religion or belief.11
Anti-discrimination law has happened to be quite a dynamic area in the EU. As Evelyn
Ellis noted, EU law has proved an ideal vehicle for upholding the principle of sex equality,
in part at least because of the EU's undoubted potential for growth. That growth has
taken place, and continues to occur, in a number of diﬀerent ways. With the expansion of
the Union's concerns to cover other grounds of discrimination, it would appear well-nigh
inevitable that what has been true in the past for sex equality will also hold good for
other ﬁelds of equality law,12 e.g. for equality and non-discrimination based on religion
or belief.
The Amsterdam Treaty marks an important step in the development of EU non-
discrimination rules with the inclusion of Article 13 TEC, which states that the Com-
munity may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, thus signiﬁcantly
broadening the scale of the EU's legislative competence in the ﬁeld. Although the article
was carefully worded to avoid direct eﬀect, and the threshold for adopting legislation
was set rather high (unanimity in the Council), so that it could have been an empty
promise13, the Treaty provision was unexpectedly quickly ﬁlled with two directives in
2000, namely a Framework Directive on equal treatment in employment and occupa-
tion14 (abbreviated as Framework Directive or Employment Equality Directive or
Framework Equality Directive), and a Directive on the prohibition of discrimination
on the basis of racial or ethnic origin15 (the so-called Race Equality Directive).16
The Commission made it clear at the time of proposing both Directives that an im-
11Schimmelfennig and Schwellnus, The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in the European
Union: Human Rights Case Studies and QCA Coding, p. 6.
12Evelyn Ellis. EU Anti-Discrimination Law. English. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 7.
13Lisa Waddington. Testing the Limits of the EC Treaty Article on Non-discrimination. English. In:
The Industrial Law Journal 28.2 (1999). Pp. 133151, p. 138.
14Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal
treatment in employment and occupation.
15Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment be-
tween persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin.
16Schimmelfennig and Schwellnus, The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in the European
Union: Human Rights Case Studies and QCA Coding, p. 9.
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portant part of its motivation was that this anti-discrimination legislation should form
part of the acquis communautaire before the accession of the new Member States. The
grouping of the four, seemingly somewhat disparate, grounds together was also part of
the Commission's strategy; it believed that the Member States were more enthusiastic
about some of the grounds than about others, and it wanted to exploit the political mo-
mentum to ensure that it achieved legislation on all the bases mandated by Article 13.
Nevertheless, this approach involves the risk of false consistency among the grounds.17
The notion of ethnicity in Race equality directive is quite elusive. The only hint given
by the instrument that religion or religious heritage may play a part in deﬁning ethnicity
is in Recital 10 which refers to Commission Communication on racism, xenophobia and
anti-Semitism.18 Ambiguity may play an important role because the two directives
diﬀer in material scope. Whereas the Employment Equality Directive applies only to
to employment and occupation,19 Racial Equality Directive applies to discrimination in
employment, social security, health care, social advantage, education and access to and
supply of goods and services including housing.20 The diﬀerences in coverage of the
two directives might suggest that there are clear boundaries between the concepts of
race and ethnicity on the one hand, and religion on the other. However, at times the
boundary between the two is not clear. The lack of clarity is caused by a number of
factors: ethnicity is sometimes deﬁned so as to include religious identity; and religious
groups may be predominantly from one particular racial group. At times there are
more fundamental complexities, with some states preferring not to recognise categories
based on racial diﬀerence. Moreover, some religious groups may understand religion to
encompass issues such as cultural practices or rituals, that might otherwise be understood
as linked to ethnic identity.21
It is possible to argue that diﬀerent scope of application of the two directives connected
with unclear concepts of religion and ethnicity presents discrimination that is contrary
to Article 13. This might be quite visible e.g. in case of following dietary requirements
in school canteens by Jews (religious and ethnic group) and Adventists (religious group
only).22
Neither the Framework Directive makes any attempt to deﬁne religion or belief, so that
similar problems of uncertainty occur here. Evelyn Ellis notes that, in using the bare but
alternative expression religion or belief, the Directive presumably means to encapsulate
both religious beliefs (however religion is to be deﬁned) and other philosophical beliefs
17Ellis, EU Anti-Discrimination Law, p. 33.
18COM (95) 653 ﬁnal, 13 December 1995.
19Article 3, Framework Equality Directive 2000/78/EC.
20Article 3, Racial Equality Directive 2000/43/EC.
21Vickers, Religion and Belief Discrimination in Employment  the EU law, p. 34.
22This point was raised by Wolfgang Wieshaider on international conference dealing with status of
national minorities Právní postavení národnostních men²in v minulosti a sou£anosti that took place
in Prague on 5 and 6 May 2008.
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on major issues such as life, death, and morality akin to, but not amounting to, religion;
thus, a belief in a divine being or deity would appear to be unnecessary.23
An advantage of the lack of a formal deﬁnition is that the concept can adapt to reﬂect
modern developments in our understanding of religion and belief. However, a corre-
sponding disadvantage is that the lack of deﬁnition can give rise to inconsistencies in
treatment. For example, Scientology is recognised in some Member States but not in
others. It may be, according to Lucy Vickers, that the Member States' courts will be
guided by the interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights.24
It would seem that although beliefs do not need to be religious in nature to be pro-
tected, there is still some limit on the types of belief to be covered. For example, a belief
in the superiority of one football team over another will not be covered. What is not
clear, however, is where exactly the dividing line should be drawn between beliefs which
are protected and those which are not. Given that the term belief would encompass
religious beliefs in any event, it would seem that the inclusion of the term religion is in-
tended in some way to place some parameters around the meaning of belief. Connected
to this are e.g. questions whether to include also political opinion and non-belief.25
Apart from the question of whether a particular set of convictions constitute a religion or
belief, diﬃculties may also arise in relation to well established religions, where there may
be more than one view of what constitutes religious observance. This may arise where
there is discrimination within one religious tradition. For the purposes of the Directive,
recognition that there are many diﬀerent shades of religious opinion will allow proper
account to be taken of the individual's freedom of religion. This may, however, cause
some problems with regard to indirect discrimination.26
The purpose of the Framework Directive is to lay down a general framework for combating
discrimination on the grounds of (among others) religion or belief. It deﬁnes principle
of equal treatment as absence of direct27 or indirect discrimination.28 The Directive
protects not only against direct and indirect discrimination but also against harrassment,
instructions to discriminate and victimization on grounds of religion or belief.29
Direct discrimination involves less favourable treatment on grounds of religion or belief.
Factual examples will include where employers refuse to employ religious staﬀ altogether,
23Ellis, EU Anti-Discrimination Law, p. 33.
24Vickers, Religion and Belief Discrimination in Employment  the EU law, pp. 4, 2829.
25Vickers, Religion and Belief Discrimination in Employment  the EU law, pp. 2930.
26Vickers, Religion and Belief Discrimination in Employment  the EU law, p. 31.
27Direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably than another
is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, on the grounds of religion or belief.
28Indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or
practice would put persons having a particular religion or belief at a particular disadvantage compared
with other persons unless (i) that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justiﬁed by a legitimate
aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary, or (ii) by measures taken to
improve situation of persons with a particular dissability.
29Articles 2 and 11, Framework Equality Directive 2000/78/EC.
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or employ some religious staﬀ, but refuse to employ those of one particular religion. Direct
discrimination will also arise where religious organisations refuse to employ those who
do not share the faith of the organisation (although some cases may be covered by the
genuine occupational requirement exception).30
Direct discrimination must be on grounds of religion or belief. The Directive is not
limited to less favourable treatment on the grounds of a victim's own religion or belief. It
would therefore cover treatment based on the discriminator's assumption about a person's
religion, even though this assumption may be mistaken; as well as discrimination based
on a person's association with people of a particular religion. The Directive may also
protect against discrimination based on the employer's religious views; for example, a
Catholic employer could dismiss an employee for marrying a divorced person, and the
less favourable treatment would still be on grounds of religion. However, some states
such as the UK have speciﬁcally ruled out this possibility.31
Indirect discrimination occurs where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or prac-
tice would put persons of a particular religion or belief . . . at a particular disadvantage
compared with other persons unless it can be justiﬁed. Factual examples will include
where the employer imposes requirements in terms of uniforms or hours of work, with
which it is diﬃcult for those of particular religions to comply. Indirect discrimination is
capable of justiﬁcation where the practice or criterion can be objectively justiﬁed by a
legitimate aim and the means of achieving the aim are appropriate and necessary. The
question of justiﬁcation is usually left to domestic courts, but what is not yet clear is the
type of factor that courts should accept as justifying indirect religious discrimination.32
Both direct and indirect discrimination require comparisons to be made with others.
Direct discrimination is deﬁned as less favourable treatment than another in a compara-
ble situation33 and indirect discrimination involves disadvantage compared with other
persons.34 This immediately raises the question of when two situations will be said to
be comparable. The Directive does not provide clear answers to the question of who
the correct comparator might be, and national implementing legislation has generally
incorporated the wording of the Directive, or used slightly diﬀerent wording, without
addressing the question of comparators. It would seem that if the recitals clauses are to
be respected, and the commitments to equality and respect for human rights contained
within them are to be upheld, then once less favourable treatment can be shown in com-
parison with another group, the discrimination ﬁnding should be made, whether that
comparison is with those of a majority religion, minority religion, established religion or
no religion. The fact that treatment may be similar to that of a third group should not
30Vickers, Religion and Belief Discrimination in Employment  the EU law, p. 12.
31Vickers, Religion and Belief Discrimination in Employment  the EU law, p. 12.
32Vickers, Religion and Belief Discrimination in Employment  the EU law, pp. 1314.
33Article 2(2)(a), Framework Equality Directive 2000/78/EC.
34Article 2(2)(b), Framework Equality Directive 2000/78/EC.
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prevent a ﬁnding of discrimination as between the two chosen groups.35
The Directive deems harassment to be a form of discrimination, where there is unwanted
conduct related to religion and belief with the purpose or eﬀect of violating the dignity
of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or oﬀensive
environment.36 The Directive does not set out how to determine whether or not dignity
is violated, nor how to determine whether an environment is hostile or oﬀensive. In the
case of well-known religions it might be practicle to give weight to the views of the formal
authorities of the religion. However, it is arguable that such an approach will protect the
individual religious person suﬃciently, as religious belief is an intensely personal matter,
and levels of oﬀence cannot be determined by outside agencies, even if those agencies
are oﬃcial religious bodies. Moreover, less well known religious groups may lack clear
statements of faith, and it may not always be easy to come to a clear conclusion about
whether individuals are justiﬁably oﬀended. Yet to allow too subjective a test of oﬀence
could have a chilling eﬀect on freedom of speech.37
The Employment Equality Directive applies to conditions for access to employement, self-
employment, occupation, (vocational) training or other work experience, and to working
conditions. However, Memeber States may provide for exception for occupational activi-
ties within churches and other public or private organisations the ethos of which is based
on religion or belief where, by reason of the nature of these activities or of the context in
which they are carried out, a person's religion or belief constitute a genuine, legitimate
and justiﬁed occupational requirement, having regard to the organisation's ethos. The
diﬀerence of treatment should, of course, take into account constitutional provisions and
principles of the Member State and general principles of Community law. This exception
should not be used for justiﬁcation of discrimination on another ground. 38
As Lucy Vickers points out, many of the questions that arise in relation to the Directive
will ultimately be determined by considering the scope of the genuine occupational re-
quirement provisions. These provide the only defence to direct discrimination. Some of
the terminology and concepts are similar to that in indirect discrimination, as they both
require exceptions to the non-discrimination principle to be justiﬁed as necessary for a
legitimate aim and proportionate. It is through the interpretation of these concepts that
the boundaries of Directive's protection against discrimination on religious grounds will
be set.39
Article 4(1) is not particularly controversial. In the context of religious discrimination it
enables the right to religious freedom and other rights to be balanced against each other
in the employment context. It only applies where there is a very clear connection between
35Vickers, Religion and Belief Discrimination in Employment  the EU law, pp. 1415.
36Article 2(3), Framework Equality Directive 2000/78/EC.
37Vickers, Religion and Belief Discrimination in Employment  the EU law, pp. 1516.
38Articles 3 and 4, Framework Equality Directive 2000/78/EC.
39Vickers, Religion and Belief Discrimination in Employment  the EU law, p. 56.
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the work to be done and the characteristics required: the occupational requirement must
be genuine and determining, and it must be proportionate in the particular case involved.
It will be necessary to consider the requirements of the job very closely before being able
to use the exception. Thus, religious discrimination under Article 4(1) is only really likely
to be lawful in cases of those employed in religious service, whose job involves teaching
or promoting the religion, or being involved in religious observance.40
More controversial is the additional exception to the principle of non-discrimination con-
tained in Article 4(2), which applies only to churches or other public or private organi-
sations which have an ethos based on religion and belief. The exception is broader than
that provided for by Article 4(1) as the genuine occupational requirement does not have
to be determining although it does still need to be legitimate and justiﬁed. This sug-
gests a less rigorous approach in deciding whether the particular job requires a particular
characteristic than that required by Article 4(1), where the emphasis is clearly on the
nature of the job itself. The aim of the provision is to allow a religious ethos organisation
to require loyalty and good faith to its ethos. In relation to religious employers it may
be possible to argue that a workplace has a particular religious ethos, because its staﬀ is
all from the same religion, and it operates according to that religious ethos. This may
then lead to employers imposing religious requirements on a broader range of staﬀ, such
as administrative staﬀ or catering or cleaning staﬀ. Although they do not need to be
determining requirements, requirements must be genuine and occupational, so must be
linked to the job in question.41
The protection available to religion within the Directive is limited to the prohibition
of direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and victimisation. It does not, on its
face, impose a duty on employers to make reasonable accommodation for the needs of
religious employees. In this regard it can be contrasted with the duty to accommodate
disability which is speciﬁcally provided within the text of the Directive. If a duty of
reasonable accommodation can be read into the Directive, its extent will be determined
by the scope of the justiﬁcation defence available in indirect discrimination cases. Where
a requirement can be objectively justiﬁed by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving
the aim are appropriate and necessary, there is no indirect discrimination. If this justi-
ﬁcation standard is interpreted in the same way as it is in sex equality cases, this will
mean that any requirement must have a legitimate aim, the means chosen for achieving
that objective must correspond to a real need on the part of the undertaking, must be
appropriate with a view to achieving the objective in question and must be necessary to
that end.42
The Framework Directive also allows support of the complainant by associations, organ-
40Vickers, Religion and Belief Discrimination in Employment  the EU law, p. 56.
41Vickers, Religion and Belief Discrimination in Employment  the EU law, pp. 5657.
42Bilka-Kaufhaus v. Weber von Hartz, Case 170-84 (1986). Vickers, Religion and Belief Discrimina-
tion in Employment  the EU law, pp. 2023.
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isations or other legal entities with legitimate interest under the Directive.43 The burden
of proof is, as in other anti-discrimination directives, shifted to the respondent.44
The relation between anti-discrimination legislation and other human rights regulation is
not possible to be easily deﬁned. This might be partially based on interconnectedness of
freedom of religion and freedom from discrimination that are complementary but still
sometimes in tension. Lucky Vickers mentiones three conﬂicting areas of these rights.
Firstly, many religions do not recognise fundamental rights and freedoms of others,45
such as rights not to be discriminated against on grounds of birth, status, gender, sexual
orientation or other grounds. Secondly, clashes can arise between various human rights
where religious interests are concerned. Thirdly, and perhaps more fundamentally, it is
not clear what connection there is between freedom of religion and non-discrimination
rights (the positive aspect of freedom of religion), with a more general freedom to be
protected from religion (the negative aspect of freedom of religion).46
There have been supposed to be more directives implementing Article 13 TEC, especially
outside of employment. The current Commission is, however, not able to deliver all of
them before end of its term. Thus Vladimír pidla stated that the Commission's proposal
on non-discrimination outside employment will cover only disability. The other grounds
of discrimination, i.e age, sexual orientation, religion and belief are to be covered by a
communication (non-binding document).47
5.4 European Court of Justice
The European Court of Justice has not had much chance to deal with cases related
to freedom of religion or belief, especially because religion has not been dealt with to
great extent by EC law. The persons who have felt their freedom of religion violated
usually have taken recourse to the European Court of Human Rights. Hence, this section
presents only two cases: Prais v. Council being landmark in human rights protection
provided by ECJ and Steymann v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie dealing with activities
of religious communities.
Vivien Prais applied for a job of linguistic expert (translator) in the Council of the
European Communities. A written test in the competition was scheduled for Friday, 16
May 1975. That very day was also the ﬁrst day of Jewish feast Shavuot.48 Vivien Prais
43Article 9, Framework Equality Directive 2000/78/EC.
44Article 10, Framework Equality Directive 2000/78/EC.
45It may be more accurate not to talk about religions but rather religious groups as it is possible to
ﬁnd almost in every religion group of people recognising fundamental rights and freedoms of the others
 and a group of people opposing them.
46Vickers, Religion and Belief Discrimination in Employment  the EU law, p. 40.
47Further information and strong opposition to narrowing the scope of the directive presented by
European Social NGOs can be found at http://www.socialplatform.org/News.asp?DocID=17207.
48Shavuot is the second of the three major Jewish festivals (Passover being the ﬁrst and Sukkot the
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asked for another day for the test as her religion had not permitted her to travel or write
on that date. She received a reply that it was not possible to ﬁx another date as it was
essential that all candidates were examined on tests passed on the same date.49
The plaintiﬀ claimed that the refusal of her request had as a result preventing her from
taking part in the competition based on her religious convictions. That was allegedly
contrary to Staﬀ Regulations (oﬃcials shall be selected without reference to race, creed
or sex) and contrary to fundamental rights as protected by community law. She also
relied on Article 9(2) of the European Convention with argumentation that since the
European Convention has been ratiﬁed by all the member states, the rights enshrined
in it are . . . to be regarded as included in fundamental rights protected by community
law. She claimed that Staﬀ Regulations are to be interpreted in such a manner that the
defendant should so arrange the dates of tests as to enable every candidate to take part
in the tests irrespective of his religion. Alternatively she based this requirement on the
European Convention.50
Council of the European Communities (defendant) opposed her claim with argumentation
that it would be too demanding for administration to ﬁx date for test so that it is suitable
for all possible religions.51
The EJC accepted argument of the Council and stated that when a competition is on
the basis of tests, the principle of equality necessitates that the tests shall be on the
same conditions for all candidates (especially when written test is concerned). And the
interest of participants not to have a date ﬁxed for the test which is unsuitable must
be balanced against this necessity. So, if a candidate informs the appointing authority
that religious reasons make certain dates impossible for him the appointing authority
should take this into account in ﬁxing the date for written tests, and endeavour to avoid
such dates. On the other hand if the candidate does not inform the appointing authority
in good time of his diﬃculties, the appointing authority would be justiﬁed in refusing
to aﬀord an alternative date, particularly if there are other candidates who have been
convoked for the test.52
The ECJ further noted that an appointing authority might inform itself in a general
way of dates which might be unsuitable for religious reasons and seeks to avoid ﬁxing
such dates for tests, nevertheless, neither the staﬀ regulations nor the fundamental rights
could be considered as imposing on the appointing authority a duty to avoid a conﬂict
with a religious requirement of which the authority has not been informed.53
third) and occurs exactly ﬁfty days after the second day of Passover. This holiday marks the anniversary
of the day when Israel received the Torah at Mount Sinai.
49Para. 13, Prais v. Council of the European Communities, Case 130-75 (1976).
50Para. 69, Prais v. Council of the European Communities, Case 130-75 (1976).
51Para. 1011, Prais v. Council of the European Communities, Case 130-75 (1976).
52Para. 1317, Prais v. Council of the European Communities, Case 130-75 (1976).
53Para. 18, Prais v. Council of the European Communities, Case 130-75 (1976).
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Based on this balancing of interests the ECJ rejected the claim of Vivien Prais.54
In case of Udo Steymann v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie arose question to what extent
activities performed by a member of a religious community may be regarded as economic
activities or services within the meaning of the EEC Treaty. Mr Steymann, a German
national, settled in the Netherlands on 26 March 1983. For a short period he was in paid
employment as a plumber. Subsequently, he became a member of the religious commu-
nity known as De Stad Rajneesh Neo-Sannyas Commune (the Bhagwan Community)
which supplies its material needs by means of commercial activities, which include run-
ning a discothèque, a bar and a launderette. Mr Steymann's contribution to the life of
the Bhagwan Community consisted in the performance of plumbing work on the com-
munity's premises and general household duties. He also took part in the community's
commercial activity. The community provided for the material needs of its members in
any event, irrespective of the nature and the extent of their activities.55
Mr Steymann applied for a Netherlands residence permit in order to pursue an activity
as an employed person. The chief of the local police turned down his application and so
did the Staatssecretaris van Justitie (on the ground, inter alia, that he was not pursuing
an activity as an employed person and consequently was not a favoured EEC national
within the meaning of the Netherlands legislation on aliens). Thus, he appealed to the
Raad van State against that decision of the Staatssecretaris van Justitie on the ground
that as a member of the Bhagwan Community he was both a recipient of services from,
and a provider of services to, that community. The national court stayed the proceedings
and turned to ECJ.56
The national court sought to establish to what extent activities performed by members
of a community based on religion or another form of philosophy as part of the activities
of such a community may be regarded as economic activities within the meaning of the
EEC Treaty. The ECJ answered that Article 2 of the EEC Treaty must be interpreted
as meaning that activities performed by members of a community based on religion
or another form of philosophy as part of the commercial activities of that community
constitute economic activities in so far as the services which the community provides
to its members may be regarded as the indirect quid pro quo for genuine and eﬀective
work.57
In this connection it might be interesting to mention case that was dealt under the
ECHR in which the Commission drew up a distinction between religious advertisement
with merely informational or descriptive character  and advertisement for marketing
goods. The former falls within protection of Article 9(1) ECHR, whereas the letter not.58
54Para. 1920, Prais v. Council of the European Communities, Case 130-75 (1976).
55Para. 24, Udo Steymann v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Case 196-87 (1988).
56Para. 56, Udo Steymann v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Case 196-87 (1988).
57Para. 8 and 14, Udo Steymann v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Case 196-87 (1988).
58[T]he concept, contained in the ﬁrst paragraph of Article 9, concerning the manifestation of a
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5.5 The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) is a body of the European
Union, established through Council Regulation (EC) No. 168/2007 of 15 February 2007.
It is based in Vienna and is being built on the European Monitoring Centre on Racism
and Xenophobia. The objective of the Agency is to provide the relevant institutions and
authorities of the Community and its Member States when implementing Community
law with assistance and expertise relating to fundamental rights in order to support them
when they take measures or formulate courses of action within their respective spheres
of competence to fully respect fundamental rights.59
The Agency carries out its tasks within the competencies of the Community, as laid down
in the EC Treaty. The Agency refers to fundamental rights within the meaning of Article
6(2) of the Treaty on European Union, including the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and as reﬂected in the Charter of Fundamental
Rights.
FRA's founding Regulation also underlines the importance of coordination with the
Council of Europe in order to avoid duplication, ensure complementarity and mutually
reinforce each other's work. To this end, a cooperation agreement with the CoE has
been concluded. The FRA has established relations with the Council of Europe's Euro-
pean Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), the Commissioner for Human
Rights and the Council of Europe's departments responsible for social cohesion issues.
The Regulation also forsees co-operation with OSCE and UN bodies as well as national
human rights institutions in the Member States.
Among the themes set up in a Multiannual Framework for the period 20072012 is also
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or
sexual orientation or of persons belonging to minorities. Some aspects of freedom of
religion should be also addressed in thematic area of immigration.60
belief in practice does not confer protection on statements of puported religious belief which appear
as selling arguments in advertisements of a purely commercial nature by a religious group. In this
connection the Commission would draw a distinction, however, between advertisements which are merely
infrmational or descriptive in character and commercial advertisements oﬀering objects for sale.
Once an advertisement enters into the latter sphere, although it may concern religious objects central
to a particular need, statements of religious content represent, in the Commission's view, more the
manifestation of a desire to market goods for a proﬁt then the manifestation of a belief in practice,
whithin the proper sense of that term. X. and the Church of Scientology v. Sweden, app. no. 7805/77
(1979).
59Article 2, Council Regulation (EC) No. 168/2007.
60Commission's proposal COM (2007) 0515 Final.
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5.6 Treaty of Lisbon
The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty
establishing the European Community (TEC) has been signed in Lisbon on 13 December
2007 by the representatives of the 27 Member States. TEC has been renamed Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
In accordance with its Article 6, the Treaty will have to be ratiﬁed by the Member States
in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements and will enter into force
on 1 January 2009, provided that all instruments of ratiﬁcation have been deposited, or,
failing that, on the ﬁrst day of the month following the deposit of the last instrument of
ratiﬁcation.
In the ﬁeld of religious rights, and human rights in general, the Treaty of Lisbon makes a
signiﬁcant step. Not only it lifts up Charter of Fundamental Rights to the level of other
treaties (primary law), but it also tries to shed more light on EU's relation to ECHR.
Article 6 provides:
(2) The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not aﬀect
the Union's competences as deﬁned in the Treaties.
(3) Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall con-
stitute general principles of the Union's law.
The Intergovernmental Conference in Lisbon declared that the Union's accession to the
ECHR should be arranged in such a way as to preserve the speciﬁc features of Union
law. It noted particularly that the existence of a regular dialogue between the Court
of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights should be
reinforced when the Union accedes to ECHR.61
The preamble of the consolidated version of the TEU mentions cultural, religious and hu-
manist inheritance of Europe. Article 13 TFEU states that the Union and the Member
States shall in formulating and implementing the Union's agriculture, ﬁsheries, trans-
port, internal market, research and technological development and space policies, since
animals are sentient beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals, while
respecting the legislative or administrative provisions and customs of the Member States
relating in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage.
Lisbon Treaty provides for the ﬁrst time regulation of the EU's relation to religious
communities. Article 17 provides the following:
61Declarations annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the
Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007.
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(1) The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law
of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States.
(2) The Union equally respects the status under national law of philosophical
and non-confessional organisations.
(3) Recognising their identity and their speciﬁc contribution, the Union shall
maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with these churches and
organisations.
The mere recognition and respect of the national status of churches, religious association,
communities philosophical and non-confessional organisations is not that revolutionary.
What makes, however, a step forward to churches and faith-based organisations is main-
tenance of open, transparent and regulard dialogue. This might raise the importance
especially of religious representations in the European institutions.
5.7 Concluding Remarks
The European Communities were founded mainly on economic and political grounds.
However, as quite substantial part of European citizens is not able to found their lives on
economic premises, religious and cultural aspects started to penetrate through economic
and political integration.
The ECJ recognized among other human rights also freedom or religion and belief. The
Commission managed to develop anti-discrimination legislation based on Article 13 TEC,
which is also directed against discrimination on grounds of religion and belief. The
European Convention drafted Charter of Fundamental Rights giving important place to
freedom of religion, thought and conscience. If Lisbon Treaty is ratiﬁed by all Member
States, Charter will become legally binding as part of primary law and the EU will join
the ECHR as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights.
Apart from religion becoming more and more present in legal documents, there is a special
space for religious and cultural elements of EU citizens' lives that has been conﬁrmed by
proclaiming the year 2008 the Year of Intercultural Dialogue.
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6 Conclusion
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of democratic
society. This basis was proclaimed by the European Court of Human Rights and is
acceptable to vast majority of of secular and religious thinkers and institutions.
However, opinions start to radically diﬀer when we get to more speciﬁc meaning of the
concept of freedom of religion, when we get to conﬂicts with other fundamental rights
and freedoms, or when we get to implementation of religious freedom in a particular
situation.
We observed that freedom of religion could be based on various fundaments. One of the
possible ways of approaching this liberty is to start with human dignity. Dignity that a
person enjoys irrespectively of his or her performance or deeds of his or her predecessors.
It is possible to argument in favour of human dignity as it was gift of God or part
of natural order, thus this idea is in principle acceptable for both religious and non-
religious people.
Concept of religious freedom shares with concept of religion, among others, characteristic
intagibility. We observed that people negotiating treaties (and other laws) and courts in-
terpreting them struggle with what is still to be included in religion or belief and what is
not  in order to maintain protection eﬀective and prevent abuses. All the way it is sail-
ing in between Scylla of objective all-encompassing deﬁnition and Charybdis of treating
as religion or belief everything a person wishes to. It is quite an embarrassing discovery
that courts do not approach this problem consistently, favours well-known religions and
orient themselves according to their limited knowledge of new or alternative religious
movements. This approach is not respectful to religious freedom of aﬀected individuals
and certainly it is not an indication of all people being equal in dignity.
Analysis of various cases, especially before the European Court of Human Rights, con-
ﬁrms the hypothesis that quite many tensions stem from Western division of religious
freedom on forum internum and forum externum. This division is unknown and unac-
ceptable particularly for non-Europeans trying to live their faith in all aspects of their
life. They cannot understand how is it possible for somebody to be claiming adher-
ence to freedom of religion and still be able to publish cartoons insulting the Prophet
Muhammad (and thus all Muslims) or to prohibit wearing headscarfs in public schools.
Thus it is understandable that many people have questioned the whole division. It
is quite interesting to observe that advocates of the division do not have persuasive
arguments for trying to draw a borderline between what person believes in and what
person does. Courts decided in favour of having some kind of elusive borderline in
order to maintain neutrality, equal treatment and non-discrimination. These ideals are
fundamental for European democracy, however, maintaining them by forcing people to
live schizofrenic lifes of internal freedom and highly regulated public manifestations,
forms a parallel with totalitarian regimes and certainly does not respect human being in
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his or her dignity. Hence, it will be interesting to observe development in this area in
coming years as it would be foolish to assume that current religious revival is over and
religion is to be considered as a historical phenomenon.
Legal instruments for protection of religious freedom that were considered in this paper
substantially inﬂuenced one another. This is quite understandable given the diﬃculties
in negotiating any provisions dealing with freedom of religion or belief. It is possible
to say that European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, which became the most eﬀective tool for protection of religious freedom, is
based on wording of Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While developing quite an
elabore case-law by the Commission and Court, newer instruments and developments in
the United Nations were also taken into consideration.
Due to developed and (more or less) eﬀective human rights protection scheme of the
European Court of Human Rights, and due to emphasis on economic and political inte-
gration, it is understandable that the European Communities (Union) have not developed
an independend system for protection of religious freedom. However, the EC legislated
extensively in the ﬁeld of anti-discrimination on various grounds; for us are important
anti-dicrimination provisions on the grounds of religion, faith or belief, and ethnic orgi-
gin (as ethnicity is in some cases interconnected with religion). The anti-discrimination
provisions are, nonetheless, not very systematic and implemented in quite diﬀering ways.
Hence, it is up to the future interpretation (possibly in connection with Lisbon Treaty,
if ratiﬁed) to shed more light on protection of religious freedom in the EU.
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eské resumé
Evropa se nepovaºuje za p°íli² náboºenský kontinent. A pokud si n¥jaké náboºenské
tradice p°iznává, pak jsou spojovány s k°es´anstvím, které bylo vytla£eno z ve°ejného
ºivota. Plná svoboda náboºenství je moºná jen ve vnit°ním sv¥t¥ £lov¥ka, v rámci tzv.
forum internum. Manifestace náboºenského p°esv¥d£ení navenek je podrobena °ad¥ ome-
zení, která se li²í v jednotlivých £ástech Evropy p°edev²ím podle historického vývoje a
p°ítomnosti konkrétních náboºenských skupin.
Odd¥lení vnit°ního náboºenského p°esv¥d£ení a jeho vn¥j²í manifestace m·ºe p·sobit po-
n¥kud schizofrenn¥, p°edev²ím pro v¥°ící, kte°í se snaºí ºít svou víru naplno. Dalo by se
°íci, ºe souvisí p°edev²ím se Západní sekulární tendencí reagující na d¥jiny plné náboºen-
ského nap¥tí a konﬂikt·. Není v²ak p°ijímáno nekriticky  p°edev²ím pro nek°es´anské
náboºenské okruhy jde o pom¥rn¥ cizí koncepci. A dokonce ani °ada k°es´anských mys-
litel· by se pod n¥j nedokázala podepsat.
Základní tezí, kterou se tato práce nasti¬uje je, ºe rozdíl v pojetí celistvosti víry a nábo-
ºenství (pop°. d¥lení na forum internum a forum externum) má zásadní vliv na pojetí
náboºenské svobody. Vede £asto ke konﬂikt·m s dal²ími základními právy, které se zdají
obecn¥ ne°e²itelnými, coº je z°etelné v nejednotné rozhodovací praxi státních orgán· a
soud·.
V médiích sou£anosti je obzvlá²t¥ z°etelný konﬂikt mezi svobodou náboºenství a svobo-
dou projevu. P°edev²ím publikace karikatur proroka Mohameda vyvolala ost°ej²í reakce
neº jejich p·vodci p°edpokládali. S trochou odstupu by se dalo °íci, ºe °ada reakcí vy-
cházela a vychází z nepochopení chyb¥jící hranice mezi vnit°ním p°esv¥d£ením a jeho
vn¥j²ím projevem, mezi testem mezí svobody projevu a cíleného útoku na celý náboºen-
ský systém.
Dal²í oblastí neutuchajících diskusí je místo náboºenství ve vzd¥lávacím systému. Pro
°adu rodi£· je klí£ové, aby jejich d¥ti m¥ly ve ²kole moºnost seznámit se se základy ur-
£itého náboºenského a hodnotového systému. Jiní rodi£e poºadují naprosto neutrální
prezentaci b¥ºných náboºenství v rámci spole£enských v¥d. A dal²í by si p°áli napros-
tou absenci náboºenství v rámci vzd¥lávací soustavy. Jak usmí°it tyto rozdílné poºa-
davky? Jakým zp·sobem má reagovat stát? Jak má být uspo°ádáno ve°ejné vzd¥lávání?
A jaké to má mít dopady na soukromé ²kolství? To jsou jen n¥které ze základních otázek
souvisejících se svobodou náboºenství a právem na vzd¥lání. Kaºdý stát a mezinárodní
instituce na n¥ odpovídá rozdílným zp·sobem.
Ve ²kolství do²lo v °ad¥ zemí k zákazu no²ení náboºenských symbol·. To vyvolává obec-
n¥j²í otázky ohledn¥ manifestace náboºenství na ve°ejnosti. Nastupuje zde také otázka
diskriminace, p°edev²ím nep°ímé, v²ude, kde se £lov¥k, jehoº náboºenství je známo, vy-
skytuje.
Mohlo by se jevit, ºe náboºenská p°íslu²nost a náboºenské p°esv¥d£ení jsou statickými
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záleºitostmi. ada v¥°ících v²ak povaºuje sv·j náboºenský ºivot za duchovní cestu .1
asto lidé stráví celou svou duchovní cestu uvnit° jednoho náboºenského systému, ale
rozhodn¥ to nejde povaºovat za pravidlo. V¥t²ina duchovních cest totiº vybízí k zamy²lení
se nad zp·sobem ºivota kaºdého £lov¥ka, k uv¥dom¥ní si toho, co d¥lá ²patn¥  a ke
zm¥n¥ smý²lení. Zde se pak dostáváme k otázce proselytismu, k ur£ování, nakolik je
moºná asistence jiného £lov¥ka v pr·b¥hu prom¥ny smý²lení . Je pochopitelné, ºe se
v¥t²ina náboºenských komunit, obzvlá²t¥ pokud se povaºují za jedinou cestu ke spáse,
bude zasazovat o to, aby náboºenská svoboda byla moºná sm¥rem dovnit°, ale nikoliv
ven. To nás staví p°ed otázku, jakým zp·sobem má tuto oblast regulovat stát, obzvlá²t¥
pokud jde o stát, který má úzkou vazbu k ur£itému náboºenství £i náboºenské organiza£ní
struktu°e.
Jak je vid¥t, kdyº za£ne být svoboda náboºenství nahlíºena v ²ir²ích souvislostech, staví
nás p°ed °adu otázek. Otázek, které není moºno jednodu²e vy°e²it v obecné rovin¥ pro
v²echny moºné p°ípady. Tato práce se snaºí stru£n¥ nastínit n¥které z moºných p°ístup·,
které se vyskytují v £innosti Rady Evropy, Organizace spojených národ· a Evropského
spole£enství (Evropské unie). K °ad¥ z nich p°istupuje kriticky a snaºí se poskytnout pod-
n¥ty pro nalézání cest odpovídajících náboºenskému p°esv¥d£ení jednotlivých v¥°ících,
jeº je primárním objektem ochrany svobody náboºenství.
Vzhledem k tomu, ºe otázky související s náboºenstvím jsou v¥t²inou pon¥kud kontro-
verzní a odpov¥di na n¥ r·znorodé, jeví se nutným poznamenat tato práce odráºí p°e-
dev²ím pozici autora, který je praktikujícím k°es´anem aktivním v mezináboºenských
vztazích, p°edev²ím v k°es´anskomuslimském dialogu.
Pojem svobody náboºenství
Svoboda náboºenství není jednodu²e deﬁnovatelný termín, coº souvisí p°edev²ím s obtíº-
nou deﬁnicí náboºenství jako takového. S tím právo samoz°ejm¥ nemálo zápasilo a zápasí,
coº je z°ejmé z v¥t²iny mezinárodních dokument· zabývajících se svobodou náboºenství
a na n¥ navazující interpreta£ní £innosti.
Evropský soud pro lidská práva (ESLP) se nap°íklad nevydal obecným vymezením toho,
co lze povaºovat za náboºenství, a co je tedy hodno ochrany pod hlavi£kou náboºenské
svobody. Spí²e v jednotlivých (hrani£ních) p°ípadech ur£oval, co je²t¥ povaºuje za nábo-
ºenství, a co jiº nikoliv. Tak nap°. pod ochranu £l. 9 Evropské úmluvy zahrnul ateismus2
nebo druidismus,3 ale nezahrnul náboºenství wicca.4
Na druhou stranu Nejvy²²í soud Spojených stát· amerických zaloºil své rozhodování na
1Nap°. judaimus mluví o cestách lidu izraelského , o následování Hospodina. K°es´anství povaºuje
Krista za tu pravou cestu ke spáse. Klí£ový znak £ínských náboºenství, tao, doslova znamená cesta .
2Angeleni v. védsko, stíºnost £. 10491/83 (1986).
3A.R.M. Chappell v. Spojené království (1987).
4X. v. Spojené království, stíºnost £. 7291/75 (1977).
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pozitivní deﬁnici, kterou p°evzal od významného teologa Paula Tillicha. Tillich stavil
na termínu ultimate concern, tedy na n¥£em, co je nejvlastn¥j²ím zájmem £lov¥ka, na
ne£em, co se £lov¥ka bezprost°edn¥ (do)týká. Nejvy²²í soud tak povaºuje za náboºen-
ství p°esv¥d£ení daného £lov¥ka, pokud je schopen prokázat, ºe jeho p°esv¥d£ení je jeho
nejvlastn¥j²ím zájmem, který je bezpodmíne£ný (neumoº¬uje kompromis).5
Subjektivní deﬁnice je výhodná p°edev²ím pro malá a nová náboºenství, která v¥t²i-
nou nenapl¬ují standardy stanovené v¥t²inovou spole£ností. Zahrnující schopnost v²ak
m·ºe být i slabostí subjektivního p°ístupu, protoºe do jedné kategorie mohou spadat i
nejvlastn¥j²í zájmy jako fotbal, sledování televize nebo ochrana lidských práv.
K deﬁnování náboºenství je moºné p°istupovat také analogickým zp·sobem. Kent Gree-
nawalt navrhl, aby se za náboºenství povaºovalo ve sporných p°ípadech to, co analogicky
napl¬uje podobné znaky jako to, co je bezpochyby náboºenstvím. adatel o ochranu by
tak musel prokázat dostatek sdílených znak· jeho víry s tím, co je bezpochyby pova-
ºováno za náboºenství stejn¥ jako ukázal Ludwig Wittgenstein, ºe pojem hra nemá
spole£nou deﬁnici, ale jde spí²e o souhrn podobností.6
Objasn¥ní obsahu náboºenské svobody m·ºe napomoci b¥ºné d¥lení na pozitivní nábo-
ºenskou svobodu (svobodu k) a negativní náboºenskou svobodu (svobodu od). Pozi-
tivní náboºenská svoboda je zaloºena na svobod¥ individua chovat náboºenskou víru nebo
p°esv¥d£ení a vyjad°ovat ji p°im¥°eným zp·sobem na ve°ejnosti, a´ osamocen¥, nebo ve
spole£enství s dal²ími. Negativní náboºenská svoboda pak spo£ívá ve svobod¥ od donu-
cení, nátlaku nebo indoktrinace v náboºenských otázkách. Tato dvoustranná svoboda
nachází protipól v povinnosti neutrality státu ve vztahu k náboºenstvím nacházajícím
se na jeho území.
N¥kdy se pro zd·vodn¥ní nezbytnosti svobody náboºenství argumentuje historicky: kdyº
se podíváme na d¥jiny plné náboºenských válek a násilí ve jménu víry, není zde jiné
moºnosti neº hájit náboºenskou svobodu. To neznamená, ºe by náboºenská svoboda
byla hodnotou sama o sob¥, jen se k ní je vhodné pragmaticky uchýlit.7
Jiným moºným zp·sobem, jak p°istupovat ke svobod¥ náboºenství je za£ít u lidské d·-
stojnosti. To je cesta, kterou nastoupila °ada náboºenských i sekulárních myslitel·. Podle
Wolganga Hubera je etika d·stojnosti (na rozdíl od etiky zájmu) zako°en¥na ve znovu-
objevení protestantské reformace. Ta u£í, ºe £lov¥k není tvo°en svými vlastními výkony
a ani nem·ºe dosáhnout kone£ného uznání svým úsilím. Ne lidská dokonalost, ale boºí
milost tvo°í lidskou bytost. Lidská d·stojnost není ani v moci jiných lidí, ani spole£nosti
nebo státu. lov¥k je ve svém £asov¥ omezeném p·sobení na sv¥t¥ obda°en nekone£nou
5Spojené státy v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). Carolyn Evans. Freedom of Religion under the ECHR.
Anglicky. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, strana 63.
6Ludwig Wittgenstein. Filosoﬁcká zkoumání. Praha: Filosoﬁa, 1993. Kent Greenawalt. Religion as a
Concept in Constitutional Law. In: California Law Review 72.5 (1984). Strany 753816, strany 762764.
Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, strana 63.
7Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, strana 24.
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d·stojností, která je naprosto nezaslouºenou milostí Boºí.8
Etiku d·stojnosti sekulárním zp·sobem nejznám¥ji shrnul Immanuel Kant jako jednu
z formulací kategorického imperativu: Jednej tak, abys pouºíval lidství jak ve své osob¥,
tak i v osob¥ kaºdého druhého vºdy zárove¬ jako ú£el a nikdy pouze jako prost°edek.
Tato formule zd·raz¬uje op¥t, ºe si ºádná osoba nem·ºe nárokovat deﬁnování druhého
£lov¥ka nebo dispozici s ním.9
Svoboda náboºenství pat°í mezi hodnoty vyznávané °adou sv¥tových náboºenství. Do-
konce by se dalo °íci, ºe v n¥kterých p°ípadech je náboºenská svoboda v náboºenství
p°ímo zako°en¥na. Takový soud v²ak není moºné obecn¥ hájit, protoºe jednotlivá nábo-
ºenství rozhodn¥ nejsou jednolitými celky, ale existují ve zna£né vnit°ní rozr·zn¥nosti.
Je moºné tvrdit, ºe prakticky v kaºdém náboºenském systému se nalezne ur£itá skupina
povaºující svobodu náboºenství za nezbytnou sou£ást jejich víry  stejn¥ jako skupina
zpochyb¬ující náboºenskou svobodu jako takovou.
Tyto rozdíly £asto vyplývají z r·zné interpretace svatých písem daného náboºenství. A£-
koliv se mnozí snaºí zd·raznit stálost a nem¥nnost svatého textu, moderní hermeneutika
ukazuje na klí£ovou roli interpreta, jeho zku²enosti a p°edporozum¥ní. Není tedy vhodné
a moºné ºádný výklad absolutizovat jako ten jediný správný pro danou náboºenskou sku-
pinu. To má samoz°ejm¥ nemalé d·sledky v právu p°edev²ím pro orgány ve°ejné správy
a soudy, pokud se cht¥jí obracet na n¥jakého náboºenského p°edstavitele se ºádostí o
autoritativní výklad ur£ité problematiky.
Svoboda náboºenství v rámci Rady Evropy
Posláním Rady Evropy je rozvíjet prostor demokracie, svobody a lidských práv v ev-
ropském regionu. Jak zd·raznil Evropský soud pro lidská práva v rozsudku Kokkinakis
v. ecko, svoboda my²lení, sv¥domí a náboºenství je jedním ze základ· demokratické
spole£nosti v pojetí Evropské úmluvy. Ve své náboºenské dimenzi je jedním z klí£ových
prvk· tvo°ících identitu v¥°ích a jejich pojetí ºivota, ale je také cenným p°ínosem pro
ateisty, agnostiky, skeptiky a lidi nejevící zájem o náboºenství. Závisí na ní pluralis-
mus neodlu£itelný od demokratické spole£nosti, který byl t¥ºce vybojován v pr·b¥hu
staletí.10
Úmluva o ochran¥ lidských práv a základních svobod (Evropská úmluva) upravuje svo-
bodu náboºenství p°ededv²ím ve svém £l. 9:
(1) Kaºdý má právo na svobodu my²lení, sv¥domí a náboºenského vyznání;
8Wolfgang Huber. Human Rights and Biblical Legal Thought. In: Religious Human Rights in Global
Perspective. Religious Perspectives. Anglicky. Ed. John Witte a Johan D. van der Vyver. The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 1996, strana 55.
9Immanuel Kant. Základy metafyziky mrav·. Praha: Svoboda, 1990, strana 91. Huber, Human Rights
and Biblical Legal Thought, strana 56.
10Kokkinakis v. ecko, stíºnost £. 14307/88 (1993).
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toto právo zahrnuje svobodu zm¥nit své náboºenské vyznání nebo p°esv¥d-
£ení, jakoº i svobodu projevovat své náboºenské vyznání nebo p°esv¥d£ení
sám nebo spole£n¥ s jinými, a´ ve°ejn¥ nebo soukrom¥, bohosluºbou, vyu£o-
váním, provád¥ním náboºenských úkon· a zachováváním ob°ad·.
(2) Svoboda projevovat náboºenské vyznání a p°esv¥d£ení m·ºe podléhat jen
omezením, která jsou stanovena zákony a která jsou nezbytná v demokratické
spole£nosti v zájmu ve°ejné bezpe£nosti, ochrany ve°ejného po°ádku, zdraví
nebo morálky nebo ochrany práv a svobod jiných.
Svoboda náboºenství je chrán¥na také zákazem diskriminace v £l. 14:
Uºívání práv a svobod p°iznaných touto Úmluvou musí být zaji²t¥no bez
diskriminace zaloºené na jakémkoli d·vodu, jako je pohlaví, rasa, barva pleti,
jazyk, náboºenství, politické nebo jiné smý²lení, národnostní nebo sociální
p·vod, p°íslu²nost k národnostní men²in¥, majetek, rod nebo jiné postavení.
Podle ESLP £l. 9 chrání v první °ad¥ sféru osobní víry a náboºenského vyznání, tedy
oblast, která je n¥kdy nazývána forum internum. Dále chrání úkony, jeº jsou úzce spojeny
s t¥mito postoji, jako náboºenské ob°ady, které jsou sou£ástí náboºenské praxe v obecn¥
uznávané podob¥. l. 9 v²ak nezahrnuje moºnost libovolného chování uloºeného vírou
nebo p°esv¥d£ením.11
Podle £l. 9 odst. 1 má kaºdý právo projevovat své náboºenské vyznání nebo p°esv¥d£ení
sám nebo spole£en¥ s jinými. Volba je v tomto p°ípad¥ na konkrétním £lov¥ku  státní
orgány nemohou provád¥t tuto volbu za n¥j a rozhodovat, jestli by v daném p°ípad¥
m¥la být svoboda náboºenského vyznání nebo p°esv¥d£ení vykonávána osamoceným jed-
nolivcem nebo komunitou. Omezení je moºno ukládat pouze na základ¥ £l. 9 odst. 2.12 Z
ustanovení £l. 9 odst. 1 v²ak není moºné vyvozovat právo formálního uznání náboºenské
spole£nosti jakoºto projevu svobody náboºenství vykonávané spole£n¥ s jinými .13
Evropská komise a ESLP se nevyjád°ili jednozna£n¥, jestli je vý£et bohosluºeb, vy-
u£ování, provád¥ní náboºenských úkon· a zachovávání ob°ad· vý£tem taxativním, £i
nikoliv. V praxi v²ak bylo s tímto vý£tem zacházeno jako s taxativním, p°edev²ím proto,
ºe provád¥ní náboºenských úkon· (v angli£tin¥ practice) poskytuje dostate£nou ²í°i
pro interpretaci zp·sobem zahrnujícím v¥t²inu myslitelných náboºenských projev·.14
Provád¥ní náboºenských úkon· není práv¥ nejvhodn¥j²ím p°ekladem anglického prac-
tice, coº je z°etelné na p°ípadu Arrowsmith v. Spojené království, který je klí£ovým pro
11C. v. Spojené království, stíºnost £. 10358/83 (1983). Odstavec 3, Porter v. Spojené království, stíº-
nost £. 15814/02 (2003).
12Odstavec 5, X. v. Spojené království, stíºnost £. 8160/78 (1981).
13Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, strana 104. X. v. Rakousko, stíºnost £. 8652/79 (1981).
14Arrowsmith v. Spojené království, stíºnost £. 7050/75 (1978). Malcolm D. Evans. Religious Liberty
and International Law in Europe. Anglicky. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, strany 304
307. Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, strany 105106.
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jeho výklad. Pat Arrowsmith byla odsouzena pro roz²i°ování leták· mezi vojáky, které se
snaºila odradit od vojenské sluºby v Severním Irsku. Povaºovala své odsouzení za poru²u-
jící svobodu projevovat své paciﬁstické p°esv¥d£ení (poru²ení £l. 9 a £l. 10 Úmluvy). Ev-
ropská komise uznala, ºe její paciﬁstické p°esv¥d£ení15 spadá pod ochranu £l. 9, nicmén¥
rozdávání leták· nebylo uznáno jako provád¥ní náboºenských úkon·, nebo´ letáky
údajn¥ nevyjad°ovaly její paciﬁstický pohled na sv¥t.16
Komise rozhodla, ºe z ochrany £l. 9 jsou vylou£eny £iny pouze motivované nebo ovlivn¥né
vírou £i p°esv¥d£ením. adatel o ochranu tedy musí prokazovat velmi úzkou spojitost mezi
£inem a vírou £i p°esv¥d£ením; musí prokázat, ºe jeho jednání bylo nutným d·sledkem
jeho víry £i p°esv¥d£ení.17
Arrowsmith test (nebo také test nutnosti), a£koliv není práv¥ nejjasn¥j²ím, byl po-
stupn¥ roz²í°en také na oblast bohosluºeb (worship). Absurdity dosáhl, kdyº Komise
rozhodla, ºe britský muslim neprokázal poºadavek islámu, aby se ú£astnil páte£ní (spo-
le£né) modlitby.18 Problematické je p°edev²ím, jaké d·kazy jsou dosta£ující k prokázání
nutnosti . Soud v¥t²inou nebere osobní pocit povinnosti st¥ºovatele, £asto ani nepro-
vede d·kazy jím navrºené19 a uºití expert· £i publikací náboºenských spole£ností20 se
d¥je spí²e ad hoc. Je tedy otázkou, nakolik je moºné takový p°ístup charakterizovat jako
p°im¥°ený ochran¥ náboºenské svobody dot£ených jednotlivc·.
l. 9 odst. 2 obsahuje vý£et moºných omezení náboºenské svobody. Druhý odstavec se t¥²í
pom¥rn¥ velkému významu, protoºe Komise a ESLP pouºívají odst. 1 spí²e výjime£n¥.
A£koliv by bylo logické nejprve zhodnotit, jestli do²lo k poru²ení náboºenské svobody,
a teprve potom °e²it otázky nezbytnosti a p°im¥°enosti zásahu (£i ne£innosti státu),
Soud a Komise odst. 1 p°eskakují bu¤ úpln¥, nebo pouze konstatují, ºe do²lo k zásahu
do náboºenské svobody. D·sledkem tohoto p°ístupu je p°edev²ím opomíjení významu a
obsahu náboºenské svobody jako takové, coº se promítá také do hodnocení nezbytnosti
a p°im¥°enosti omezení náboºenské svobody státem.
Omezení musí být p°edev²ím stanovena zákonem (právním p°edpisem). Podle soudu
z toho vyplývá, ºe zákon (právní p°edpis) musí být ob£anovi p°im¥°en¥ p°ístupný a
jeho formulace musí být dostate£n¥ ur£itá, aby podle ní mohl ob£an °ídit své chování.
Ob£an tedy musí být schopen p°edvídat (pokud t°eba s nezbytnou odbornou pomocí)
v p°im¥°eném rozsahu následky svého chování. P°edvídatelnost samoz°ejm¥ neznamená
absolutní jistotu, která je dle zku²enosti nedosaºitelná, nebo´ právo musí být dostate£n¥
15Pat Arrowsmith deﬁnovala sv·j paciﬁsmus jako oddanost, jak v teorii tak v praxi, ﬁlosoﬁi prosa-
zování politických nebo jiných cíl· bez pouºití násilí nebo jeho pohr·ºky, a to za jakýchkoli okolností
v£etn¥ pohr·ºky nebo pouºití násilí.
16Arrowsmith v. Spojené království, stíºnost £. 7050/75 (1978).
17Arrowsmith v. Spojené království, stíºnost £. 7050/75 (1978). Evans, Religious Liberty and Inter-
national Law in Europe, strany 307312. Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, strana 115.
18X. v. Spojené království, stíºnost £. 8160/78 (1981).
19Nap°. X. v. Spojené království, stíºnost £. 8160/78 (1981).
20Nap°. zpráva Sv¥tové rady církví pouºitá v p°ípad¥ Kokkinakis v. ecko, stíºnost £. 14307/88 (1993).
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obecné, aby mohlo reagovat na m¥nící se okolnosti.21
ada st¥ºovatel· se snaºila v rámci svého p°ípadu napadnout i (ne)soulad právního
p°edpisu jako takového s Evropskou úmluvou. lo p°edev²ím o p°edpisy s moºností velmi
extenzivní interpretace a s neur£itými pojmy.22 ádný z takových pokus· v²ak zatím
neusp¥l.23
Pokud je omezení svobody náboºenství stanoveno zákonen, ESLP nebo komise zkou-
mají, zda bylo omezení v daném p°ípad¥ nezbytné v demokratické spole£nosti . Soud se
otázkou nezbytnosti v demokratické spole£nosti zabýval v p°ípadu Handyside v. Spojené
království, ve kterém rozhodl, ºe stát má prostor pro uváºení (margin of appreciation)
v rozhodování o konktrétním omezení za daných okolností. Tento prostor k uváºení je
dán p°edev²ím z toho d·vodu, ºe stát ma p°ímý a soustavný kontakt s d¥ním na svém
území a je v lep²ím postavení pro vykládání pojm· nutnost , omezení a trest neº
mezinárodní soudce. Prostor pro uváºení se vztahuje jak na zákonodárce, tak na soudce
a v²echny, kte°í mají právo interpretovat a aplikovat. Prostor pro uváºení v²ak není
neomzenený  ESLP nad ním vykonává dohled.24
Carolyn Evans uvádí n¥které z faktor· ovliv¬ujících ²í°i prostoru pro uváºení: míra kon-
senzu v dané v¥ci mezi £lenskými státy Rady Evropy, míra zásahu do st¥ºovatelova
soukromého ºivota, d·leºitost daného práva v demokratické a pluralitní spole£nosti, okol-
nosti a skutkový pr·b¥h daného p°ípadu.25
Nutno poznamenat, ºe doktrína volného uváºení státu (margin of appreciation) je
£asto pouºívána soudem v p°ípadech náboºenské svobody v kontroverzních p°ípadech,
kdy se soud bojí rozhodnout ve prosp¥ch st¥ºovatele, aby p°íli² nezpochybnil status
quo (nap°. uspo°ádání vztah· mezi státem a církví).
asto záleºí na kontextu, v jehoº rámci dochází k projevování náboºenské víry nebo p°e-
sv¥d£ení. Jednou z kontroverzních oblastí jsou ve°ejné prostory, p°edev²ím státní instituce
a vzd¥lávací za°ízení. P°ed ESLP se dostaly dva zajímavé p°ípady ºen, kterým bylo za-
kázáno no²ení muslimského ²átku (hidºábu). První z nich, Lucia Dahlab byla u£itelkou
malých d¥tí ve výcarsku, v pr·b¥hu své u£itelské praxe konvertovala k islámu a za£ala
nosit hidºáb. Jeho no²ení jí bylo zakázáno aº po t°ech letech, v pr·b¥hu kterých si na
ni nikdo nest¥ºoval. ESLP rozhodl, ºe zákaz no²ení byl nezbytným v demokratické spo-
le£nosti, aniº by poskytl d·kladné od·vodn¥ní. A d·vody, které uvedl stojí minimáln¥ k
zamy²lení. Zd·raznil, ºe malé d¥ti (£ty°i aº osm let) ºasnou nad °adou v¥cí a jsou snáze
ovlivnitelné neº jiní ºáci. Za takových okolností nem·ºe být pop°eno, ºe no²ení ²átku
m·ºe mít proselytizující ú£inky, nebo´ se jeví jako uloºený ºenám p°edpisem ustanove-
21Odstavec 49, Sunday Times v. Spojené království, stíºnost £. 6538/74 (1979).
22Nap°. Kokkinakis v. ecko, stíºnost £. 14307/88 (1993) nebo Manoussakis a dal²í v. ecko, stíºnost
£. 18748/91 (1996).
23Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, strana 139.
24Odstavec 48 Handyside v. Spojené království, stíºnost £. 5493/72 (1976).
25Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, strana 143.
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ným Koránem a je t¥ºké jej skloubit s principem rovnosti pohlaví. Jeví se proto obtíºné
usmí°it no²ení islámského ²átku se sd¥lením tolerance, respektu k druhým a p°edev²ím s
rovností a nediskriminací, coº jsou principy, které musí v²ichni u£itelé v demokratických
spole£nostech p°edávat svým ºák·m.26 Je otázkou, jak se soud dopracoval k takovým
záv¥r·m bez vypo°ádání se s argumenty pro no²ení hidºábu jako ochrana ºeny, ºen-
ská emancipace nebo skupinová identita muslimek. V od·vodn¥ní ESLP je postaven na
hlavu i b¥ºn¥ pouºívaný argument pluralismu, na kterém je vystav¥na Evropa; naskýtá
se totiº otázka: kde jinde mají evrop²tí ºáci lep²í moºnost seznámit se s p°íslu²níky jiných
náboºenství neº v dialogu s u£iteli vyznávajícími takové náboºenství?
V p°ípad¥ Leyla ahin v. Turecko nebyla studentka medicíny p°ipu²t¥na ke zkou²ce z d·-
vodu no²ení hidºábu, který byl v pr·b¥hu jejího studia zakázán. ESLP shledal, ºe do²lo
k zásahu do náboºenské svobody a existoval zde právní základ pro daný zákaz. Vzhledem
k tomu, ºe legitimita daného zákazu nebyla p°edm¥tem sporu mezi stranami, zam¥°il se
na hodnocení nezbytnosti daného zásahu v demokratické spole£nosti. Dle Soudu je t°eba
vzít v úvahu vliv no²ení náboºenského symbolu, který je moºno povaºovat za náboºen-
skou povinnost, na ty, kte°í jej nenosí. V sázce je ochrana práv a svobod druhých a
zachování ve°ejného po°ádku v zemi, kde je v¥t²ina obyvatel jak zastánci rovnopráv-
ného postavení ºen a sekularismu, tak vyznávajícími islám. Uloºení omezení v daném
p°ípad¥ m·ºe být nahlíºeno jako odpovídající naléhavé spole£enské pot°eb¥, obzvlá²t¥ v
dob¥, kdy se °ada extrémních politických hnutí snaºí turecké spole£nosti vnutit jejich ná-
boºenské symboly a pojetí spole£nosti zaloºené na náboºenských základech. Na základ¥
historické zku²enosti jsou státy oprávn¥ny zasáhnout proti takovým politickým hnutím.
Omezení byla tedy vnímána jako zachovávající pluralismus na univerzit¥ , odpovídající
principu sekularismu a rovnosti muº· a ºen p°ed zákonem.27
Zaráºející je, ºe hlasování ve velkém senátu skon£ilo 16:1. Dissentující byla pouze Franço-
ise Tulkens, která zpochybnila spojování pouhého no²ení ²átku s fundamentalismem a
extremismem snaºícím se zavést povinné no²ení ²átku. Upozornila také na vícezna£nost
hidºábu jako symbolu a poukázala na to, ºe pokud by bylo no²ení ²átku proti principu
rovnosti muº· a ºen, byl by stát povinen zakázat jeho no²ení jak na ve°ejnosti, tak v
soukromí.28
Právo na vzd¥lání upravuje £l. 2 prvního protokolu k Evropské úmluv¥:
Nikomu nesmí být odep°eno právo na vzd¥lání. P°i výkonu jakýchkoli funkcí v
oblasti výchovy a výuky, které stát vykonává, bude respektovat právo rodi£·
zaji²´ovat tuto výchovu a vzd¥lání ve shod¥ s jejich vlastním náboºenským a
ﬁlozoﬁckým p°esv¥d£ením.
Zatímco rodi£e mají právo, aby jejich dít¥ bylo vychováváno ur£itým zp·sobem, nemají
26Dahlab v. Switzerland, stíºnost £. 42393/98 (2001).
27Leyla ahin v. Turecko, stíºnost £. 44774/98 (2005).
28Leyla ahin v. Turecko, stíºnost £. 44774/98 (2005).
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z Evropské úmluvy nárok na to, aby stát ﬁnancoval náboºenskou a morální výchovu
ur£itého druhu. Stát nicmén¥ m·ºe ﬁnan£n¥ podporovat náboºenské (církevní) ²koly
nebo výuku náboºenství ve ve°ejných ²kolách, pokud se k tomu rozhodne.29
V p°ípad¥ Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen a Pedersen v. Dánsko se snaºila dánská vláda prosadit
pojetí, podle kterého se druhá v¥ta £l. 2 nevztahuje na státní ²koly, protoºe nikdo p°eci
rodi£e nenutí, aby dávali své d¥ti do t¥chto ²kol, obzvlá²t¥ pokud stát výrazn¥ ﬁnan£n¥
podporuje soukromé ²kolství. Soud v²ak toto pojetí odmítl. Dále zd·raznil, ºe není moºné
rozli²ovat mezi náboºenskými hodinami a jinou výukou; stát musí respektovat p°esv¥d-
£ení rodi£· v rámci celého studijního programu. Je totiº prakticky nemoºné vyu£ovat
p°edm¥ty, které by nezasahovaly do oblasti náboºenského nebo ﬁlosoﬁckého p°esv¥d£ení;
na druhou stranu mnoho náboºenství pojednává o v¥t²in¥ aspekt· lidského ºivota, a tedy
se dotýká prakticky v²ech vyu£ovaných p°edm¥t·. Stát musí dbát na to, aby informace
byly podávány objektivním, kritickým a pluralitním zp·sobem.30
Co se tý£e nápln¥ p°edm¥t· zabývajících se ﬁlosoﬁí a náboºenstvím, ESLP respektuje ²i-
roký prostor pro uváºení £lenských stát· (margin of appreciation). V rámci jejich uváºení
je také moºnost výrazného rozdílu v £asové dotaci v¥nované jednotlivým náboºenským
systém·m, p°edev²ím ve prosp¥ch majoritního náboºenství v dané zemi. Tento nepo-
m¥r v²ak nesmí být tak výrazný, aby to vedlo k výrazné jednostrannosti, pop°. úplnému
zanedbání n¥kterého minoritního náboºenství v dané zemi nebo regionu.31
Podle £l. 9 Evropské úmluvy zahrnuje svoboda náboºenství také svobodu zm¥nit své
náboºenské vyznání nebo p°esv¥d£ení. Vzhledem k tomu, ºe ke zm¥n¥ dochází £asto
s pomocí druhého £lov¥ka, je tato svoboda spjata s pon¥kud kontroverzním pojmem
proselytismu.
ESLP se zabýval proselytismem ve známem p°ípad¥ Kokkinakis v. ecko. Minos Kokki-
nakis se narodil do orthodoxní rodiny, nicmén¥ stal se Sv¥dkem Jehovovým, pro£eº byl
podroben °ad¥ trestních stíhání. V ecku byl totiº proselytismem rozum¥n p°edev²ím
kaºdý p°ímý nebo nep°ímý pokus zasahovat do víry osoby jiného náboºenského p°esv¥d-
£ení za ú£elem zpochybn¥ní takového náboºenského p°esv¥d£ení . V daném p°ípad¥ se
pan Kokkinakis spole£en¥ se svou ºenou dali do rozhovoru s manºelkou místního ortho-
doxního kantora, který na n¥ pak zavolal policii. ESLP nep°ijal argumentaci st¥ºovatele,
ºe by zákon upravující proselytismus byl neospravedlniteln¥ vágní, nebo´ k n¥mu existo-
vala ustálená judikatura.32
Soud potvrdil, ºe £l. 9 v zásad¥ chrání právo p°esv¥d£ovat druhé o svém náboºenském
p°esv¥d£ení, jinak by totiº bylo ustanovení o zm¥n¥ náboºenství jen mrtvou literou. Je
29Evans, Freedom of Religion under the ECHR, strany 8889.
30Odstavce 5053, Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen a Pedersen v. Dánsko, stíºnost £. 5095/71, 5920/72 a
5926/72 (1976).
31Folgerø a dal²í v. Norsko, stíºnost £. 15472/02 (2007). Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turecko, stíºnost
£. 1448/04 (2007).
32Kokkinakis v. ecko, stíºnost £. 14307/88 (1993).
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v²ak t°eba rozli²ovat mezi dosv¥d£ováním evangelia a nepat°i£ným proselytismem.33 Moº-
nost stanovení této hranice je v²ak, stejn¥ jako legitimita takového d¥lení, kontroverzní
otázkou.
Svoboda náboºenství se £asto dostává do konﬂiktu se svobodou projevu a judikatura
ESLP tuto skute£nost reﬂektuje. Jedním z prvních p°ípad·, který se dostal ke Komisi byl
p°ípad ²védských scientolog·, kte°í si st¥ºovali na infamující soud profesora teologie, který
pronesl v pr·b¥hu p°edná²ky a následn¥ byl oti²t¥n v místních novinách. Komise zaujala
stanovisko, ºe ze svobody náboºenství nevyplývá zákaz kritiky náboºenství. Náboºenství
m·ºe být kritizováno, dokud to neohrozí svobodu náboºenství jako takovou, pop°. dokud
ne£innost orgán· ve°ejné správy nebude moci vést k odpov¥nosti státu.34
Pozice Komise byla dále rozpracována Soudem v p°ípadu Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Ra-
kousko. Skutkový d¥j spo£íval v tom, ºe místní ú°ady zakázaly promítat ﬁlm vyobrazující
negativn¥ (posm¥²n¥) klí£ové postavy k°es´anství (na popud ímskokatolické církve) a
zabavily kopie tohoto ﬁlmu. ESLP zd·raznil, ºe v¥°ící musí tolerovat a p°ijímat popírání
vlastní víry jinými lidmi stejn¥ jako propagaci nauk nep°átelských jejich ví°e. Nicmén¥
zp·sob, jakým jsou náboºenské p°esv¥d£ení a u£ení napadány, m·ºe dosáhnout takové
intenzity, ºe si vynutí zásah státu k zaji²t¥ní pokojného výkonu práv chrán¥ných £l.
9. Respekt k náboºenskému cít¥ní v¥°ícících m·ºe být legitimn¥ povaºován za naru²ený
v p°ípad¥ provokujícího vyobrazení objekt· náboºenského uctívání; taková vyobrazení
mohou být povaºována za zlovolné naru²ení ducha tolerance, který musí být rysem de-
mokratické spole£nosti. Tedy, kdokoliv vyuºívající svobody projevu se musí vyst°íhat
projev· bezd·vodn¥ uráºejících ostatní (tedy poru²ujících jejich práva), a tak nezp·so-
bilých k p°isp¥ní ve°ejné debat¥ podporující lidský pokrok .35
Soud zd·raznil, ºe v není moºné vystopovat nap°í£ Evropou jednotný model významu
náboºenství ve spole£nosti. Proto není také moºné deﬁnovat jednotn¥, které zásahy svo-
body projevu do náboºenského cít¥ní jsou tolerovatelné. Je tedy nutné ponechat stát·m
jistou míru uváºení (margin of appreciation).36
P°ístup vytvo°ený v Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Rakousko byl zopakován i v p°ípadech,
kdy ²lo o p°edb¥ºný zákaz distribuce krátkého ﬁlmu vyobrazujícího extáze sv. Terezy37
nebo v p°ípadu publikace knihy hanící proroka Mohameda.38 Problémem tohoto p°ístupu
je p°íli² ²iroký prostor pro uváºení místních (národních) orgán· rozhodujících o tom,
co je v dané lokalit¥ p°íli² napadající náboºenské cít¥ní obyvatel. Ve v¥t²in¥ p°ípad·
tento p°ístup zvýhod¬uje majoritní náboºenství, pop°. náboºenské skupiny, které jsou
33Kokkinakis v. ecko, stíºnost £. 14307/88 (1993).
34Scientologická církev a jejích 128 £len· v. védsko, stíºnost £. 8282/78 (1980).
35Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Rakousko, 13470/87 (1994).
36Müller a dal²í v. výcarsko, stíºnost £. 10737/84 (1988). Odstavec 50, Otto-Preminger-Institut v.
Rakousko, 13470/87 (1994).
37Windgrove v. Spojené království, stíºnost 14719/90 (1996).
38.A. v. Turecko, stíºnost £. 42571/98 (2005).
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ochotny a schopny ost°e zareagovat na kritiku namí°enou v·£i nim. Skupiny mírn¥j²ího
a tolerantn¥j²ího ducha na sebe v¥t²inou neupozorní dostate£n¥ intenzivním zp·sobem,
proto je jejich ochrana v¥t²inou nedostate£ná.
Otázkou také z·stává, zda by bylo moºné tento p°ístup aplikovat i na p°ípady karikatur
proroka Mohameda publikovaných nejprve v Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten a následn¥
v dal²ích médiích. Tento p°ípad se zatím nedostal k p°ezkoumání meritu v¥ci ESLP.39
Svoboda náboºenství a Organizace spojených národ·
Svobody náboºenství se dotýká °ada úmluv, deklarací a jiných více £i mén¥ závazných
dokument· Organizace spojených národ·. Historickým mezníkem je £l. 18 V²eobecné
deklarace lidských práv, který se stal inspriací pro °adu dokument· upravujících svobodu
náboºenství (nap°. pro Evropskou úmluvu). Zní následovn¥:
Kaºdý má právo na svobodu my²lení, sv¥domí a náboºenství; toto právo
zahrnuje v sob¥ i volnost zm¥nit své náboºenství nebo víru, jakoº i svobodu
projevovat své náboºenství nebo víru sám nebo spole£n¥ s jinými, a´ ve°ejn¥
nebo bohosluºbou a zachováním ob°ad·.
Mezinárodní pakt o ob£anských a politických právech m¥l objasnit a zp°esnit dikci £l.
18 V²eobecné deklarace, ale p°íli² se mu to nepovedlo. Na vin¥ jsou p°edev²ím rozpory
mezi východním a západním blokem a dále spory s islámskými zem¥mi, jestli je moºné
zahrnout svobodu zm¥nit náboºenství. l. 18 Paktu byl nakonec p°ijat v následujícím
zn¥ní:
(1) Kaºdý má právo na svobodu my²lení, sv¥domí a náboºenství. Toto právo
zahrnuje v sob¥ svobodu vyznávat nebo p°ijmout náboºenství nebo víru podle
vlastní volby a svobodu projevovat své náboºenství nebo víru sám nebo spo-
le£n¥ s jinými, a´ ve°ejn¥ nebo soukrom¥, provád¥ním náboºenských úkon·,
bohosluºbou, zachováním ob°ad· a vyu£ováním.
(2) Nikdo nesmí být podroben donucování, které by naru²ovalo jeho svobodu
vyznávat nebo p°ijmout náboºenství nebo víru podle své vlastní volby.
(3) Svoboda projevovat náboºenství nebo víru m·ºe být podrobena pouze ta-
kovým omezením, jaká p°edpisuje zákon a která jsou nutná k ochran¥ ve°ejné
bezpe£nosti, po°ádku, zdraví nebo morálky nebo základních práv a svobod
jiných.
(4) Státy, smluvní strany Paktu, se zavazují respektovat svobodu rodi£·, a
tam, kde je to vhodné, poru£ník·, zajistit náboºenskou a morální výchovu
svých d¥tí podle vlastního p°esv¥d£ení rodi£· nebo poru£ník·.
39P°ípad Ben El Mahi a dal²í v. Dánsko, stíºnost £. 5853/06 (2006) nebyl shledán p°ípustným z
d·vodu nedostate£né vazby marockých ob£an· na £lenský stát, konkrétn¥ Dánsko.
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Valné shromáºd¥ní OSN si vyºádalo v reakci na antisemitské útoky v roce 1962 vytvo°ení
deklarací a úmluv na odtran¥ní v²ech forem rasové diskriminace a náboºenské netole-
rance. V p°ípad¥ nástroj· potírajících rasovou diskriminaci ²el proces pom¥rn¥ rychle
(deklarace byla hotova v roce 1963 a úmluva v roce 1965), zatímco p°ijetí Deklarace o
odstran¥ní v²ech forem nesná²enlivosti a diskriminace zaloºených na náboºenství £i ví°e
se poda°ilo aº v roce 1981 a o úmluv¥ se jiº prakticky ani neuvaºuje. Od roku 1983 je jme-
nován zvlá²tní zpravodaj, který monitoroval nejd°íve projevy náboºenské nesná²enlivosti
a od roku 2000 svobodu víry a náboºenství jako takovou.
Svoboda náboºenství a Evropská unie
Evropská integrace se po druhé sv¥tové válce ubírala p°edev²ím ekonomickou a politickou
cestou. Ochrana lidských práv a mezi nimi svobody náboºenství nebyla prioritou, a£koliv
se k ní Evropský soudní dv·r postupem £astu dopracoval.
Jakmile za£aly být cíle ekonomické a politické integrace ve v¥t²í mí°e napl¬ovány, sílily
hlasy po prohloubení integrace i do jiných oblastí, jako je nap°. kultura a vzd¥lávání. V
tomto duchu se rozjela °ada projekt· a program·; za zmínku stojí nap°. vyhlá²ení roku
2008 rokem mezikulturního dialogu (a£koliv je zde tendence vyhýbat se náboºenským
otázkám na oﬁciální rovin¥, v praxi se mezikulturní dialog zakládá z nemalé £ásti na
dialogu mezináboºenském).
Do evropského práva se ochrana náboºenské svobody dostala zvlá²tní oklikou p°es an-
tidiskrimina£ní legislativu. Amsterdamská smlouva totiº p°inesla £l. 13 SES oprav¬ující
Radu na návrh Komise a po konzultaci s Evropským parlamentem jednomysln¥ p°ijmout
vhodná opat°ení k boji proti diskriminaci na základ¥ pohlaví, rasového nebo etnického
p·vodu, náboºenského vyznání nebo sv¥tového názoru, zdravotního postiºení, v¥ku nebo
sexuální orientace. Navzdory o£ekáváním byl £l. 13 SES napln¥n po krátkem £ase dv¥mi
sm¥rnicemi: sm¥rnicí Rady 2000/78/ES ze dne 27. listopadu 2000, kterou se stanoví
obecný rámec pro rovné zacházení v zam¥stnání a povolání a sm¥rnicí Rady 2000/43/ES
ze dne 29. £ervna 2000, kterou se zavádí zásada rovného zacházení s osobami bez ohledu
na jejich rasu nebo etnický p·vod.
Je otázkou, nakolik se sm¥rnice 2000/43/ES vztahuje na diskriminaci z d·vodu náboºen-
ství. Vztahuje se totiº jen na p°ípady, kdy je pro ur£itou etnickou skupinu charakteristické
ur£ité náboºenství, coº je p°íklad t°eba ºid·. Sm¥rnice 2000/78/ES stanoví obecný rá-
mec pro boj s diskriminací na základ¥ náboºenského vyznání £i víry jako jeden z d·vod·
diskriminace  je tedy p°ímo namí°ena na ochranu náboºenské svobody. Mohlo by se
tedy zdát vhodn¥j²í pouºívat pro diskriminaci na základ¥ náboºenství rámcovou sm¥rnici
2000/78/ES, nicmén¥ jejím problémem je výrazn¥ uº²í p·sobnost. Zatímco se sm¥rnice
2000/43/ES vztahuje na v²echny níºe uvedené oblasti, sm¥rnice 2000/78/ES se vztahuje
pouze na body a)d):
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a) podmínky p°ístupu k zam¥stnání, samostatn¥ výd¥le£né £innosti nebo do pracovního
pom¥ru v£etn¥ kritérií výb¥ru a podmínek náboru, bez ohledu na obor £innosti a na
úrove¬ profesní hierarchie v£etn¥ pracovního postupu;
b) p°ístup ke v²em typ·m a úrovním odborného poradenství, odborného vzd¥lávání, zdo-
konaleného odborného vzd¥lávání a rekvaliﬁkace v£etn¥ získávání praktických zku²e-
ností;
c) podmínky zam¥stnání a pracovní podmínky v£etn¥ podmínek propou²t¥ní a odm¥¬o-
vání;
d) £lenství a ú£ast v organizaci pracovník· nebo zam¥stnavatel· nebo v jakékoli organi-
zaci, jejíº £lenové vykonávají ur£ité zam¥stnání v£etn¥ výhod poskytovaných t¥mito
organizacemi;
e) sociální ochranu v£etn¥ sociálního zabezpe£ení a zdravotní pé£e;
f) sociální výhody;
g) vzd¥lání;
h) p°ístup ke zboºí a sluºbám, které jsou k dispozici ve°ejnosti v£etn¥ ubytování, a jejich
dodávky.
Naskýtá se tedy otázka diskriminace na základ¥ antidiskrimina£ních sm¥rnic , nebo´ £l.
13 SES jist¥ nezamý²lel, aby byla rozdílná ochrana poskytována t°eba ºid·m a adventis-
t·m v jejich poºadavku na zvlá²tní stravu ve ²kolních jídelnách.
Ob¥ sm¥rnice stanovují zásadu rovného zacházení , kterou se rozumí zákaz p°ímé nebo
nep°ímé diskriminace z d·vod·, na které se sm¥rnice zam¥°ují, pro na²e ú£ely tedy z
d·vodu etnického p·vodu, náboºenského vyznání nebo víry. Sm¥rnice 2000/78/ES pak
stanoví také výjimku pro církevní organizace, resp. organizace zaloºené na náboºenském
étosu (jde nap°. o poºadavek °ímskokatolické víry pro °ímskokatolického kn¥ze).
Svoboda my²lení, sv¥domí a náboºenství je spolu s právem na vzd¥lání a respektem ke
kulturní, náboºenské a jazykové rozmanitosti obsaºena v Chart¥ základních práv EU vy-
hlá²ené 7. prosince 2000. Charta pak byla v mírn¥ upraveném zm¥ní znovu vyhlá²ena 12.
prosince 2007 ve trasburku p°ed podpisem Lisabonské smlouvy. Pokud dojde k úsp¥²né
ratiﬁkaci Lisabonské smlouvy, dostane se Charta na úrove¬ primárního práva. Ú£inná
Lisabonská smlouva by také znamenala p°ístup Evropské unie k EÚLP a nastoupení
otev°eného, transparentního a pravidelného dialogu evropských institucí s náboºenskými
organizacemi.40
40l. 6 a 17 Smlouvy o fungování Evropské unie.
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Záv¥r
Svoboda my²lení, sv¥domí a náboºenství je jedním ze základ· demokratické spole£nosti.
Na tété formulaci Evropského soudu pro lidská práva se shodne jak v¥t²ina myslitel·, tak
institucí. Názory se v²ak za£ínají velmi r·znit, jakmile se dojde k obsahu této svobody,
pop°. nutnosti vyvaºovat náboºenskou svobodu s právy a svobodami jinými.
Svoboda náboºenství sdílí s náboºenstvím velmi obtíºnou deﬁnovatelnost, coº se jeví
jako obzvlá²t¥ problematické pro právo. V¥t²ina p°ístup· promítajících se do (soudní)
praxe se snaºí manévrovat mezi extrémem p°esné a p°edvídatelné deﬁnice  a p°ístu-
pem povaºujícím za náboºenství (víru) hodnou ochrany cokoliv, co si konkrétní subjekt
zamane. Díky tomuto manévrování je v²ak spí²e výjimkou najít koherentní p°ístup k
dané problematice i v rámci jedné instituce, jako je t°eba Evropský soud pro lidská práva.
Analýza °ady p°ípad· a spletitých cest vyjednávání mezinárodních dokument· ukazuje,
ºe oblastí, ze které pramení velká °ada pnutí a st°et· je rozli²ování £i nerozli²ování mezi
forum internum a forum externum. Je proto t¥ºké si p°edstavit prohlubování svobody
náboºenství a její ochrany bez nalezení p°ístupu, který by se dokázal s tímto rozli²ováním
vypo°ádat zp·sobem, jeº by ctil lidskou d·stojnost a náboºenské sm¥°ování kaºdého
individua.
